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Abstract
This is a phenomenographic study of learners’ perceptions of randomness. Underpinning 
the study is a sense of randomness as a dynamic process, in which events emerge 
unpredictably from a generating process, into the determined past, through the curtain 
separating past from future. Previous research into perceptions of randomness has often 
used tasks in which people are asked to recognise randomness in a given sequence of 
outcomes. Other research has asked people to make up sequences of random outcomes. 
Such tasks do not carry the sense of randomness as dynamic.
Interview tasks in this study were designed to present the dynamic sense of randomness 
using outcomes from random generators such as dice, coins and sampling bags in situ. 
Interviewees were invited to talk about their experiences of making sense of the emerging 
sequence of outcomes.
The analysis of the interview transcripts addressed two related questions:
• What do learners believe about randomness?
• To what situations and circumstances do learners consider randomness to be an 
appropriate model?
The first question encompasses learners’ expectations of a random generator and the 
methods, strategies and heuristics by which learners discern what is random from what is 
not. Drawing on local and global meanings of randomness identified by Pratt (1998), the 
thesis argues that learners’ perspectives on randomness shift rapidly and frequently 
between the local and global as the learners seek to interpret the observed outcomes. 
Learners’ interpretations of and beliefs about randomness are found to have significant 
impact upon the kinds of situations to which learners are able and willing to apply the 
model of randomness.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
What is randomness? When you think of “randomness”, what else comes to mind? How 
would you react if a process, which you thought should be random, resulted in a run of the 
same outcome? How do you reason about whether a process is random or not?
These are some of the questions that are investigated in my study of how teenage learners 
think about randomness, what they think it is, and when they think it is applicable. In this 
chapter, I outline what I am interested in, why I have become interested in it, why it 
matters and to whom. In section 1.1,1 outline the place of randomness as a topic within 
the school mathematics curriculum in England, and its role in the wider national agenda of 
creating a numerate and statistically literate democracy. My own personal perspective on 
the importance and difficulty of understanding the concept of randomness has played a 
significant role in the shaping of this study as well as providing a personal motivation to 
carry out this research.
1.1 My aim for my project
Across the world in the last thirty years, probability education has played an increasingly 
important part in the basic education of school children. The school mathematics 
curriculum in England contains much more content relating to statistics and probability 
than was the case fifty years ago. Since 1989, when the National Curriculum was 
introduced, the Handling Data strand has become compulsory for all children aged 5 to 16. 
Key statistical ideas within Handling Data in the latest version include measures of central 
tendency (location), measures of variation (spread) and the concept of the distribution of a 
set of values. Pupils are also required to develop understanding of measures of uncertainty 
(probability) and to use probability to make and justify decisions under uncertainty.
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Behind these ideas lie the critically important concepts of ‘randomness’, ‘variability’ and 
‘distribution’. Within this National Curriculum, there are few mentions of the word 
‘random’, but a central one is “Pupils should be taught to... see that random processes are 
unpredictable” (DfEE, 1999, pp 40, 54 and 69). This injunction appears in the 
programmes of study for each of Key Stages 3 and 4, and is therefore required to be part of 
pupils’ learning experiences from the ages of 11 to 16. Related to this,
Pupils should be taught to:
compare experimental data and theoretical probabilities
understand that if they repeat an experiment, they may - and usually will - get different outcomes, and 
that increasing sample size generally leads to better estimates of probability and population 
parameters.
(DfEE, 1999, p71)
Randomness underpins the notion of random sampling and random variable. The idea is 
also fundamental to a sound understanding of probability in many applications.
Knowing when it is appropriate to question whether a process is ‘random’ is one of the few 
instances where the term ‘random’ is mentioned in the National Curriculum. It is 
important in knowing when and how to apply probabilistic reasoning to solve problems. 
However, there is, within the school curriculum in the UK and in many other English- 
speaking countries, reliance upon a few simple contexts within which to study randomness. 
Most common amongst these contexts are the traditional canonical settings for probability: 
dice, coins, urns, playing cards and spinners. Most of these contexts are used to represent 
situations that can be considered to have a finite set of equally likely outcomes. This can 
result in the misapprehension that randomness requires equally likely outcomes.
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Reliance on a narrow range of contexts for randomness may also lead to limited awareness 
among pupils of the variety of contexts to which randomness is applicable as a model. 
Critical reading of the news media, and other activities that are part of being a functioning 
member of a modem western democracy, require citizens to have some understanding and 
informed experience of random variation. Within the International Statistical Institute 
(ISI) there has been recently increased attention given to developing statistical literacy 
among the population (Gal, 2003). A similar concern was part of the motivation for the 
launch in 2004 of Significance, a new popular journal produced in the UK by the Royal 
Statistical Society (RSS).
Understanding the importance of statistical variation is particularly important to citizens 
when they need to evaluate or interpret statistical reports in the news media. For example, 
newspapers often report on geographical clusters of occurrence of some disease, 
suggesting that some local factor may be contributing to the cause. It is important to 
recognise that some geographical clusters will occur by chance when cases of a disease are 
randomly scattered in the population. The important judgement to make is whether such a 
cluster is abnormally large. For example, there have been stories in the media for several 
years suggesting health risks arising from living near to high-voltage electricity pylons. A 
recent item on the BBC news reported on a study that “found children who had lived 
within 200m of high voltage lines at birth had a 70% higher risk of leukaemia than those 
600m or more away” (BBC News website, 3 June 2005). The item went on to report a 
debate between experts from different organisations, some of whom called for immediate 
action to prevent houses and schools from being built close to such pylons, and others 
suggesting that here was no cause for concern and that other factors were likely to be the 
significant triggers for childhood leukaemia. Experience of experimenting with random 
processes can help learners to develop awareness of variation and of clustering.
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In this study I aim to find out more about how learners think about randomness and how 
they discern when a situation can be thought of as random. As a consequence, I hope that 
it will be possible to discern some of the obstacles to appreciating the mathematical use of 
the term ‘random’.
This study is concerned with the conceptions of randomness held by learners in secondary 
schools. As such, the primary context in which the concept occurs for the subjects in this 
study is in relation to the study of probability.
My motivation to undertake this study arises in part from my own experience of learning 
probability and statistics in secondary school. From an early age, I had formed a sense of 
randomness as a description for outcomes that were unpredictable and ever-changing. The 
idea of randomness referred to the anticipation and uncertainty of what the outcome would 
be, up to the instant in which the outcome occurred and was observed. Once I had 
observed the outcome, it was fixed and immutable; that was the outcome and nothing 
could change it now. Once the outcome had emerged from the curtain separating the 
future from the past, it seemed to me that it was, in an important sense, no longer random. 
Although it is now hard for me to be clear about how I arrived at this sense, I suspect it 
was derived from my experiences of playing games involving dice and playing cards.
During the beginning of my formal study of statistics, at A level, I felt a deep sense of 
unease about the way in which randomness was introduced into the discussion. I felt that 
my preconceptions about randomness were different from what I understood from the 
presentation of randomness in my lessons. In particular, I was introduced to many 
different statistical tables, all presented in a single volume: tables of various distributions 
(binomial, Poisson, normal, student’s t) and a set of random number tables. I remember 
clearly feeling deeply bothered by the random number tables: they were not random in any 
sense that I understood.
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Later, I was introduced to the ideas of hypothesis testing, and estimation using confidence 
intervals. I remember experiencing a sense of enlightenment when I recognised that a 
confidence interval was a particular outcome from a random process, and that the level of 
confidence expressed a probability related to this. Today I see computer simulation as an 
important tool in helping students to understand the idea of a confidence interval, but such 
tools were not available then. Looking back on these and other early experiences of 
learning probability and statistics, I can see that my early understanding of randomness 
played an important part in the way in which I made sense of these ideas. In particular, the 
knitting together of my understanding of randomness and probability distribution was very 
important.
I came to this study of randomness as a teacher of mathematics in secondary schools.
When I was teaching probability and statistics, I became aware of a variety of difficulties 
experienced by learners, not all of them like mine. Some pupils appeared to lack 
experience of experimenting with random generators; I had a sense that these found the 
idea of a probability distribution more difficult. Later, when I carried out research, using a 
computer-based probability simulation to enable pupils to work on some counter-intuitive 
probability problems involving conditional probabilities, I observed that some pupils 
appeared to have difficulty understanding how the computer could possibly produce 
random outcomes (Wilder, 1993). Through these experiences I came to question precisely 
how my pupils thought about randomness.
Previous research into learners’ conceptions of randomness has pointed to the fact that 
learners have significant difficulties, but the research does not seem to me to have listened 
closely to what learners believe about random phenomena, and how they think about and 
interpret situations in which the outcomes are inherently unpredictable. One exception to 
this was the work of Pratt (1998), in which learners worked with computer-based 
microworlds, using simulations of random generators to construct their own meanings for
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what they observed. Pratt’s study is important, but it moved learners directly into using 
and interpreting computer simulations of randomness without first considering what those 
learners believe about random phenomena and simple random generators apart from the 
computer. In this study I hope to look more closely at what learners believe about simple 
random generators such as dice and urns, and whether they perceive randomness in their 
daily experience. Although computer-based simulations of randomness are increasingly 
widespread, I suspected that many learners might not recognise them as examples of what 
is “random”.
This study is not a teaching experiment and no deliberate teaching intervention is 
considered, neither is there any attempt to study learning or to see a change in thinking.
I see my research as lying within the area of mathematics education. I have interviewed 
learners aged 13 to 17 to explore their conceptions of randomness. During the interviews,
I was interested in how children recognised randomness, and what they thought they were 
recognising. I gave the learners simple tasks using dice, coins and sampling bags, and 
asked them to talk about their experiences of thinking about and interacting with these 
tasks.
The learners were inevitably discussing difficult ideas, and often without having the 
benefit of sophisticated language to describe their ideas. The word ‘random’ was 
problematic, not only because it was new to some learners, but also because it has acquired 
a currency in modem ‘youth’ culture that is different in subtle ways from the technical 
usage that statisticians want. Thinking about these issues raised questions as to whether 
even statisticians really know what they mean by ‘random’!
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1.2 The structure of the study
This study is organised in four parts.
Chapters 1 to 5 form Part 1, which provides the background to the study. Chapter 2 
reviews relevant literature relating to epistemology of randomness, while Chapter 3 moves 
on to review literature about psychology and the pedagogy of randomness. Chapter 4 is a 
brief outline of the aims of the study. The methodology and the methods used in the study 
are discussed in Chapter 5.
Part 2, Chapters 6 to 9, covers stage 1 of the study. Chapter 6 is an account of various 
initial investigations, which provided valuable data and informed the development of an 
analysis of the stage 1 interviews. Chapter 7 contains an account of the conduct of the 
stage 1 interviews, including a description of the interview tasks, an account of the 
selection of interviewees and a short description of each interviewee, as well as a brief 
account of the process of analysis. An account of the main themes that emerged is given in 
Chapter 8, illustrated by short extracts from the interview transcripts, while Chapter 9 
provides a deeper account of the idea of shifting perspectives on randomness as it emerged 
from the stage 1 interviews.
Part 3, Chapters 10 to 13, covers the second and final stage of the study. Chapter 10 
contains an account of the development of a new interview task, designed to approach the 
idea of shifting perspectives from a different direction. Chapter 11 describes the conduct 
of the stage 2 interviews in a similar way to the description of stage 1 interviews in 
Chapter 7. The shifting perspectives that emerged in stage 2 interviews were similar to 
those in stage 1, but there was also evidence of a second kind of shift; these shifts are 
described in Chapter 12. In Chapter 13, evidence from stage 2 interviews is related to the 
material from Chapter 8 to provide a developed account of the other themes that emerged 
across the two stages.
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Part 4 concludes the study with Chapter 14: a summary of the findings and a discussion of 
implications for further research and for teaching.
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Chapter 2: What is Randomness?
In this chapter, I review some of the literature relating to the concept of randomness. I 
include consideration of some philosophical issues behind what is meant by randomness, 
and of some differences in meaning that occur in the various contexts in which the concept 
is used.
Based on my experience, it is natural to begin my review of the literature by looking first at 
approaches to probability. I outline different approaches to probability and the 
implications of these for the concept of randomness, before exploring the meaning of 
‘randomness’ and its applications in modem thought. This leads to a discussion of random 
phenomena and of the relationship between different ideas of randomness and approaches 
to probability.
Chapter 3 contains a review of the research literature relating to ways in which naive users 
think of randomness.
2.1 Probability
Hawkins and Kapadia (1984), in a review of research into understanding of probability, 
distinguished four approaches to probability. I propose to discuss each of these in turn and 
to consider what each has to say about randomness. I believe that the first three of these are 
different in kind from the fourth.
1. “A priorF probability (or theoretical probability) is calculated using an assumption of equal 
likelihood.
2. Frequentist probability (or empirical probability) is calculated from the observed relative 
frequencies in repeated trials.
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3. Subjective and intuitive probabilities are an expression of a degree of personal belief. Such 
probabilities may be “embryonic precursors” to formal probability (see 4).
4. Formal probability (sometimes objective or normative probability) is that precisely calculated 
using the mathematical laws of probability. The calculation may be based on an “a priori” or 
a “frequentisf ’ approach.
(Hawkins and Kapadia 1984, p 349)
2.1.1 “a priorP probability
The very early theoretical work on probability, for example by Cardano in the 16th Century 
(Liber de Ludo Aleae, c l625), supposes a set of equiprobable outcomes (David, 1962). 
Similar approaches were taken later by De Moivre (Doctrine o f Chances, 1756) and 
Laplace (Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 1814), amongst others. This classical 
a priori interpretation of probability appears to have been the first to have been subject to 
calculations using the probability calculus. In that sense it may be thought of as the 
simplest, and it may be a natural point of entry for young children beginning to learn about 
probability. The approach is also relatively easy to implement within computer simulation 
software, and much of the probability simulation software for children that has been 
written about requires the application of simple ideas based on this approach to build 
simulations, for example, ProbSim (Konold and Miller 1992) and ChanceMaker (Pratt, 
1998). However, there are many probabilistic situations in which it appears inappropriate 
or impossible to assume a set of equally likely outcomes. Some examples of such 
situations are discussed later in this chapter.
The equally likely outcomes at the heart of the a priori approach are sometimes identified
with the notion of randomness. In this case, the idea of randomness is at the heart of the
»
process by which the outcomes are generated. The ‘randomness’ of the sequence of
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successive observed outcomes is a necessary consequence of the idea that the generating 
process consists of a set of equally likely outcomes.
2.1.2 Frequentist probability
The idea of long run relative frequency underlies the frequentist approach to probability. 
This idea was developed by von Mises (1939). In a formal definition of this approach, the 
probability of an attribute A relative to a collective w is the limiting relative frequency of A 
in w (Hajek, 2001). This approach has some intuitive appeal in experimental cases where 
the experiment can be replicated as many times as required. For example, when a drawing 
pin is tossed onto a level surface it will either land on its back (point upwards) or on its 
side. These two outcomes cannot be assumed to be equally likely, and the best way to 
determine the probability of each outcome is to repeat the experiment a large number of 
times and to observe the long-run relative frequency. In such a case, the sequence of 
observed outcomes might be considered random, but in this case the focus of attention is 
upon the fact that the sequence is disordered.
There are however limitations to the application of this approach. One difficulty is that 
there is no simple way of seeing how any finite sequence of observed outcomes can be an 
approximation to a collective, since a collective is infinite. More fundamentally, there 
needs to exist a collective w in which the relative frequency of the attribute may be 
examined. In many real situations to which probabilities might be applied, it is not clear 
what this collective should be, or even whether such a collective exists. For example, in 
considering the question “what is the probability that it will be raining at 9am tomorrow?” 
such a collective consists of only a single event and the frequentist approach is 
inapplicable. Of course, many people might blur the definition of the appropriate 
collective in cases like this, and argue from a collection of somewhat similar events such as 
on how many days was it raining at 9am in the last month, or on how many days was it
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raining at 9am on days in this week of the year for the last five years. More likely 
however, is that people abandon the frequentist approach and construct a probability based 
upon the weather now and a subjective judgement of how it is likely to change in the next 
few hours, influenced inevitably by factors that bias the judgement towards optimism or 
pessimism.
These problems concerned Karl Popper and led him to develop the ‘propensity’ 
interpretation of probability (Popper, 1957, in Miller, 1986). In Popper’s approach, 
probability is a property of a situation describing a propensity for a particular physical 
situation to give rise to a particular outcome. There are several different variants of the 
propensity approach but these all draw on Popper and the differences appear to be small 
(for example, Mellor, 1971). The main intention of such propensity approaches seems to 
be to resolve the problem of single-case probabilities within a modified frequentist 
approach. A fundamental difficulty with such approaches is that of explaining and 
justifying what is a propensity and how it can be identified, particularly in those difficult 
situations of single-case probabilities.
An issue in this study might be to consider whether the event that it will rain at 9am 
tomorrow can be considered to be a random event. Just as it is difficult to define what is 
meant by the probability of such an event, so it is difficult to define in what sense such an 
event can be considered to be random. Popper’s propensity approach has little to say about 
this.
2.1.3 Subjective degrees of belief
The view of probabilities as subjective degrees of belief is quite different from previous 
interpretations and does not necessarily require the concept of randomness. In the most 
common treatment, a degree of belief is described in terms of betting behaviour: a person’s 
degree of belief m A i s p  if and only if the person is prepared to pay up to p  units for a bet
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that pays 1 if A, 0 if not A (based on Hajek 2001, p. 369). The problem here is that there is 
no clear objective justification to relate such a probability to ‘reality’. However, since the 
probabilities can be treated within the probability calculus, it is possible to update them in 
the light of evidence by conditioning, using application of Bayes’ theorem. This gives rise 
to the Bayesian approach to probabilities. According to Bayesian epistemology, a rational 
person’s subjective degrees of belief that an events will occur, P (A), should be updated on 
acquiring evidence E to the conditional probability of A given E, V(A\E). The conditional 
probability is obtained using Bayes’ theorem and requires that the person should also be 
able to quantify their subjective degrees of belief that E  will occur and that both A and E 
will occur. The Bayesian approach assumes that any rational person’s degrees of belief 
will satisfy the axioms of probability, but there is some evidence that people often fail to 
reason according to probabilistic norms (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1981).
2.1.4 Formal Probability
The fourth approach to probability identified by Hawkins and Kapadia deals with a 
different set of issues and is not clearly identifiable as an approach in the same sense as the 
previous three. It refers to a mathematical model (the probability calculus), whereas the 
previous three have been more about how a model can be related to contexts in the material 
world.
The idea of “Formal” probability here seems to refer to the agreed “normative” probability 
calculus, based on the commonly accepted axioms for probability. It is not necessary to 
restrict this to objective (a priori or frequentist) probabilities as the axioms and the rules 
that follow from them can be applied equally well to subjective degrees of belief. Indeed, 
this is exactly what is done in standard Bayesian statistics, where subjective probabilities 
may be updated in the light of experience (which may be empirical observation) using 
Bayes Theorem.
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2.1.5 Summary
To a greater or lesser extent, behind each of these approaches to probability lies some 
conception of randomness or uncertainty, or chance. In the classical a priori approach, 
randomness can be identified with the equally likely outcomes that lie at the heart of the 
process. This is in contrast to the frequentist approach, in which the observer’s experience 
of randomness is really focused on the disorder within the emerging sequence of observed 
outcomes. When the situation consists of a single case of an unpredictable outcome, 
randomness may be considered to be unpredictability. Unpredictability might also be 
considered a simile for randomness in cases for which subjective probability judgements 
are used.
In order to take this discussion further, it is necessary to turn now to explore how the term 
‘random’ is understood.
2.2 Dictionary definitions of Random
For lay people the term ‘random’ may be rather less clearly defined than it is for 
statisticians. One simple device by which the meaning of the term for different people can 
be investigated is to examine the definitions of the word in a current dictionary. In the 
following dictionary definitions, taken from two widely-used single volume dictionaries, 
each set of definitions begins with a general definition, which attempts to encompass the 
meaning of the term in lay use. This is followed in each case by some more specialist uses 
in statistics and other fields.
Oxford dictionary1
Random: made or done without method or conscious choice
1 These are from the Concise Oxford Dictionary. Of course there are many more obscure definitions and 
meanings in the full OED. I am only concerned here with illustrating the meanings that a lay person might 
meet.
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Random: with equal chances for each item
Random (of masonry) with stones of irregular size and shape
Collins dictionary
Random: lacking any definite plan or prearranged order; haphazard
Random: (statistics: of a variable) having several possible experimental values any one of which is 
uncertain and depends on chance
Random: (statistics: of a sampling process) carried out so that each member of the population has an 
equal probability of being selected
Random: noun, a printing term for lines of type under a headline (also called a bank)
There is some similarity between the first meanings identified in each of these definitions, 
but there are also significant differences, which may indicate differing ways of thinking of 
randomness in particular contexts. The first definition seems to suggest a focus on the 
process of selection. The second seems to describe more the outcomes of the selection 
process. This distinction between process and outcomes turns out to be significant.
The idea that ‘randomness’ may be thought of in two distinct ways is proposed in the 
following sentence taken from a paper by Falk and Konold.
One major source of confusion is the fact that randomness involves two distinct ideas: process and 
pattern.
(Zabell, 1992, in Falk and Konold, 1997, p 306)
This distinction is potentially very significant for understanding the different ways in 
which people think about randomness. The idea of randomness as process may indicate 
the unpredictability of any individual event in the process. This may be seen to be 
expressed in the two dictionary definitions discussed above in the phrases “without 
conscious choice” and “lacking any definite plan”. However, the randomness of a process
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may usually only be judged by consideration of the outcomes as lacking pattern by which 
prediction might be aided. Falk and Konold (1997), in discussing this distinction, cite 
Spencer-Brown (1957), who writes of primary randomness and secondary randomness in 
discussing similar ideas. Primary randomness describes the randomness of the causal 
process, while secondary randomness is that which is discerned in the sequence of 
outcomes. The importance of this distinction between process and outcome lies in the fact 
that they may not appear to be exactly equivalent: a finite sequence may be highly 
patterned and so not appear random, and yet still have been produced by a random process.
Each of these definitions defines randomness in terms of what it is not, rather than stating 
what it is. Herein lies another of the fundamental difficulties with the concept: that it is 
difficult to define or to describe directly. It may be that many people’s concept of 
randomness is based on an exclusion of other causes, and has nothing beyond this. There 
may be a parallel here with the mathematical concept of infinity, which might be thought 
of as not finite, and therefore as “going on for ever”, “without end”.
A number of related terms can be identified in a thesaurus; their meanings are closely 
related to, and possibly even overlapping with, randomness: for example, haphazard, 
chance, fortuitous, serendipitous, aleatory, arbitrary, casual, stray, occasional, indefinite, 
indiscriminate, non-specific, unspecific, unspecified, unordered, unorganised, undirected, 
unplanned, accidental, uncalculated, unsystematic, adventitious, incidental, hit-or-miss, 
irregular, erratic.2
Some of these terms are clearly no longer current, and might even be considered obsolete, 
but others may be used by lay people in conversation to refer to features of randomness 
without directly using the word ‘random’. For naive users of the concept, the word 
‘random’ and its derivatives may be less familiar than more everyday terms such as
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chance, haphazard, unplanned or accidental. However, the difficulty is that such terms are 
inherently less precise and are open to misinterpretation.
2.3 A structured examination of the idea of randomness
The question “What is Randomness?” can be considered a philosophical one; it certainly 
touches on philosophical issues. Dembski (2000), writing in The Concise Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, identifies five different approaches to randomness used by 
philosophers.
• Randomness as the output of a chance process
• Randomness via mixing
• Randomness as pattern-breaking
• Randomness as a measure of computational complexity
• Randomness as mimicking chance (sometimes referred to as pseudo-randomness)
I have taken these five approaches as an organising framework for the following discussion 
in which I identify some of the ways in which randomness might be seen by children in 
secondary schools, and by their parents.
2.3.1 The output of a chance process
This definition focuses upon the process generating the output and links the idea of 
randomness with that of chance. However, the term ‘chance process’ is also similar to 
‘randomness’ in that it is difficult to define precisely. In ancient times, chance processes 
were often used as a basis for making decisions. Societies in ancient Greece, Jerusalem, 
Mesopotamia, and in China, all demonstrated a belief that a purely chance mechanism, 
which eliminated the possibility of human manipulation, would “give the gods a clear 
channel through which to express their divine will” (Bennett, 1998, p28). The idea appears
2 These have all come from The Oxford Thesaurus, 1991 edition.
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to be that a chance process has no earthly cause and can therefore be viewed as a pure 
expression of divine will. Such a view is still widespread today: an event that might be 
considered a chance outcome will be interpreted as something that was ‘meant to be’, that 
is due to fate or destiny. Terms such as ‘good fortune’ and luck also come to mind in this 
context. Thus, an element of our present concept of randomness comes from the early 
historical idea that something without known cause is caused by ‘chance’. Again, 
randomness is seen in terms of what it is not.
It is interesting to reflect on whether people today think of ‘random’ events as having a 
‘cause’. For children in school, who conduct experiments with random outcomes in order 
to learn about probability, there might be some difficulty in accepting the teacher’s agenda 
if they hold the idea that such outcomes are governed by divine will or even by luck, fate 
or destiny. To understand the implications of the mathematics of probability may require a 
different view of the events.
This seems to me to be the most general and unrestricted definition, but also perhaps one 
that says least about what the output will be like. The idea applies equally to the outcomes 
from rolling a die, or tossing a coin, or waiting time at Oxford Circus for the next bus to 
Warren Street, provided that you accept these are chance processes and are unpredictable. 
Unfortunately, each of these particular processes could also be viewed as deterministic, if 
only we knew enough information about, for example, the motion of the die. There is a 
potentially circular argument here, in that the reference to a chance process begs all the 
questions that we are asking of the term ‘random’.
An important question here is whether randomness, in the sense of a purely chance 
process, can ever be shown to exist. If one approaches empirical study with the assumption 
that all observable phenomena may be accounted for deterministically, then any apparent 
chance in what is observed can be thought of as observations for which the deterministic
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explanation has yet to be found. If one has all knowledge, in particular, knowledge of the 
exact values of all the parameters, any system is deterministic, even if chaotic. The 
problem is that such complete and perfect knowledge is not possible.
Falk and Konold (1990) write of two distinct ways of viewing probability: the epistemic 
and the ontic. According to the epistemic view, uncertainty is introduced into science to 
account for the scientist’s ignorance of the many variables that affect the data, and because 
of the error in measurement, as in the previous discussion. The randomness in 
evolutionary biology can be thought of as arising from the deterministic interaction of 
multiple variables in a highly complex process; the complexity of the process and the 
variety of different variables are beyond human capacity for analysis and so the outcomes 
are viewed as irreducibly random. Even people who believe that nature is ultimately 
deterministic may use probability in this way. In contrast, ontic probabilism sees chance as 
an irreducible part of natural phenomena, represented to some degree for example in 
theories of quantum physics. In most accounts of quantum physics, the physical universe 
is fundamentally random; quantum events exhibit random outcomes that can never be 
accounted for by hidden variables (Eagle, 2005). There is still some debate about whether 
ontic probability is an acceptable view. For example, Ayer (1980) explores the use of the 
chance concept, and distinguishes ways in which people speak of events as ‘happening by 
chance’, but at the end he remains unconvinced about the existence of ontic probability.
Even if one rejects the idea of ontic probabilism, epistemic probabilism can open the 
possibility of using randomness (and the idea of a chance process) as a powerful model for 
some aspects of situations where events are unpredictable. For example, the outcomes 
from rolling a die or waiting time at Oxford Circus for the next bus to Warren Street can 
each be modelled usefully as outcomes from a chance process.
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2.3.2 Randomness via mixing
There is a certain intuitive appeal in the idea that, when things are mixed, the result is 
‘random’. Piaget and Inhelder (1975) used the idea of the random mixture in their study of 
children’s ideas about chance published in 1951 (English translation, 1975). For Piaget, 
“chance is an essential characteristic of an irreversible mix, while at the other extreme is 
mechanical causality, characterised by its intrinsic reversibility” (p xvii). He supposed that 
the idea of chance must therefore be dependent upon the prior understanding of ‘reversible 
operations’, since he claims that chance phenomena are those which are not reducible to 
reversible operations.
One of the common early experiences of randomness for many children is that of selecting 
objects from a mixture. Situations such as these become recognised in ‘urn problems’ - 
one of the icons for randomness - picking a counter (or a chip or some other object) from a 
mixture of counters (or chips or other objects) in an um (or a bag or a pot). Selecting afi 
item from a random mixture of items is a commonly experienced context for early 
probability problems in primary school and in early secondary school.
The idea is important in the study of fluids in physics as it is fundamental to the theory of 
statistical mechanics. Consider for example a large jar of water containing a small sachet 
of blue dye that is about to be punctured. At the instant that the sachet is punctured all the 
blue dye is concentrated inside the sachet in one comer of the jar. Over time, forces act on 
the water to move the fluid around in the jar so that eventually the particles of blue dye 
become thoroughly mixed throughout the water in the jar and the fluid achieves a 
‘uniform’ mixture. As someone said to me: “It’s like putting hot water into a bath that has 
grown cold; it takes time to diffuse its way around and raise the overall temperature.”
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2.3.3 Pattern-breaking
Within this account of randomness, the focus is squarely upon the sequence of outcomes, 
the output of the random process. I expect that most people are looking for continuous 
pattern breaking as evidence of randomness, to judge whether a process can be considered 
‘random’. In this sense, I see this view of randomness as being closest to an informal view 
that might be used by people outside formal mathematics or statistics. The idea is 
intuitively simple: if I can discern a repeating pattern in the emerging sequence generated 
by a process, and this pattern is sustained, then the process is not random.
Yet there is a catch within this reasoning. Consider for example a process that repeatedly 
generates outcomes of 0 or 1 with equal probabilities. Every finite sequence of 0-1 
outcomes, whether patterned or not, could be generated by this infinite process at some 
time. So, although any pattern that appears in a sequence of outcomes from this process 
will end eventually, finite sequences with apparent patterns will always continue to 
emerge. This means that searching for pattern in the emerging sequence of outcomes is not 
necessarily an effective means of arriving at a judgement of the randomness of the 
underlying process.
2.3.4 A measure of computational complexity
Chaitin (see 1975 and 1988) defined the complexity of a character string in terms of its 
minimal description. Any sequence comprising a simple pattern, such as 
101010101010101010101010101010, can be described concisely. Descriptions such as 
“1010...” or “start with 10 and then continue to alternate all the way” may suggest how 
this might be done. More complex sequences cannot be so compressed.
The definition and measurement of this idea of complexity has led more recently to a new 
conceptualisation of randomness (Falk and Konold 1997).
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The algorithmic randomness of a binary-digit sequence is the bit length of the shortest computer 
program that can reproduce the sequence.
(Falk and Konold, 1997, p306)
One aspect of the intuitive appeal of this definition lies in the fact that an incompressible 
sequence must be without pattern. The idea of randomness as complexity may be 
considered equivalent to that of randomness as pattern breaking, in the sense that it may be 
difficult or impossible to distinguish empirically between behaviours arising from the one 
or the other. Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) draw on evidence from a variety of previous 
studies to suggest that the pattern breaking view of randomness is common, but Falk and 
Konold (1997) use much of the same evidence to justify a claim that people may be 
judging randomness as complexity.
2.3.5 Pseudo-randomness
Pseudo-randomness is used in electronic random number generators. The ‘pseudo­
random’ outcome is generated by some algorithm, designed to produce a sequence of 
outcomes that look like a random sequence, in the sense that outcomes are distributed as 
they would be by a random process. The sequence of outcomes has no pattern and is 
essentially unpredictable without detailed knowledge of the algorithm and its inputs. 
However, the sequence is completely determined by the starting point: if the iterative 
function that generates the sequence and the initial seed value are known, then the 
sequence generated by this pseudo-random process is entirely predictable. In this sense, 
such a sequence of numbers is not random at all, any more than would be the list in a 
printed table of ‘random’ numbers, as used by statisticians in the past.
For all practical purposes, since the algorithm and its seed value are not known, the 
sequence can be treated as the outcome of a ‘random’ process, and is indistinguishable 
from the output of any other ‘random’ process.
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2.4 Philosophical accounts of Randomness
Recent accounts of randomness by modem philosophers have re-examined the concept in 
attempts to clarify it, and to seek to extend the rigour of the idea to contexts in which it 
seems natural to apply it. In this section I shall refer to just two writers whose ideas have 
brought me some enlightenment as I have considered the ways in which pupils in 
secondary school speak of and think about randomness. The first offers an interpretation 
of randomness that fits with my sense that randomness provides a model for thinking about 
situations that are uncertain or unpredictable. The second extends this by defining 
randomness as unpredictability, and in so doing seems to me to extend the applicability of 
the model.
2.4.1 A model for incomplete knowledge
Kyburg (1974) offers a helpful interpretation of randomness consisting of four parts.
the object that is supposed to be a random member of a class;
the set of which the object is a random member (population or collective);
the property with respect to which the object is a random member of the given class;
the knowledge of the person giving the judgement of randomness.
(Kyburg 1974)
This interpretation is interesting for two important reasons. First it draws attention to the 
importance of considering the class of objects from which the random outcomes are drawn. 
This encourages us to be clear about the meaning of the term in a particular context. 
Second, Kyburg draws attention to the important role of the state of knowledge of the 
person making the judgement that the situation is ‘random’. As he says: “[Rjandomness...
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is going to be a concept which is relative to our body of knowledge, which will somehow 
reflect what we know and what we don’t know.” (Kyburg, 1974, p217)
Thus, whether or not the object is considered a random member of the class depends on the 
state of the judge’s knowledge of the object. Such an interpretation is much more 
generally applicable to ffequentist situations and to situations where there is some partial 
information affecting the judgement of randomness.
This interpretation of randomness fits comfortably with the idea of randomness as a model 
for situations of uncertainty. It allows the use of pseudo-random generators without 
difficulty, since the user has not the knowledge of the underlying algorithm to enable her to 
predict the outcomes. For example, the sequence of integers in the decimal expansion of pi 
may appear to be the outcome of a random process to a person who did not know their 
source, even though they are a determined sequence.
I find Kyburg’s interpretation also reminiscent of the frequentist definition of probability in 
that it includes explicit reference to the underlying class from which the random object is 
drawn. This is interesting in that adopting Kyburg’s view of randomness would draw me 
towards a frequentist approach to probability. The work of Gigerenzer (1993) in 
countering the heuristics and biases programme of Kahneman and Tversky (1972) has also 
suggested strongly that naive users are able to reason more readily and more accurately 
when probabilities are represented in terms of frequencies. The possible significance of 
frequencies in assisting people to reason about situations of uncertainty will be discussed 
further in Chapter 3.
My own view is that randomness is a powerful model for thinking about many situations 
where the outcomes are unpredictable or uncertain. I do not at present want to be 
concerned with the debate about ontic probabilism, whether randomness is in fact an
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essential aspect of reality. For me it is enough that the idea can be applied to thinking 
about situations that I experience.
2.4.2 Unpredictability
The concept of randomness is used in such a variety of ways that there are suggestions that 
it may be impossible to adequately account for all of the various applications through a 
single united concept. “Indeed, it seems highly doubtful that there is anything like a 
unique notion of randomness there to be explicated” (Howson and Urbach, 1993, p324). 
However, in a more recent paper Eagle (2005) attempts to achieve such unification when 
he proposes that “randomness is to be understood as a special case of the epistemic concept 
of the unpredictability of a process” (pi). The National Curriculum for Mathematics in 
England requires that “pupils should be taught to see that random processes are 
unpredictable”. Clearly the meaning of unpredictability in Eagle’s paper is much more 
rigorous and precise than that intended in the National Curriculum, but there is a resonance 
of ideas here which is worth pursuing a little.
Eagle begins his paper with an analysis of various scientific uses of the concept from 
which he identifies four competing demands that he suggests any rigorous analysis of 
randomness as a single concept would need to satisfy. Eagle goes on to consider standard 
approaches to defining randomness -  the frequentist approach of Von Mises, and the 
complexity approach of Kolmogorov and Chaitin -  and he shows that each fails to meet 
some of the four demands of randomness that he has identified. He develops a rigorous 
approach to predictability and unpredictability and uses this to build an analysis of 
randomness as unpredictability. Finally he argues that his approach provides features that 
meet the intuitive demands of the concept.
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The four demands that Eagle identifies as required for an intuitive use of the concept are 
interesting for this study to the extent that they resonate with pupils’ experiences of 
randomness. They are outlined below.
Statistical Testing: The concept needs to encompass random sampling and randomized experiments. 
This requires that random sequences may be generated as required, and it should be possible to judge 
whether a given sequence is random.
Finite Randomness: The concept needs to be applicable to finite phenomena and to single events.
Explanation and Confirmation: The suggestion that a system is random should indicate an 
explanation for why the system shows particular behaviour. Also, such a suggestion should be 
confirmable by empirical observation.
Determinism: Randomness should be compatible with determinism, so that the idea can be used 
where appropriate to describe the behaviour of, for example, chaotic systems.
(Drawn from Eagle, 2005, pp7-8)
In the following paragraphs I shall briefly review each of these demands in order to 
consider the relevance of speaking about randomness as unpredictability for children 
meeting the concept of randomness in secondary school.
Statistical Testing
The idea of random sampling is an important new idea introduced in Key Stage 3 of the 
English National Curriculum for Mathematics. Pupils are expected to select random 
samples and to be able to justify this. They therefore need to be able to work with pseudo­
random numbers generated by computer, and possibly also with random number tables. 
This requires at least an informal idea of the characteristics that might be expected of a 
random sequence and some ideas about how a random sequence can be recognised. While 
the treatment of these ideas for secondary school pupils is necessarily informal, their 
discussion still raises some of the difficult issues underpinning the concept of randomness.
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To see randomness as unpredictability makes the recognition of a random process intuitive 
and emphasises the idea that whether an individual considers a process to be random must 
depend upon that individual’s state of knowledge about the process. Pseudo-random 
numbers are self-evidently unpredictable for the pupil using the computer software. 
However, it might be instructive to pupils to work with a simple random number generator 
in a graphic calculator, where the seed can be controlled and so a predetermined sequence 
of pseudo-random numbers can be generated.
Finite randomness
The mathematics National Curriculum in England requires that “pupils should be taught to 
see that random processes are unpredictable”. This inevitably means that pupils will 
consider finite processes and single events. It is often natural to speak of a single event as 
random, even though the standard frequentist explanation of probability, which has often 
been presented in secondary textbooks, uses a view of randomness which is incompatible 
with such usage. However, if an event is clearly unpredictable, then randomness may 
intuitively be an appropriate model to consider.
Explanation and Confirmation
The problem of how to recognise, test or confirm whether a process is random is a 
particularly difficult one for pupils with the standard views of randomness. Typically 
pupils might use the pattern breaking idea, but as discussed earlier, this can lead to 
difficulties. However, if the pupil is simply looking to see if the outcomes are 
unpredictable, some of these issues can be avoided.
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Determinism
Some pupils may consider that a process that is essentially deterministic cannot be seen as 
random, and vice versa. Such a belief would be difficult to reconcile with approaches 
whereby some phenomena are seen as both deterministic and random.
2.5 Randomness and Distribution
I have discussed earlier the idea that in both mathematical and everyday contexts 
‘randomness’ is often thought of in terms of that which it is not: particularly that it is 
without pattern and without order. Yet, in order to develop ideas of probability and 
distribution, the pattern and order that emerge from the long run behaviour of random 
phenomena are critically important. This apparent contradiction between ‘randomness’ as 
without pattern, and ‘distribution’ as a pattern that emerges from random behaviour in the 
long run, is interesting.
The statistician David Moore, writing with intention of influencing teaching of chance and 
data in schools (1990) has given a definition of randomness that makes clear the 
relationship between randomness, distribution and probability.
Phenomena having uncertain individual outcomes but a regular pattern in many repetitions are called 
random. “Random” is not a synonym for “haphazard” but a description of a kind of order different 
from the deterministic one that is popularly associated with science and mathematics. Probability is 
the branch of mathematics that describes randomness.
(Moore, 1990, p98)
The regular pattern that becomes increasingly discernible in many repetitions is the 
distribution. When a random process generates outcomes, the manner in which the 
observed outcomes are distributed amongst all the possible outcomes will produce, in the 
long run, an emergent pattern. The pattern becomes clearer as the process continues to
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generate more outcomes. This pattern may be described as the distribution of the 
outcomes.
Wilensky writes of emergent phenomena as a new computational field “in which global 
patterns emerge from local interactions” (Wilensky, 1997, p i80). He places probability 
distributions as “canonical cases of emergent phenomena”, stating that “they are stable 
global structures that emerge from the interactions of multiple distributed agents” (ibid).
In standard statistics classes, students do not experience this emergence of order from 
disorder, and they learn about distributions only through such global characteristics as 
mean and variance. Wilensky suggests that the “connection between the micro- level of 
the phenomenon and the macro- level” is critically important for the learner to experience, 
and its absence from the learner’s experience is an example of the disconnection of 
learning that causes what he terms “epistemological anxiety”. He uses computer-based 
random simulations as environments in which learners can experience and experiment with 
the emergence of distribution as long-run pattern.
Thus there is a sense in which randomness as locally unpredictable, and distribution as 
long run pattern can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Then, probability in the 
frequentist sense can be associated with the long run emergent pattern.
However, as was noted earlier, “a priori” probabilities can also be defined classically from 
an assumption of equally likely outcomes based on symmetries in a random generator. In 
this case, the assumption that all outcomes in the base set of outcomes are equally likely is 
justified only to the extent that the emergent long-run distribution approaches the 
classically derived probability distribution.
In the case of a probability assigned to a single event, based upon subjective degrees of 
belief, there is no identifiable distribution. Consider for example the likelihood of there 
being a thunderstorm during my holiday week in the seaside town where I am due to go
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next summer. While it is intuitively natural to view the occurrence of a thunderstorm 
during the specified week as a random event, it is not possible to see an emergent 
distribution because there is no conceivable set of repetitions: the specific week will only 
occur once.
2.6 A Dynamic Concept: a personal view
I see “randomness” as a dynamic concept: a concept involving unpredictable change. For 
me, the word “random” describes something that cannot be ‘pinned down’ or ‘printed off 
in a permanent record without losing something of the essence of what it is to be 
“random”. I trace this way of thinking back, in my own experience of learning, to when I 
was first introduced to random number tables during my A level studies. I felt very 
strongly that these tables were, in a fundamental sense, the antithesis of what I understood 
by the word “random”. They were entirely predictable. The sequence of numbers on the 
page was always the same whenever I opened the book to use the tables, and I therefore 
felt very strongly the need to invent some more ‘random’ (unpredictable) way of selecting 
numbers from the page. I was trying to make the numbers selected more truly 
unpredictable, more dynamic, and in this sense more random.
Years later, I felt a similar sense of unease about the pseudo-random numbers generated on 
my calculator when I first realised that there was a deterministic algorithm that generated 
them. For me at that time, the calculator’s pseudo-random numbers would be predictable 
if I only knew the formula, and so they could not be random. More recently I have 
observed that some of my students appeared to experience some unease about pseudo­
random number generators when they first used them in my courses, being concerned that 
the numbers generated by them could not be trusted to behave as though they were 
random.
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In time I came to recognise that my own state of knowledge about the underlying 
algorithm generating pseudo-random numbers was such that I could not predict the 
outcomes at all. I find it interesting that I have never been able similarly to resolve my 
sense of unease about random number tables. While the calculator’s random number 
generator seems to embody a dynamic sense of randomness that cannot be pinned down, 
and is always changing, printed tables of random numbers are static, permanent and 
unchanging.
It would seem that there are at least two levels of appreciating randomness. The first is to 
recognise the use of the term random to describe something where the outcomes are 
unpredictable in an absolute sense. The second level, which may be later in developing, is 
where the outcomes would be predictable if one had good enough knowledge, but since 
one does not, the outcomes are essentially unpredictable and can be seen as random.
2.7 Process and outcome
A key issue to be considered in this study is whether ‘randomness’ is seen by people as 
being a property of the generating process or of the sequence of outcomes generated. I 
have argued above that I see randomness as a model to describe a process. In this way it 
can be seen as providing explanation for the outcomes observed. The sequence of 
observed outcomes might be described as ‘random’ if it were considered to have arisen 
from a process that was seen as being a random process, that is a process that is reasonably 
considered to be modelled by ‘randomness’. This is a key aspect of the notion of 
randomness that I wish to convey to my students when I am teaching. One question for me 
in this study is whether learners see randomness as a process in this way.
An important distinction for me to make is between the random process and the random 
pattern in a sequence of outcomes that is generated by a random process (Zabell, 1992).
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Previous research into perceptions of randomness has not always been clear about this 
distinction (Nickerson, 2002), but some writers have discussed the issue explicitly (Falk 
and Konold, 1997; Wagenaar, 1991). The position that randomness is a property of a 
process rather than of the outcomes was adopted by Wagenaar (1991), and related to this is 
the view that any outcome from a random process is considered a random outcome 
(Pollatsek and Konold, 1991). The problem here is that it is only by observing the 
outcomes from a process that one can judge whether the process is random.
A process is deemed random if it generates a sequence of unpredictable outcomes.
However, a judgement or perception that a process is random will often be based on 
examination of a sequence of outcomes, which if the process is random will be expected to 
be without pattern. Unfortunately, while the argument would be true if infinite sequences 
were examined, in practice only finite sequences are ever considered, and short finite 
sequences produced by a random process are likely to contain apparent patterns. A real 
sequence of 20 outcomes from tossing a coin -  such as HTTTTHTHTHHTHHHHHHHH 
which arose in one of my interviews and provoked much consternation in the interviewee -  
when viewed as a record of an experiment in the past, feels very different from the sense of 
unfolding surprise and anticipation when I experience it one outcome at a time in a real 
experiment.
2.8 Concluding remarks
The following themes that were identified in this chapter will be revisited in later chapters.
1. Definitions of randomness seem to be in two kinds:
• Randomness is defined in the negative
• Equally likely outcomes EQUIVALENT to randomness
2. Furthermore, the ways people view randomness can be classified in different ways:
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• Caused / Not caused:
Some people see a chance process as involving (or even being caused by) luck 
or divine will. Is Chance Caused or not caused?
• Local / Global:
Randomness and distribution are two sides of the same phenomenon. 
Randomness can be viewed at the local level or at the global level.
• Process and outcome:
It is possible to consider that randomness is in the process or the product.
3. The conflict between randomness and determinism as ideas that appear to be 
opposites has been shown in two distinct ways in the discussion in this chapter.
• Randomness can be applied as a model for incomplete knowledge. This means 
that randomness may be considered as a model for a situation that is essentially 
deterministic, albeit complex. There is a potential contradiction here in the 
conjunction of two apparently opposite ideas: determinism and randomness.
• A related conflict of determinism with randomness may lie within the idea, 
within the frequentist approach to probability, of a determined distribution 
emerging from the disorder of successive random outcomes.
4. Some other ideas and questions were identified in this chapter and will be referred 
to in later chapters.
• Randomness can be seen as pattern breaking.
• Randomness can be seen as equivalent to unpredictability.
• Can people see a single event as random? If so, what might they mean by this?
5. Finally, I have outlined my personal view of randomness as a dynamic concept that 
describes a generating process and the outcomes as they emerge from that process.
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Chapter 3: Randomness: Teaching and Learning Issues
In this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the history of probability and randomness and 
some possible implications for learning. I consider some research findings about teaching 
and learning randomness and related ideas of probability. There are necessarily some areas 
of overlap between issues discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In particular, some 
literature considered in this chapter was referenced in Chapter 2, where it exemplified or 
related to some approaches to conceiving of randomness. When such .cross-references 
occur, I have referred back to Chapter 2.
3.1 Luck, agency and cause
In medieval Europe, according to Hacking (1975), there were considered to be two distinct 
classes of knowledge. Knowledge acquired through demonstration was known as scientia, 
while knowledge, opinion or belief that required the testimony of authority or God-given 
signs was referred to as opinio. The word ‘probable’ described opinions that had received 
approval from some authority. A ‘probable’ belief or opinion was therefore ‘approved’ by 
an appropriate authority, but it could never completely change from being opinio to 
scientia, no matter how much approval it received.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the concept of evidence came to 
incorporate the Stoic idea of signa: signs that are recognised by experience to be often 
associated with or suggestive of a phenomenon (Hacking, 1975). This provided a bridge 
between opinion and demonstrable knowledge. As Hobbes wrote in 1640: “.. .signs are but 
conjectural; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their assurance is more 
or less; but never full and evident...” (Hobbes, 1650). The word probability came to 
describe the degree to which a belief had moved, considering the evidence of signs, from 
complete ignorance to certain knowledge. In other words, it conveys the extent to which
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opinio is also scientia. A special case of this was the tendency for experiments with coins
i
or dice to produce stable relative frequencies in the long run.
The emergence of the idea of probability in seventeenth-century Europe was followed by 
its rapid spread as it was applied to various areas of science, accompanied by a change in 
the concept of evidence (Hacking 1975). Following “the emergence of probability” 
described by Hacking (1975) there was a dramatic change in the world view expressed by 
the leading thinkers of the day. This remarkable shift has been aptly described as “The 
Probabilistic Revolution” (see Kruger, Daston and Heidelberger, 1987; Kruger, Gigerenzer 
and Morgan, 1987). This conceptual revolution between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries represents the change from a purely deterministic world view, framed in terms of 
universal laws and constrained by the religious sensibilities of the day, to a view in which 
probability and randomness were central and indispensable.
The manner in which the function of the word ‘probability’ has changed with the 
emergence of the new concept may provide insight into some of the difficulties 
experienced by today’s students as they grapple with notions of probability and 
randomness. Words such as ‘chance’ and ‘luck’, as they are used in daily life, may convey 
ideas that owe more to a pre-seventeenth-century view of the world than the modem view. 
The word ‘luck’, for example, might be used to express a belief that the world is not 
random or probabilistic, and that events are determined by the intervention of ‘fate’, or 
‘fortune’, or even by a capricious god.
One way of thinking about students’ talk about chance events may be to see the students as 
sometimes reflecting pre-seventeenth-century views of evidence, rather than a modem 
probabilistic view. The conceptual revolution that took place during the seventeenth 
century with the emergence of probability was so sudden and so significant as to represent 
a discontinuity. It seems likely that the strongly held pre-seventeenth-century worldview
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might persist in popular culture in much the same way that Aristotelian thinking about 
motion has been found to persist (for example, diSessa, 1982; Bums, 1988).
It may be that in discussion of situations involving uncertainty, between student and 
student, or between student and teacher, students will appear to switch between the “public 
discourse” involving the language of chance, and the “private musings” in which they still 
think in deterministic patterns. Wagenaar (1988) has observed that “in the minds of many 
people, luck and chance often seem to act as real causes”. The suggestion is that gamblers 
see chance and luck as separate causal mechanisms; for example, when faced by a long run 
of reds at roulette, they may see chance as having broken down, and luck playing a more 
important role. Luck is thought to influence a bettor’s choice through future outcomes and 
explains important consequences and accomplishment, whereas chance lies behind 
surprise, fun and coincidence. Wagenaar (1988) suggested that a belief in luck could be a 
basic fallacy of gamblers. Hawkins, Joliffe and Glickman (1992) point out that the 
existence of beliefs, such as the gamblers’ belief in luck, may produce classroom 
difficulties similar to those reported in the science education literature and cited in Garfield 
and Ahlgren (1988) in which belief systems conflict with school science. Such beliefs are 
often found to be particularly robust in the face of challenge.
More significantly, the work of both Hacking (1975) and Wagenaar (1988) indicate that 
there may be serious disagreement between statisticians and nai've learners about the 
meanings of words used by statisticians. This possibility of a failure of communication 
between teacher and student, or between researcher and subject, (or even between 
statistician and teacher) has serious implications for anyone involved in statistical 
education or in researching notions of chance and randomness.
Kath Truran has reported that children aged between 7 and 12, in interviews, frequently 
mentioned luck when discussing the behaviour of simple random generators, such as dice,
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spinners and urns (Truran, 1998). The children also sometimes expressed animistic beliefs 
in a controlling force, or in a strategy or skill by which they could control outcomes.
Few researchers have explicitly investigated the role of cultural views of probability and 
randomness in the development of probabilistic understanding. A study by Phillips and 
Wright (1977) suggested that students from eastern cultures in Asia showed less inclination 
to apply probabilistic thinking than those from Western Europe. A more recent study by 
Amir and Williams (1999) focused explicitly on the relationship between culture as 
represented in beliefs, language and experience, and the development of informal and 
formal probabilistic knowledge. Findings suggested that a significant proportion of 
children, aged 11 to 12 years, showed some superstitious belief which could be related to 
their informal probabilistic thinking. There were also significant differences in beliefs and 
experiences relating to chance and probability between pupils in English and Asian ethnic 
groups; these differences appeared to relate to different religious beliefs and cultural 
practices within the two groups (Amir and Williams, 1999).
3.2 Developmental studies
Beginning with the work of Piaget on the development of concepts of number, logic, shape 
and chance in young children, there have been various attempts to study and describe the 
development of children’s understanding. In this section I consider the findings from three 
developmental studies of chance and randomness. Each of these studies says something 
about the relationship between randomness and distribution.
3.2.1 Piaget and Inhelder’s Raindrops Task
The earliest research into the development of children’s understanding of random 
phenomena assumed a frequentist and objective definition of probability (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1975). According to Piaget and Inhelder, a child cannot distinguish between
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chance and necessity before the age of six or seven. According to their model, the concept 
of chance cannot be recognised until the idea of a reversible operation has been 
understood. A child who has not understood reversibility cannot tolerate disorder and 
seeks a reason for everything; they therefore cannot comprehend the idea of an irreversible 
mixture or random mixture. The ability to estimate probabilities only begins to appear 
after this, and requires two other abilities: to count the possible outcomes, which Piaget 
considers involves the logical process of counting permutations; and to compare ratios 
(Piaget and Inhelder, 1975).
Piaget and Inhelder suggested that children’s experiences with random mixtures would 
lead to the development of ideas of distribution and the law of large numbers (1975). One 
of their tasks focused on this aspect of development regarding a uniform distribution; it 
was the ‘raindrops task’ in which children were asked to consider raindrops landing on 
squares of pavement. The researchers interpreted the ways in which children ‘distributed’ 
raindrops among the squares as an indication of their understanding of randomness and of 
distribution. The children’s responses were classified broadly in three age groups, 6 to 9 
years, 9 to 12 years, and over 12, representing stages of development. The youngest 
children tended to place raindrops in a few adjacent squares or evenly across the squares, 
even with a very small number of raindrops. Responses from children aged 9 to 12 were 
characterised by “an understanding of a progressive regularity” (Piaget and Inhelder, 1975, 
p52) but they showed little understanding of how the differences between numbers of 
raindrops in adjacent squares might vary as the number of drops increased. The oldest 
children attributed the progressively uniform distribution to the decreasing proportional 
differences rather than absolute differences. Piaget and Inhelder concluded from this task 
that only the children in the oldest age group had an understanding of the law of large 
numbers that variability decreases in proportional terms, while the middle age group had 
only “qualitative intuitions of proportionality” (Piaget and Inhelder, 1975, p54).
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3.2.2 Green’s development of the Raindrops task
Piaget’s stages were investigated in a study of about 3000 secondary school students by 
Green (1983). Green developed a Probability Concepts Test for his study, in which he 
used pencil and paper versions of many of the practical experimental tasks used by Piaget, 
as well as drawing on tasks used by other researchers such as Kahneman and Tversky (see 
section 3.5 below). Green analysed the results using statistical techniques to demonstrate a 
hierarchy of ‘difficulty’ in the questions. He claimed to have shown the existence of the 
Piagetian stages in the development of the concept of chance.
A few questions in Green’s study were specifically intended to explore children’s 
understanding of random phenomena, and one of these was a version of Piaget and 
Inhelder’s raindrop task. This question, which was expressed in terms of snowflakes, is 
reproduced in an abbreviated form in Figure 3.1 (taken from Green, 1989, p31).
Below are three s e ts  of two pictures. Each set show s the pattern 
of snow flakes building up: first 4 flakes, then 16 flakes.
SET A
SET B
SET C
Which of th ese  s e ts  best show s the kind of pattern you would expect to se e  
as the snow flakes land?
Each is a s
B C B an dC  I'kely
Figure 3.1: The Snowflakes Task (Green, 1989, p31)
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The results from this particular question showed a remarkable decline with increasing age 
in the percentage of pupils selecting option C, the random option, from 26% at age 11/12 
to 18% at age 15/16 (Green, 1983). This prompted Green to refine the question for use in a 
test for younger pupils aged 7 to 11 (Green, 1989). The refined question again produced 
surprising results. Although the proportion of children choosing a regular symmetrical 
pattern declined with age, there was not a corresponding increase with age in the 
proportion of children choosing either the random or the semi-random patterns.
Green speculated that the context of falling raindrops or snowflakes might be interfering 
with children’s responses to these problems, in that the lasting impression of falling 
raindrops is of an even wetness everywhere. In reality, people might pay little attention to 
the distribution of the first few drops.
Green wrote a variation on this problem in which counters were independently placed on a 
4 by 4 grid of squares in a randomly chosen square. This context was developed 
specifically to make clear the idea of a discrete uniform distribution. Groups of pupils first 
participated in an experiment in which they placed six counters randomly on the grid and 
saw that duplication was likely to occur. Then they were given the task in which they were 
asked to select the most random responses. The responses of pupils showed that random 
grids like set C in Figure 3.1 were chosen by much higher proportions of pupils than in the 
earlier snowflakes problem, and the decline with increasing age was reversed. Green’s 
experiment demonstrated clearly that the pupils’ responses are highly dependent upon the 
context in which the problem is set and the circumstances surrounding the test. He went 
on to comment on his findings:
The increase in facility with age on some items and the lack of any such increase for other apparently 
very similar items shows the very subtle intellectual demands which the concept of randomness 
makes. What to the teacher may appear trivial and obvious may, in fact, be deep and subtle and so 
should not be hastily dismissed or glossed over. In studying random events, aspects of local and
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global frequency distribution and visual appearance arise together. These need to be separately 
considered and focused upon. To use the blanket term ‘random’ without exploring its different 
manifestations and interpretations creates rather than avoids difficulties and impoverishes the 
intellectual life of our students.
(Green, 1989, pp38-39)
Green’s reports on his work on the raindrops problems (1983, 1988, and 1989) 
demonstrate how difficult are the ideas of randomness and distribution for pupils to learn 
and for researchers to explore. He has shown that Piaget’s original account (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1975) may be inadequate and he has pointed in particular to the need for careful 
consideration of the ideas embedded within use of the term ‘random’. Green’s suggestion 
that closer attention should be given to the local and global aspects of distribution is 
important and will be considered further in a later chapter of this study.
3.2.3 Metz on randomness and distribution
Metz (1998) reported a large study in which she examined the probabilistic reasoning of 5- 
and 8-year old children and undergraduates, with the intention of distinguishing aspects of 
the concept of randomness that develop with age. She used various classical probability 
tasks, which involved subjects predicting outcomes, experimenting and reflecting on what 
they observed. Tasks used random generators, such as spinners and urns, and each task 
involved a single uncertain event in a repeatable context in which increasingly regular 
distributional patterns emerge with increasing numbers of repetitions. The data consisted 
of videotapes of participants engaged in the tasks; these were analysed by two researchers 
who independently coded all the tapes using an agreed coding scheme.
The study considered a construct of randomness involving “an integration of the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of a given event with patterns manifested over many 
repetitions of the event” (Metz, 1998, p349). A key finding was that many children and
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adults failed to integrate the uncertainty with the long-run patterns in one of two ways.
One form of failure was to over-interpret the determinism of the distributional pattern, and 
this led people to over-state the information given by a distribution and to assume the 
possibility of deterministic outcomes from their model of the random generator. The other 
failure was to recognise uncertainty separately from the distribution, leading to a tendency 
to under-estimate the information given by a distribution and to treat situations as less 
predictable than they might have been.
3.3 Intuitions of chance -  Fischbein
Learning in western education systems is characterised by a search for increasing certainty 
and dispelling of doubt. Western school curricula tend to be dominated by an emphasis on 
a deterministic world view, which Fischbein (1975) suggested leads students to over-ride 
and neglect probabilistic intuitions they developed in their early years. Students learn to 
look for one right answer, and this is difficult to reconcile with understanding that learning 
probability will not enable one to predict the immediate outcome of a random process with 
certainty.
Fischbein argued that teaching of probability should build on early probabilistic intuitions 
developed in young children. He proposed that intuition and reasoning each provide the 
individual with information about the same reality, and that they are reconcilable to each 
other. Since intuition is intimately linked with action, and is more readily available than 
explicit reasoning, it may represent an intermediate stage between mental operation and 
outward action. He suggested that young children develop a range of adaptive mechanisms 
through everyday experience, and that among these is the ability intuitively to estimate 
proportions and to make predictions (Fischbein, 1975). For example, he drew attention to 
the findings of probability matching experiments, such as those reported by Estes (1964).
In the simplest experiments of this kind, the subject was asked to predict which of two
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events A or B will occur and, having made a prediction, was shown which of the two 
events actually occurred and was asked to make another prediction. The experiment 
continued in this way, and the subjects predictions were confirmed or falsified by the true 
outcome. “Probability Matching” refers to the finding that, over a large number of trials, 
the proportion of predictions of event A tends to match the proportion of occurrences of 
event A. In particular, Fischbein noted that this phenomenon was shown by children as 
young as three years. He interpreted this as evidence that young children have a primary 
intuition of relative frequency.
Other more recent studies, such as Green’s study (1989) discussed in section 3.2, have 
echoed the finding that children appear to become more deterministic in their thinking as 
they get older. This has prompted some to wonder whether it is the school curriculum 
teaching children to think deterministically and to suppress their early intuitions about 
probabilistic thinking.
3.4 Sources of uncertainty
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) contrasted two ways in which ideas of randomness and 
probability are applied. The distinction arises from the source of the uncertainty. When 
the uncertainty arises from an aspect of the world external to the individual, the task can be 
interpreted as finding “the probability” of an event, and the interpretation is considered to 
be objective. On the other hand, if the uncertainty is seen as arising from the state of the 
individual’s knowledge or relative ignorance about the event, then the individual has the 
task of finding “My probability”, leading to an internal probability. It is worth noting that, 
within the Bayesian school of probability, all uncertainty is regarded as arising from some 
degree of ignorance, and is therefore internal.
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The distinction between external and internal sources of uncertainty is further refined by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982). Assessments of external uncertainty may need to be made 
either in singular mode, by consideration of the propensities of the possible outcomes, or in 
distributional or frequentist mode, by considering all similar situations observed in the 
past. Distributional mode refers to situations which can be considered as replicable, in 
which the distribution emerges from many repetitions; such situations can be analysed in 
frequentist terms. In contrast, there are situations in which probabilities can be assigned to 
single events: such probabilities are in the singular mode. For example, an assessment of 
whether a drawing pin is more likely to land point up or point down could be made in 
singular mode by a reasoned argument about the physical characteristics of the drawing 
pin, such as the position of its centre of gravity; or it could be made in frequentist mode by 
recalling the past incidents of dropped drawing pins, and judging the relative frequency of 
pins landing point up.
Similarly, assessments of internal uncertainty are made, in two different modes: a reasoned 
consideration of external evidence and arguments; and an introspective assessment of 
confidence. For example, the question ‘How sure are you whether Rome is north of New 
York?’ could be assessed by reason and argument, but the judgement of whether a person’s 
name has been remembered correctly or a word has been spelled correctly will often be 
based on whether it looks, sounds or feels right.
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) conclude by considering some of the consequences of their 
analysis. Particular situations of uncertainty are often assessed in more than one mode, and 
it is quite possible that the person making the assessment will not be explicit about the 
mode in which they are working, and may not be aware of it. Some people may switch 
between modes as they consider a situation. The laws of probability, such as the 
probabilities of two complementary events summing to one, do not seem to apply equally 
to all variants of uncertainty. Indeed, in natural language, the very word “probability” does
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not seem to apply to internal judgements of uncertainty as much as to external assessments. 
Finally they point out that external assessment in the frequentist or distributional mode 
forms a link between subjective probabilities and frequentist probabilities.
This analysis has important consequences for teachers and researchers. A researcher 
investigating peoples’ reasoning about uncertainty may need to consider whether the 
manner in which she has posed a problem requires the subject to work with one particular 
variant of uncertainty. If the subject is, in fact, reasoning in an unexpected mode, then he 
may not understand the language of the problem in the sense intended by the researcher, 
and so may not interpret the problem in the manner expected. It is also possible that either 
the subject or the researcher will not be expecting their assessment of the uncertainty to be 
consistent with the normal mathematical laws of probability. This may lead to difficulties 
for the researcher in interpreting the subject’s response. Similar difficulties will exist for 
teachers introducing probability and related concepts.
3.5 Heuristics and Biases
The work of Kahneman, Tversky, and colleagues, which aimed to investigate ways in 
which people make judgements under uncertainty, has grown into what is known as the 
heuristics and biases programme (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). Papers arising 
from this research have identified several heuristics that are reported to be widely used in 
reasoning under uncertainty. Of these, the representativeness heuristic and the availability 
heuristic appear to be considered particularly often in studies of children’s probabilistic 
reasoning (for example: Amir and Williams, 1999; Fischbein and Gazit, 1984) and are 
considered most relevant within the context of the present study.
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3.5.1 Representativeness
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) proposed a representativeness heuristic which they claimed 
is widely used by people to judge the probability of events, to predict outcomes and to 
judge what to expect from a random process. Outcomes which most closely represent the 
essential characteristics of the process that generated them are judged more likely than 
those which do hot, and people take such outcomes to be what they expect to see. In 
many circumstances this heuristic leads to appropriate judgements, but Kahneman and 
Tversky have demonstrated through a variety of experiments that under certain conditions 
people’s use of representativeness can lead to bias. For example, the following question 
was put to 92 subjects.
All the families of six children in a city were surveyed. In 72 families the exact order of births of boys 
and girls was GBGBBG. What is your estimate of the number of families surveyed in which the exact 
order of births was BGBBBB?
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, p34)
Most subjects judged the ordered sequence GBGBBG of births of boys and girls in a 
family of six to be more likely than the ordered sequence BGBBBB. The same subjects 
viewed the birth sequence BBBGGG as less likely than GBGBBG. The second choice 
here is very like the idea of randomness as ‘pattern-breaking’, which was discussed in 
Chapter 2. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that their subjects judged the sequence 
GBGBBG to be more likely in these circumstances since it is more similar to the 
proportion of boys and girls in the population as a whole and it appears more random.
Alternative explanations for these results are possible. It may be that, in making a 
judgement between GBGBBG and BGBBBB, many subjects were in fact judging between 
the unordered outcomes “three boys, three girls” and “five boys, one girl” (Konold, 1990). 
On the other hand, the representativeness account of this situation contains two hidden
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assumptions: that the subjects saw the goal of the question as being to arrive at a 
judgement about probability; and that the concept of probability held by the subjects was 
‘similar’ to that held by the researchers. The second of these assumptions is particularly 
open to question, as illustrated by the outcome approach (Konold, 1989; see section 3.7).
Kahneman and Tversky have also identified a belief in a “law of small numbers” (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1971), under which even small samples are expected to be representative. 
The combination of these two accounts yields “the simplest and most intuitive account of 
subjective randomness, that of Local Representativeness” (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991, 
p 444). Kahneman and Tversky propose that local representativeness provides an 
explanation for the widely reported gambler’s fallacy according to which, when faced with 
a run of red on a roulette wheel, most people will wrongly predict that black is more likely 
to come up next “presumably because the occurrence of black will result in a more 
representative sequence than the occurrence of an additional red” (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974).
Local representativeness and the idea of randomness as pattern-breaking together provide 
an explanation for persistent features of people’s perception of randomness as observed by 
many researchers (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991, Falk and Konold, 1997).
3.5.2 Availability
People using what Kahneman and Tversky have termed the availability heuristic typically 
base their judgements under uncertainty upon specific cases which are most readily 
brought to mind. Two examples will serve to illustrate this heuristic. The first involves 
the judgement of word frequency.
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Suppose you sample a word from the English language. Is it more likely that the word starts with a K, 
or that K is the third letter?
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, pl66)
Using the availability heuristic, people answer such a question by assessing how easily 
they are able to think of instances of the two categories. Because it is easier to recall 
words beginning with the letter K, this category is judged by most people to be the more 
frequent, even though in a typical English text words with K in the third position are twice 
as frequent as words beginning with K. This is an example of a bias due to the 
effectiveness o f the search set used in the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974).
The second example concerns bias o f imaginability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), 
arising from the fact that in certain circumstances some instances are more easily imagined 
than others.
Consider a group of 10 people who form committees of k members, 2 < k < 10. How many different 
committees of k members can be formed?
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p i2)
A person who attempts this question without computation might try mentally to construct 
committees of various sizes and then evaluate how many exist of each size according to 
how easily they can be imagined. A simple scheme for constructing such committees is to 
partition the set of 10 members. While it is easy to construct five disjoint committees, it is 
impossible to find even two disjoint committees of 8 members. Since smaller committees 
are more easily imagined than large ones, they appear to be more frequent.
The availability heuristic is affected by several factors: the recency of incidents; the 
distinctiveness of incidents; the frequency with which incidents are brought to mind; the
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depth with which the memory of incidents is processed. The recency factor can be used to 
explain why motorway drivers are seen to drive at a slower speed after passing the scene of 
an accident that they did before. The risk of an accident is highlighted in their minds while 
the accident is recent and the risk appears to be higher. Distinctive risk factors can appear 
to be greater than those which are less distinctive: for example, the risk of shark attack in 
Florida is much less than the risk of heart attack, but a report of a shark attack is very 
distinctive and more easily recalled than report of someone having suffered a heart attack. 
The frequency of reporting of rail crashes in the UK in the last few years has been very 
high compared with the reporting of road accidents and this appears to have been 
accompanied by a public perception that rail travel is more dangerous than road travel, 
although the statistics suggest otherwise.
3.5.3 Criticism of heuristics and biases
Gigerenzer (1993) has proposed counter-arguments to the heuristics suggested by 
Kahneman and Tversky. He reports experiments in which carefully modified versions of 
the tasks used by Kahneman and Tversky have shown no evidence of biases when 
presented to subjects. The modifications focus on re-expressing the tasks in terms of 
absolute frequencies instead of probabilities, ratios or relative frequencies.
As an example consider the example of what Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have called 
the conjunction fallacy, illustrated by the example of Linda, the bank teller.
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she 
was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti- 
nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
(a) Linda is a bank teller.
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(b) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement.
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983)
In Tversky and Kahneman’s research, about 90% of respondents answered that the second 
option (b) was more probable, a judgement that Tversky and Kahneman claimed was 
clearly non-normative since it violates the conjunction rule: for any two events A and B , 
V(AC\B) < P(4) and P(/4D2?) < P(5). The explanation for this widespread fallacy, according 
to Tversky and Kahneman, is that it is another example of people’s reliance upon the 
representativeness heuristic.
Gigerenzer’s analysis points out two problems with this example. First, he notes that this 
is a situation in which the probability would not be accepted by statisticians of the 
frequentist school (Gigerenzer, 1997), since it is really a probability in ‘singular mode’. 
Gigerenzer shares “the worries of those statisticians, philosophers, and psychologists who 
caution that the laws of probability do not apply to all kinds of statements about singular 
events, but apply only in well-defined circumstances” (Gigerenzer, 1996, p593). He 
suggests that there are good reasons for proposing that a respondent to the Linda example 
might quite reasonably interpret the question in such a way that the conjunction rule would 
be inappropriate. Secondly, he notes that Kahneman and Tversky’s view of what 
constitutes sound reasoning ignores the content and the context. He suggests that such a 
view is not acceptable, and that it is necessary to identify what the word ‘probable’ means 
in order to identify what is sound reasoning in the context of this problem. He notes that in 
a colloquial sense the word can mean ‘plausible’ or ‘having the appearance of truth’, and 
he suggests that such meanings might have little relation to the mathematical interpretation 
of probability, implying that the conjunction rule is not relevant.
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In view of these concerns, Gigerenzer reformulated the Linda problem in terms of 
frequencies. He replaced the question, “Which is more probable?” by a judgement 
involving frequencies.
There are 100 women like Linda.
How many of them are
(a) bank tellers,
(b) bank tellers and active in the feminist movement?
(Gigerenzer, 1997)
This reformulation appears to make explicit that the problem is about mathematical 
probability. This version of the problem was used in a series of experiments, in which 
violations of the conjunction rule fell from almost 90% with the original problem to about 
20% with the frequency judgements.
Gigerenzer and his colleagues have constructed a theoretical framework to predict the 
circumstances under which particular frequentist modifications to the probes used by 
Kahneman and Tversky will reduce or even nullify the biases observed using the original 
probes. This work is significant, but it works by narrowing the field of application of 
probabilistic thinking to situations in which a frequentist approach to probability can be 
used.
3.6 Equiprobability bias
A significant finding with potential implications for understanding of randomness is the 
equiprobability bias reported by Lecoutre (1992). In a series of experiments, subjects 
showed a tendency to assume that the set of possible outcomes in a chance setting were by 
nature equally likely. The finding persisted even when the subjects had some background 
in probability theory. Furthermore, when the chance element was masked in an
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‘equivalent’ test item requiring the same numerical calculations, the bias towards 
equiprobability was significantly less.
The standard problem involved three chips in ajar: two red and one white. When two 
chips are randomly selected from the jar, the result is either Rl: “a red and a white chip are 
obtained” or R2: “two red chips are obtained”. The question posed was:
Do you think the chance of obtaining each of these results is equal? Or is there more chance of 
obtaining one of them, and if so, which, Rl or R2?
(Lecoutre, 1992, p557)
In almost all their experiments, Lecoutre and colleagues found that the proportion of 
respondents who stated that Rl and R2 were equally likely was at least 50%.
The “house experiment” used a mathematically equivalent problem in which the chance 
element was masked. The experiment involved three square cards: two cards showed a 
triangle (in place of the two red chips), and the third showed a square (in place of the white 
chip). The three cards are shown in Figure 3.2 below.
Card 1 Card 2 Card 3
Figure 3.2: Lecoutre’s three cards.
The subjects were explicitly shown that it was possible to construct a rhombus if cards 1 
and 2 were drawn, or a house if cards 1 and 3 or cards 2 and 3 were drawn. Through this 
demonstration the chance aspect of the problem was masked. Respondents were then 
given the following question and were asked to select one of the four given responses.
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I put the three cards in this box and I am going to draw two cards. With the two cards drawn I will be 
able to construct either a house or a rhombus as you have just seen.
Do you think there is:
• An equal chance of obtaining a house and a rhombus?
• More chance of obtaining a house than a rhombus?
• More chance of obtaining a rhombus than a house?
• If it is impossible for you to give an answer, why?
(Lecoutre, 1992, p562)
In response to the house question, 75% of respondents gave the correct response and only 
23% gave the equiprobable response. This was a significant reduction in the proportion 
giving the equiprobable response, and would indicate, as Lecoutre argued, that the 
equiprobability bias is closely linked to people’s understanding of chance. Even when the 
correct cognitive models are available, they are sometimes not spontaneously associated 
with a situation involving chance.
Other studies have reported that the equiprobability bias remains common across students 
of different ages and persists in both simple and compound events (see Watson, 2005; 
Batanero and Sanchez, 2005). However, Amir and Williams (1999), in a smaller study that 
looked at beliefs and experience of a narrow age range across different cultural 
backgrounds, found relatively little evidence of consistent use of the “equiprobability bias 
heuristic”: only 19% of 11-12 year old pupils showed such a bias in at least one-third of 
their responses on a questionnaire. Amir and Williams suggest that the equiprobability 
bias may be linked with “a culture that regards chance in most cases as ‘equiprobable’, for 
examples in games using equiprobable dice...” (Amir and Williams, 1999, p i01).
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3.7 Outcome Approach
Another heuristic apparently used by people, adults as well as children, to interpret 
frequentist probabilities is the outcome approach, identified by Konold (1989). Konold 
interviewed college students about situations of uncertainty, and found evidence that many 
students hold conceptions of probability that are ‘non-probabilistic’ (Konold, 1989, and 
1990). He argued that these people reasoned according to the outcome approach, showing 
a tendency to interpret a statement about the probability of an event as a prediction that the 
event will occur. For example, the statement that the probability of rain tomorrow is 70% 
is understood as a prediction that it will rain tomorrow. The prediction is interpreted as 
being only 70% confident, but it is nonetheless a definite prediction. A student who uses 
the outcome approach may interpret the fact that it rained on 70 days out of 100 as 
showing that the prediction was wrong 30 times out of 100; the prediction was therefore 
not very good. A probability of close to 50% is interpreted as an inability to make any 
prediction and probabilities are interpreted according to their proximity to the ‘key’ values 
of 0%, 50% and 100%. Indeed, it is only when the probability is close to 50% that the 
outcome-oriented individual will consider the event to be ‘random’.
The objective of a person using the outcome approach appears to be that of predicting 
whether event A will occur in a single instance, rather than answering the question “How 
often will event A occur in the long run?” Of course, when considering the weather 
forecast, this is a perfectly natural interpretation, but it ignores the probabilistic nature of 
the prediction which is implied in the statement “the probability of rain tomorrow is 70%”. 
The natural inclination of a person inclined to use the outcome approach seems to be a 
search for causality. Falk and Konold (1990) see this difference in objective as lying 
behind the outcome approach, and as characterising the difference between formal and 
informal views of probability. An informal view of probability is common in the weather 
forecast, for example, and may be widely found in colloquial uses of the language of
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probability. The person who adopts the outcome approach, or who considers reasoning 
with uncertainty as being about predictions in the short run, is under-rating the role of 
chance. They may have learned “to think and converse in everyday language about 
‘chance’, ‘probability’, ‘luck’, ‘randomness’, and have developed a rich vocabulary with 
which to communicate degrees of belief ’ but their underlying perspective is at odds with 
formal theory. Their focus is on the short run, whereas the success of formal probability 
theory is only apparent in the long run.
Steinbring (1989) observed a similar suppression of the role of chance which arose when 
students were invited to evaluate a probability theory against observed outcomes. He i 
described a classroom dialogue in which students discuss the justification, correctness and 
interpretation of a proposed theoretical model for an urn drawing experiment. The students 
considered how to judge the difference between the theory and the observed data. During 
the discussion chance was presented by the students (and later also by the teacher) as the 
“only valid pattern of justification” (p331). Faced with the suggestion that in a particular 
single instance the least likely event might occur, the student’s response was “that’s 
chance”, with no attempt to consider the difference between the short term and long term 
perspectives. Steinbring suggests that this degeneration of chance “into a substitute for 
justification” obscures the difference between theoretical expectation and empirical facts in 
probability (Steinbring, 1989, p331).
3.8 Meanings of randomness
In a study of the meanings that children attributed to random phenomena, Pratt observed 
closely the ways in which children aged 10 and 11 years articulated their ideas and beliefs 
as they worked in a carefully designed computer-based domain. He identified two separate 
classes of meanings articulated by the children: local meanings and global meanings.
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Local meanings related to the behaviour of the ‘stochastic’ process in the short term. They 
were “local in the sense that such meanings focus on trial by trial variation” (Pratt, 1998, 
p i42). The local meanings identified by Pratt can be seen as characteristics that defined 
randomness for the children in his study.
• Unpredictability: If the next outcome is not predictable, a child might regard the experiment 
as random,
• Irregularity: If there is evidently no patterned sequence in prior results, a child might refer to 
the experiment as random,
• Unsteerability: If the child is unable to exert physical control over the outcome of the 
phenomenon, the experiment might be seen as random, and
• Fairness: If there seems to be a rough symmetry in the experiment, a child may think of the 
experiment as random.
(Pratt, 2005, pl75)
A fifth characteristic, which related specifically to the fact that the work was done within a 
computer-based domain using the pseudo-random generator, was the idea of the computer- 
in-control. Some children appeared to be initially reluctant to see the process as truly 
random because it had been programmed.
Sometimes the local meanings that the children articulated were contradictory, in which 
case children very often responded by readily modifying the characteristics considered 
necessary for randomness. Some children did not notice, or suppressed and ignored, the 
contradictions within the meanings that they articulated. For example, when a child 
experienced a simulation of a spinner as unfair and yet also as unpredictable, the unfairness 
was ignored and the spinner was considered random because it was unpredictable.
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On the other hand, global meanings evolved as children began to see the significance of an 
increase in the number of trials and recognized what emerged in the long term behaviour.
In their fully evolved form, global meanings were characterized by properties that broadly 
corresponded to the three of the main local characteristics of randomness, and all focused 
on a view of randomness arising from aggregation.
Global meanings are characterised by the following properties:
• The proportion of outcomes for each possibility is predictable (probability),
• The proportion of prior results for each possibility in the possibility space will stabilise as an 
increasing number of results is considered (large numbers),
• The observer is able to exert control over these proportions through manipulation of the 
possibility space (distribution).
(Pratt, 1998, pp 142-3)
The transition from local meanings to global meanings was not straightforward, and 
children did not move smoothly from articulating a local meaning to the corresponding 
global meaning. However, children appeared to construct meanings for aspects of 
randomness through their interaction with the tools provided within the computer 
microworld in a process that was lengthy and complex. Often the global meanings that 
emerged were expressed in terms of causal relationships.
Whereas local meanings remain at the level of that which can not be explained deterministically, the 
ultimate irony is that the central meanings constructed for long term behaviour, despite being later 
developments, turn out after all to have features associated with deterministic behaviour...
(Pratt, 1998, p225)
Thus the global meanings appeared to exist alongside the local meanings and, during the 
activity with the computer microworld, the children’s focus moved from local to global.
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Pratt does not report any movement from global to local, but it seems implicit in the task 
that he set and the probes that he used, that no such switch was either anticipated or looked 
for.
The movement of the subject’s attention between local meanings and global interpretations 
is interesting and deserves further attention. Pratt has shown that learners can hold 
multiple interpretations of what they observe, and that some of these may appear to an 
outsider to be contradictory. He has also shown that learners appear to be adept at shifting 
their attention between meanings and are able readily to suppress inconsistencies. At the 
global level, he has noted that the meanings for randomness become apparently self­
contradictory in that they appear to be deterministic in nature. Because Pratt’s method 
made extensive use of tools in a computer-based microworld, learners were led relatively 
quickly from the uncertainty and messiness of viewing outcomes trial by trial to viewing 
representations of larger numbers of trials that had been aggregated to produce an image 
that pointed towards the idea of distribution.
There are important questions to be asked about what people experience as they move from 
looking at short sequences of outcomes to looking at increasingly long sequences, before 
the data has been aggregated. What leads people to shift their attention from the local 
meanings to looking at the possibility of some global meaning? When does this shift 
occur? Does attention shift in the other direction, from global interpretation to the local, 
trial-by-trial variation?
3.9 Pattern seeking
It has been argued by Dehaene (1998) that a sense of number is innate in the human mind. 
Dehaene claims that the brain centre responsible for this sense of number can be identified 
and that the capacities of this ‘Number Sense’ can tell us something about how to teach
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mathematics. Furthermore, some recent research has suggested that there is a particular 
centre in the brain, in the pre-frontal cortex, which constantly monitors for patterns in 
sequences of events (Meredith, 2002), a kind of compulsive pattem-perception. This 
finding comes from experiments in which subjects watched random sequences of images - 
a circle or a square - flash onto a screen. During the experiments, researchers used a high- 
resolution functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging machine to monitor the subjects’ brain 
activity. Subjects were asked to press a button with the left hand when they saw a circle 
and with the right hand when they saw a square.
Because the sequence of circles and squares displayed was random, there were sometimes 
short patterns in the sequence of outcomes, either runs of the same image, or repeated 
alternations of circle square. When such a pattern occurred, the subjects showed brain 
reaction at the moment that the pattern was broken. When a long pattern was broken, the 
subjects tended to show an increased reaction time. Unsurprisingly, a longer sequence of 
an alternating pattern (circle square) was required before a response was detected, than for 
a run of the same image (circle circle). The researchers suggested that this unconscious 
searching for patterns might lie behind superstitious behaviour, where people believe that 
they have discerned a pattern in a sequence of random outcomes, where in reality no long­
term pattern exists (Meredith, 2002). It seems likely that, if such compulsive pattern- 
seeking is widespread, then it might provide an alternative explanation for some of the 
heuristics and biases identified by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982). For example, the representativeness heuristic could be seen as seeking to 
match observed outcomes to a template representing the essential characteristics of the 
generating process.
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3.10 Generation or Recognition
The stimulus tasks or activities that have most commonly been used in previous research to 
investigate people’s ideas about randomness may be classified into two categories (Falk et 
al., 1997):
Generation tasks, in which subjects are required to make up random sequences or sets of outcomes to 
simulate a series of outcomes from ‘tossing a coin’ or the final positions of a number of ‘snowflakes 
landing randomly on a square grid’;
Recognition (perception or judgement) tasks, in which subjects are asked to select what they think is 
the ‘most random’ of several sets of results that might have been produced by a ‘random’ process, or 
to decide whether a given outcome was produced by a random process.
Falk and Konold suggest (1997) that recognition tasks “may be more appropriate for 
revealing subjective concepts of randomness” because “a person could perceive 
randomness ‘accurately’ and still be unable to reproduce it” (p302). Indeed there is clear 
suggestion from many studies (Nickerson, 2002; Shaughnessy, 1992; Garfield and 
Ahlgren, 1988) that people are generally not good at generating random sequences. This 
usually means that when people try to generate what they consider to be ‘random 
sequences’, the sequences generated differ in some systematic manner from sequences 
generated by an independent random generator. Typically, people trying to simulate a 
random process tend to produce more short runs, fewer long runs and more alternations 
between outcomes, than would be expected from a random process (Bar-Hillel and 
Wagenaar, 1991; Falk and Konold, 1997). Other studies have used recognition tasks to 
explore what sequences people consider to be maximally random, and these again show 
that people tend to identify randomness with those sequences having an excess of 
alternations between outcomes (Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar, 1991; Falk and Konold, 1997).
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However, the fact that people can perceive randomness ‘accurately’, or not, does not reveal 
what they are paying attention to. It is not possible, using such tasks, to examine the role 
of the idea of ‘process’ within the subject’s conception of randomness. The recognition 
tasks described above focus attention only on a given sequence of outcomes; they do not 
require the person to consider the process by which these outcomes were generated.
Because I see randomness as, in an important sense, ‘dynamic’, I wanted to use probes that 
would present subjects with a ‘dynamic randomness’. Recognition tasks do not have this 
dynamic sense: the sequences presented to the subjects are static and fixed in the same way 
that a table of random numbers was ‘fixed’ for me. Generation tasks go some way towards 
the dynamic view that I want to present, since the subject may need to be aware of the 
essential unpredictability as they ‘generate’ the sequence. A subject, who has generated 
their own sequence, may have access to their assumptions about the particular process that 
they had in mind. However, I expected other tasks, involving real-time interaction with the 
outcomes from a random process, would go further. My initial intention was to include 
generation tasks in my study, accompanied by further tasks to form the basis for a 
discussion of what people believe about randomness in the situation presented.
3.11 Critiques of previous studies
Epstein Kainan (2000) provides a detailed and extensive review of research relating to 
people’s perceptions and judgements of randomness. In this, she argues that many of the 
experiments reported in the literature, which find that people are unable to behave 
randomly or to recognise randomness, are open to criticism.
She discusses a variety of ‘instructional biases’ that might be brought about by the manner 
in which the researchers frame their instructions to subjects. As Falk notes:
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Randomness is not only vaguely defined; it has also received an ambivalent treatment over decades by 
statisticians, psychologists, and other scientists.
(Falk, 1991, p215)
Instructional biases may arise from an explicit but inadequate or misleading definition. For 
example, some researchers have explicitly directed participants in generation tasks to 
produce jumbled sequences, without order (see Ayton et al, 1989). In this case the notion 
of a jumbled sequence, without order, is taken as representing randomness, but this is 
misleading since any random generator would produce discernible patterns if the sequence 
were sufficiently long. In fact, almost any instruction could mislead. For example, a 
subject who is asked to generate an arrangement of a set of cards that might be produced if 
the set were well-shuffled (Falk, 1981), might attempt to produce an arrangement in which 
the cards do not appear in any order that might be helpful in playing the game. If the 
instruction uses the term ‘random mixture’ the subject might bring their experience of 
creating a mixture in a cooking context where the goal is to produce a homogenous 
arrangement of the elements in small pieces, as in a salad mixture. Such an assumption 
might result in a subject tending to avoid runs of any individual outcome in generating a 
random sequence (Falk, 1999).
It seems unfair to require subjects to evaluate their attempts to produce sequences 
according to one set of criteria, when they are being judged in the research according to 
another. As Ayton et al. remarked about the potential for instruction bias:
(This) potential instructional bias seems to us symptomatic of a deeper tacit uneasiness among 
investigators of the lay concept of randomness. Running somewhat hauntingly through the published 
reports on the psychology of randomness is the disconcerting notion that it may not be reasonable to 
judge the competence of experimental subjects when, strictly speaking, the task they are set requires 
them to do what cannot, logically, be justified.
(Ayton, Hunt and Wright, 1989, p225)
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Much of Epstein Kanain’s discussion of methodological issues in studies of randomness 
relates to the question of whether an individual’s behaviour can ever be random. She cites 
work by Rapoport and Budescu (1992 and 1997) which used a procedure that avoided any 
instructions concerning randomness. The studies used tasks in which the simple and well- 
defined objectives would be optimally achieved through a random response. Using this 
paradigm, Budescu and Rapoport (1994) report that, when people play two-person 
competitive games, in which they need to conceal their choices in order to maximise their 
gain, the binary sequences that they generate appear random under standard tests.
However, while this might demonstrate that people can, under certain circumstances, 
produce behaviour which appears to be random, it does not say much about what people 
believe randomness to be, nor about what they perceive to be random, and why they think 
the way they do.
3.12 Researching Perceptions of Randomness
Previous research into peoples’ understanding of ‘randomness’ has often focussed on the 
perceived randomness of a sequence of ‘outcomes’. For example, many studies have 
required subjects to judge whether a sequence of outcomes may be described as ‘random’ 
without inviting them to pay attention to the process by which these outcomes were 
generated (Falk and Konold, 1997; Batanero and Serrano, 1999)
I suggest that, in research into perceptions of randomness, the lack of attention given to the 
dynamic sense of random is related to the lack of attention paid to the randomness of the 
generating process. I therefore decided that the stimulus tasks used in the present study 
should focus the subjects’ attention on the process. However, paying attention to the 
process may not in itself be enough. I have also set out to encourage and enable my 
subjects to be aware of the surprise and anticipation that can often be experienced when 
one interacts with a random process at each successive outcome. Inevitably, when
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someone is judging whether a process that generates a sequence of discrete outcomes is 
random, they will pay some attention to a sequence of past outcomes from the process as 
well as possibly considering the nature of the generating process itself. The object of the 
consideration may remain static and unchanging, even if it includes the process itself, 
unless it includes an attempt to anticipate the future outcomes of the process. It is in 
anticipating the next outcomes and in the accompanying experience of surprise that the 
dynamic unpredictability of what is random becomes a part of what is experienced.
Previous research into people’s perception of randomness has often appeared to conclude 
that people have ‘wrong’ conceptions of randomness or that human reasoning is in some 
sense lacking or failing. My aim in this study is not to draw such conclusions but rather to 
describe what the learners in my interviews actually do and how they reason. I try not to 
evaluate the responses of the interviewees but rather to describe them, so as to appreciate 
the range of perceptions and ways of thinking.
3.13 Pseudo-random numbers
An important issue is whether it would be appropriate to use computer simulation in this 
study. Some writers have expressed reservations about the use of computer generated 
pseudo-random numbers with learners. Green (1990) reported on a small study of a suite 
of programs for BBC microcomputers used in classrooms. He noted difficulties verifying 
the claims for such software.
.. .The misconceptions which are common in the field of probability (and about computers) must give 
cause for doubt as to whether the pupils get from computer simulations what the teachers or software 
writers assume. There seems to be a built-in assumption that the basis of the simulation is understood 
and accepted and the role of the computer (and the random number generator) is appreciated.
(Green, D., 1990, p59)
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Hawkins et al (1991) and Shaughnessy (1992) suggest that experience of physical versions 
of the experiments represented by the software may be an essential pre-requisite. As 
Shaughnessy puts it:
It is as though students must proceed through the same steps as the computer in order to believe the 
results. It is important for us to continue to develop connections between concrete simulations and 
computer simulations in our teaching, and to investigate the effects of transition between the two in 
our research.
(Shaughnessy, 1992, p485)
The random number generator in a computer is often explained to students by analogy to 
physical generators such as dice or spinners. The difficulty with this approach is that 
physical generators are not usually considered primarily as generators of random 
sequences, but rather their physical properties of symmetry and homogeneity are used to 
justify the assumption that there is a pool of equally likely outcomes. On the other hand, a 
random generator on a computer has no direct link with physical symmetry or other 
physical properties by which to justify a probabilistic model. Biehler (1991) suggests the 
similarity between a random generator and a pool of equally likely outcomes lies in the 
structure of the data generated. To judge the quality of a random generator requires 
detailed probabilistic analysis of the generated data.
The difficulties with pseudo-random number generators in computer simulations really are an 
indication of inherent features of probability.
(Biehler, 1991, page 191)
Biehler proposes that computer generators be presented to students alongside physical 
generators, and used to give insight into the structure of data generated by physical 
generators. Such an approach might help students understand that random numbers can be 
imitated by a mathematical algorithm, and might move towards overcoming the mystique
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surrounding computer generators. But this still leaves the profound philosophical conflict 
that the computer generates a ‘random’ sequence deterministically.
In view of these cautions about learners’ abilities to trust pseudo-random numbers, I 
decided that I would not use computer simulations in the early stages of this study.
3.14 Modelling and Learning
In Chapter 1 ,1 discussed my view that the concept of randomness involves the act of 
modelling some phenomena. In the sense that the act of modelling involves creating 
and/or working with a representation of the phenomena for some purpose, the motivation 
behind the act of modelling is clearly significant. The motivation of a learner choosing to 
use the ideas of randomness when thinking about a phenomenon is another aspect of the 
concept of randomness that is not considered in either recognition or generation tasks. 
Indeed, I suggest that the way that generation tasks and recognition tasks have been set to 
subjects in many studies has not recognised that randomness is a model and that the 
application of randomness to a situation is an act of modelling.
The extent to which a learner chooses to apply randomness as a model when thinking 
about a particular situation may be a significant variable. Indeed it is possible that in some 
circumstances a learner may choose not to apply the recognised randomness model at all, 
but some variation of it. Konold’s identification of people using what he has termed the 
‘outcome approach’ (Konold, 1989) would seem to suggest that some people tend to apply 
something other than the randomness model in some circumstances. An individual using 
the outcome approach is concerned to predict the outcome of a single trial, and does so by 
relying on a causal model which ignores frequency information, even when such 
information contradicts the causal model. However, there are circumstances in which it 
may be a rational decision to work with a deterministic model instead of a stochastic one,
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so one may not necessarily conclude that an individual who appears to predict a single 
outcome is using the outcome approach. Pratt (1998) uses the idea of crossing the road 
safely to make this point. If I choose a place to cross the road which is visible, and I 
exercise caution in choosing when to cross, then I expect to cross safely. In this sense, I 
minimise the risk but I choose to think deterministically: because I have minimised the risk 
I will cross safely. Few people would use a stochastic model for crossing the road, in 
which they would explicitly recognise that they have a specific chance of crossing safely 
and therefore a chance of not doing so.
It follows that any attempt to use tasks as a stimulus for subjects to discuss their ideas of 
randomness needs to pay attention to the purposes which might motivate the subject in a 
given context when they choose whether to apply a stochastic model or not.
Thinking with models is a common activity in many spheres of human experience. 
Learners’ perceptions of randomness and of the behaviour of random processes must be 
recognised as distinct from both the mathematical models and the real world situations that 
they represent. Randomness is a model that is sometimes useful to describe certain kinds 
of phenomena. Many attempts to define mathematical modelling can be found in the 
literature, but one definition that I have found helpful in thinking about this study is the 
following:
Modelling is thinking about one thing in terms of simpler artificial things; mathematics is thinking
about these simple artificial things, including inventing new ones.
(Ogbom, 1994, pi 3)
If modelling is described in terms of thinking, then what is thinking? At one level, 
thinking can involve building explanations of observed phenomena, solving problems, or 
making reasoned predictions. When children speak of “working things out”, this is an
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expression of the substance of thinking. At a different level, thinking is the mental 
manipulation of imagined entities, in the style of mental models.
I think of mental models as general tools for thinking: mental tools for thinking about 
abstract concepts in terms of objects or events in the real world, using logical reasoning to 
extend from the real world experience of objects or events to build mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Normative models of random phenomena and probability may be 
less precise and less explicit than in an area such as physical systems; thus mental models 
used by subjects to think about situations involving uncertainty, chance or randomness 
may be difficult to articulate.
There is an important sense in which a goal for teaching about randomness is that the idea 
of randomness should become a model for thinking about situations in which it is not 
possible to know precisely what will happen in any single instance, as discussed in Chapter 
2. However such a development requires the learner to bring together thinking and 
experiences from various different arenas of experience, particularly from daily life and 
from the classroom.
From everyday life, the learner has many experiences of uncertainty, such as waiting for a 
bus, or reading newspaper reports of earthquakes or a tsunami. The individual learner will 
have tried to make some sense of each of these experiences, and may have attempted to 
generalise across such experiences. In attempting to make sense of uncertainty and 
unpredictability, they may draw upon informal lessons from home, family and possibly 
from a community. For example, children whose family belongs to a religious community 
may have been taught religious beliefs relating to a particular faith community, which may 
affect how they consider situations involving uncertainty, especially where such a situation 
involves some personal stake.
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From formal education, the learner experiences lessons about the formal mathematical 
models of randomness and probability, and may experience applying formal models to 
replicable experiments. The planned and organised intention behind the provision of 
experiences in a formal educational setting seems initially to be quite different from the 
manner in which learners experience in daily life. However, the processes of sense- 
making -  of organising, interpreting and building meaning from the formal experiences -  
cannot be separated from the meanings that learners have previously constructed in 
informal settings. This argument fits the essential principles of constructivism:
Knowledge is actively constructed by the cognizing subject, not passively received from the 
environment.
Coming to know is an adaptive process that organises one’s experiential world; it does not discover an 
independent, pre-existing world outside the mind of the knower.
(Kilpatrick, 1987, p7)
The processes by which mental models are acquired and become internalised as tools for 
thought are not well understood. I want to outline an account which builds on a 
Vygotskian perspective and is drawn in part from Bliss (1994, pp27-30).
Johnson-Laird (1983) views a mental model as a tool for thought, as a working 
representation of a phenomenon held in the mind. He sees the individual as searching for 
examples and counter-examples against which to judge and match their developing mental 
model. Bliss suggests that two important processes need to be examined. First, there is 
the process of internalisation, whereby action and experience become organised, abstracted 
and internalised in the mind as tools for thought. Secondly, she considers the expression of 
ideas and thinking for communication, reflection and inspection; this process of 
extemalisation she suggests can help an individual to refine, clarify and develop their 
thinking.
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According to Piaget, the development of mental processes arises when the individual is 
engaged in unconscious mental activity to abstract general schemes from experiences and 
actions. This Piagetian internalisation is within the individual and the mental schemes 
abstracted are unconscious. This essentially private process seems to me to be inadequate 
to describe the process by which individuals learn.
From a Vygotskian perspective, the process of internalisation is concerned with relations 
between social processes and the individual’s activities, and is mediated through language. 
Schemes are built from experiences of external social activities in which individuals share 
experiences and share their understanding of these experiences using language. Examples 
of such activities relating to randomness might be an informal family game of ‘snakes and 
ladder’ or a discussion at the bus-stop about whether or when the late-running bus will 
arrive. Within a classroom, the activity might be an activity using dice to simulate traffic 
flow at a set of traffic lights. The expression, interpretation and exchange of ideas and 
models enables development of a language within the mind of the individual for thinking 
about, reflecting upon, internalising and owning versions of these ideas and models, as 
they become internal mental processes. However, the process of building a shared 
understanding through conversation, listening to and reading from others, and trying 
express, may sometimes leave mismatches between the internalised mental models held by 
different individuals, and may leave mismatches between an individual’s mental model and 
the equivalent idea in formal mathematics.
The process of externalising ideas and models is the relationship between thought and 
language. Vygotsky discussed this relationship in ways that express the subtle and yet 
dynamic nature of the process.
The relation of thought to word is not a thing but a process, a continual movement back and forth from 
thought to word and from word to thought... Every thought tends to connect something with 
something else, to establish a relationship between things. Every thought moves, grows and develops,
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fulfils a function, solves a problem. This flow of thought occurs as an inner movement through a
series of planes.
(Vygotsky, 1934, edited and translated 1962, p i25, from Bliss, 1994, p29-30)
This process is capable of infinite variety and may stop at any point. Many thoughts are 
never externalised and many cognitive activities are tacit. Indeed, as Bliss points out, there 
is a distinction to be made “between mental models acquired without explicit instruction 
and those deriving from teaching” (p29). Bliss suggests that the second are likely to be 
more readily available for conscious thought and reflection, while the first will often be 
less easily externalised. Vygotsky suggests that extemalisation of thought enables 
reflection, which in turn aids the development of understanding. Bliss notes that, while 
actions and speech are transient, extemalisation in other media, such as writing, drawing 
and painting, is more permanent and can enable more extended reflection.
My intention in this study is not to explore the processes of internalisation and 
extemalisation, but to explore what has been internalised by learners about randomness. 
Thus I am concerned with devising activities which will encourage and enable learners to 
externalise their ideas to me. I now need to discuss how what is internalised in the mind of 
an individual can be related to external stimuli.
The diagram in Figure 3.3 below is developed from a similar figure that I devised in an 
earlier study (Wilder, 1993). It represents schematically some of the different ways in 
which one thing represents another. Boxes in the top half of the figure represent things 
outside the mind of the learner, while those in the bottom half are representations held in 
the learner’s mind. The box in the top left might represent an activity in which the learner 
experiments with a cubical die. The box in the bottom left would then represent the set of 
expectations held by the learner about how the die will behave when it is rolled, the 
outcomes that will be observed. This box might also contain the learner’s ideas about how
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to interact with a die, and what to do if it does not behave as expected. The expectations 
and ideas that constitute the learner’s mental model will have been acquired from previous 
experiences of playing games involving dice, many of which are likely to have occurred in 
social settings. In such settings, the learner may have observed behaviours such as 
blowing on the die ‘for luck’ before rolling it, or they may have experienced the frustration 
of trying to ‘get a six’ to start the game!
Outside 
the learner
In the mind 
of the learner
Real world situation
Mental model of
the situation
Learner's
Representation of the 
Situation
Formal mathematical
understanding of the 
mathematical model
Learner's
Figure 3.3: Representations and models
Boxes on the right hand side of Figure 3.3 represent mathematical ideas, and are likely to 
have been the subject of formal educational experiences. I anticipated that, in this study, 
all the learners would have had some formal introduction to probability. Thus, when 
presented with the task of experimenting with a cubical die, the learner might call to mind 
their understanding of a probabilistic model for the outcomes from rolling a fair die. This 
would be in the box in the bottom right, and it might or might not be consistent with a 
formal mathematical model for a fair die.
The heavier vertical and horizontal lines joining the boxes represent some of the interfaces 
across which these various representations interact. Suppose, for example, that the cubical 
die in the real world situation is discovered by experiment to be biased. There might be
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initially an inconsistency, a mismatch, with the learner’s mental model of the situation.
The learner might be expected to adapt their mental model, which would create an 
inconsistency with the probabilistic model that was called to mind earlier. In attempting to 
modify their understanding of a suitable mathematical model, it is possible that the learner 
could be faced with creating a mathematical model that is outside their previous experience 
of formal mathematical models, in which case there might arise a vacancy in the box in the 
top right.
The focus of attention in this study is on the box in the bottom left and its interfaces with 
the top left and the bottom right. I shall not be much concerned in this study with formal 
mathematical models outside the mind of the learner, but only with the learner’s 
interpretation and understanding of the mathematics: that is, with what the learner believes 
that they know.
3.15 Concluding remarks
A variety of themes have been discussed in this chapter. In this closing section I 
summarise those that will be important in later chapters. I have related some of these 
themes to the bullet points in section 2.8 at the end of Chapter 2.
Reflection upon the historical development of probability and statistics alongside evidence 
from psychological studies of people’s beliefs about luck and chance may indicate that 
children still hold beliefs in spurious controlling forces or agencies when they come to 
study probability in school. Indeed some studies (such as Phillips and Wright, 1977, and 
Amir and Williams, 1999) have indicated that such influences are more prevalent amongst 
pupils from some cultural and ethnic groups. This relates to point 2a) in Chapter 2, that 
randomness is seen as either caused or not caused.
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The work of Piaget (1951, translated 1975), Green (1989) and Metz (1998) indicate that 
randomness, distribution and the law of large numbers are a related set of ideas in the 
development of the concept of randomness. Green points to a failure to consider local 
uncertainty separately from global aspects of randomness, and Metz suggests that 
integration of these two aspects is a critical development in understanding of randomness. 
This issue may relate to the potential conflict between the ideas of randomness and 
determinism (Chapter 2, point 3b). From a different perspective, Pratt’s work has also 
indicated the critical nature of the transition from working only with local meanings of 
randomness to holding global meanings of deterministic distribution alongside local 
uncertainty (Pratt, 1998). This relates to point 2b) in Chapter 2 that randomness can be 
seen either locally or globally.
Of the widely reported heuristics used by people of all ages in making judgements under 
uncertainty, some are likely to have particular significance in recognising and interpreting 
situations in which randomness might be applied. I list below those heuristics discussed in 
this chapter, which I expect to find young people using in their strategies to discern random 
from non-random behaviour.
• Representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) is widely reported amongst 
children and adults.
• Availability (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) is reported to be used in making 
judgements about risk and may be related to people’s beliefs about how hard it is to roll 
a six with a fair die.
• Equiprobability bias (Lecoutre, 1992) may affect people reasoning about random 
generators. I wonder whether the equiprobability bias is related to the belief held by 
some people that randomness is equivalent to having equally likely outcomes (Chapter 
2, point lb).
• Outcome approach (Konold, 1989)
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• Pattern seeking as a strategy is likely to be closely related to the idea that randomness 
is pattern-breaking (Chapter 2, point 4a).
The distinction between distributional and singular uncertainties (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982) relates to the question, identified at the end of Chapter 2, of whether people see 
single events as being random. Similarly, the distinction between internal and external 
sources of uncertainty may be significant. While randomness might be expected to be 
readily applied to situation of external uncertainty, this might not be the case for internal 
sources of uncertainty.
A variety of methodological issues has been raised in this chapter, relating to methods used 
in previous studies reported in the research literature. In discussion of the distinction 
between recognition tasks and generation tasks, I do not see recognition tasks as 
embodying my idea of randomness as dynamic and I therefore have a preference for 
generation tasks. However, when people perform generation tasks, I see the need to 
interview them about their experience of generating outcomes to explore the focus of their 
attention.
Computer generated pseudo-random numbers are likely to be significant in the teaching 
and learning about randomness and probability. However, I consider that they would 
introduce an added level of complexity that is best excluded for the purposes of this study.
Finally I have drawn upon ideas about mental models and a Vygostkian approach to 
learning to outline a model of learning and understanding about randomness. This model 
has enabled me to identify my focus for this study as the learner’s informal mental models 
for randomness.
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The fundamental purpose of this study is to explore learners’ perceptions of randomness. 
There are two distinct, but related, sets of questions that I sought to address under this 
heading.
The first set of questions relates to what learners believe about randomness.
• What do learners believe randomness to be?
• What do learners expect from a random generator?
• How do learners recognise what they believe to be random and discern the random 
from what they consider to be non-random?
The second set of questions relates to the idea that randomness is an important model to be 
applied to describe a process.
• To what situations and circumstances do learners consider randomness to be an 
appropriate model?
• What is the range and variety of situations and circumstances for which learners 
consider that randomness is an appropriate model?
• How are learners’ responses to this second set of questions related to their responses to 
the first set?
In this study, I was not concerned with trying to develop any kind of teaching approach, 
and I did not seek to effect any change in learners’ understanding. Rather, I aimed to 
identify and describe the range and variety of what learners understand about randomness.
A fundamental question for me in beginning this study was to identify what randomness is. 
In Chapter 2 ,1 have identified various ways in which randomness is conceived by 
statisticians and by philosophers. This in itself has presented some major challenges for
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me in undertaking this study as randomness is defined in several different ways. However, 
my starting point has been my own personal perspective on randomness as a dynamic 
concept, which I described in section 2.6. This view of randomness is the one that I intend 
to present in my research.
Two important considerations relating to my personal view of randomness lie behind my 
approach to the study. The first is that randomness is a model for a process, not only a 
description of a sequence of outcomes. Secondly, randomness is dynamic.
I wanted to try to engage learners in discussion of randomness as process, as well as 
considering how and whether to interpret observed outcomes as from a random process.
As noted in Chapter 3, many previous studies have considered people’s interpretation of 
finite sequences of outcomes, often quite short sequences, and have not paid sufficient 
attention to the subject’s ideas about the generating process.
My view of randomness as a dynamic concept has also led me to make criticisms, in 
Chapter 3, of the methods adopted in much previous research into perceptions of 
randomness. I have set out to develop short tasks or probes to encourage learners to 
consider what they expect from the situation presented to them, and to decide whether they 
believe the situation to be random. An important feature that I wanted to build into these 
tasks was that they should be dynamic in the sense that I have described, and that they 
encourage the individual to attend not only to the outcomes as they appear, but also to the 
generating process.
I also wanted to consider whether it is possible to develop a modification of the standard 
generation task, in which learners not only attempt to emulate a random generator by 
producing random outcomes, but also reflect on what they were thinking while so doing. 
Although it is possible that a generation task leads the individual to focus almost 
exclusively upon the generated outcomes, I wonder whether by encouraging people to
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reflect upon and to talk about the experience of generating random outcomes, I might be 
able to access some ideas about the generating process that they are trying to emulate.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 ,1 decided not to introduce computer simulations of 
randomness in this study. My concern was with what people believe about randomness; to 
introduce pseudo-randomness into this discussion seems to me to be a diversion from my 
main purpose. However, I do not mean to suggest that computers have no role in children 
learning to experience and understand randomness. Indeed, I see one outcome of my study 
as being to contribute to the more effective design of software in which children can 
experience and experiment with random phenomena.
My aim was to explore learner’s existing informal notions of randomness and their 
interfaces with both the real world and with the learner’s own formal mathematical 
understanding of randomness. I wanted learners to express their mental models of 
randomness -  that is, to express those working internalised representations of randomness 
that they used to solve problems and to interact with real situations. (See Figure 3.3)
Page 88
Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods
Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods
In this chapter, I outline the considerations that have shaped the development of the 
methods used in my study. In Chapter 3 ,1 discussed my own view of the concept of 
randomness as being dynamic. I contrasted this view with the ideas implicit in methods 
used in other studies of people’s perceptions of randomness that have been reported in the 
literature and I considered how my own view of randomness relates to some critiques of 
previous studies. In this chapter, I draw upon the discussion in Chapter 3 to show how 
consideration of these critiques and of my own perspective on randomness, and my reading 
about phenomenography, have shaped the development of the tasks used in this study and 
led me to use in-depth interviews with a few subjects rather than short probes with a larger 
sample. The present study is set within a phenomenographic framework.
5.1 Methodology
From an early stage, the development of this study was influenced by my reading about 
phenomenography as a methodological framework for describing what I was aiming to 
achieve in my research. As the study evolved, the design moved away from being a purely 
phenomenographic study, but the influence remains and needs to be acknowledged.
Attempting to probe people’s awareness of randomness causes considerable 
methodological difficulties because of the essentially negative nature of randomness (not 
determined, not predictable, without pattern). Its meaning as a word could be probed using 
a Wittgensteinian approach by looking, for example, at the various ways the word is used 
in the media and in interviews, but I wanted to try to probe beneath the surface of use to try 
to uncover what makes it such a difficult concept to grasp and to use appropriately.
Because I was interested in exploring the variety of experiences and uses of the term
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amongst students, I turned to phenomenography, which is intended to identify the range of 
ways of experiencing a phenomenon.
5.1.1 Phenomenography
Phenomenography is related to, but distinct from, phenomenology. Phenomenology 
originated in the writing of the German philosopher, Husserl, in 1900, and later developed 
to a philosophical movement that included scholars such as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau- 
Ponty, Gadamer and Schutz. Broadly it represents an approach to the study of phenomena 
through experience: the researcher’s account of her experience of the phenomenon 
provides the data. Phenomenological research has been influential in sociology and 
psychology, amongst other areas.
Phenomenography is a much more recent development and arose originally in Gothenburg, 
Sweden, in the 1970’s, in research into conceptions of what it means to learn, and to teach 
(Marton, 1981; Saljo, 1982). It has since been applied to studying different ways of 
understanding the content of learning (Linder, 1989; Renstrom, Andersson and Marton, 
1990), and to studying different conceptions of the world.
Marton (1994) suggests that, in phenomenography, the data to be analysed relates to many 
people’s experience of the phenomenon being studied. Phenomenographic methods 
provide a systematic approach to the collection and analysis of this data. Within 
phenomenology, the researcher attempts to provide a ‘thick description’ of the 
phenomenon based upon her own experiences (direct observation of or ‘living in’ the 
phenomenon). In contrast, the phenomenographic researcher uses data from many 
different subjects and seeks to produce broad categories to describe differences between 
the ways people experience, conceptualise, understand, perceive and apprehend the 
phenomenon (Marton, 1994). The aim of phenomenographic research is to identify a 
limited number of qualitatively different ways of experiencing the phenomenon, and to
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characterise these in terms of relationships between them, perhaps forming hierarchies in 
relation to some criteria. This aim closely matches what I hoped to achieve in relation to 
learners’ understanding and thinking about ‘randomness’.
Data collection in a phenomenographic study usually involves a large number of individual 
interviews conducted as a dialogue, in which the interviewee is encouraged to reflect on 
aspects of the phenomenon, which may yet be unconsidered in the mind of the interviewee. 
In Marion’s words: “The more we can make things which are unthematised and implicit 
into objects of reflection, and hence thematised and explicit, the more fully do we explore 
awareness” (1994). Or again, “As phenomenography is empirical research, the researcher 
is not studying his or her own awareness and reflection, but that of their subjects” (1994). 
Marton describes the interview as a dialogue, enabling the ‘thematisation’ of previously 
implicit aspects of the subject’s experience. The data therefore represents an account of 
these various aspects jointly constituted by interviewer and interviewee.
In a phenomenographic approach, analysis of the data is usually conducted iteratively. The 
first stage is to focus on “similarities and differences between the ways in which the 
phenomenon appears to the participants”, beginning with an attempt to identify what is 
immediately relevant in the interview as an expression of experience of the phenomenon. 
This leads on to identifying “distinct ways of understanding (or experiencing) the 
phenomenon”, looking for similarities and differences between the ‘relevant’ quotations 
from the interview and grouping them under these headings. Having identified the groups, 
the researcher can look for relationships between the groups to see how the “distinct ways 
of understanding (or experiencing) the phenomenon” are related. The ordered or partially 
ordered set of categories of description is referred to as the outcome space and constitutes 
the outcome of the study.
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There are undoubtedly difficulties within the philosophical foundations of 
phenomenography, some of which might be represented by the difficulty of such 
fundamental questions as “What is a way of experiencing something?” (This question 
appears on Hasselgren’s website (Hasselgren, webref) and represents recent concerns of 
phenomenographic researchers). However, it is not my intention to engage with these here 
as the approach has been shown to be effective in previous studies (Marton, 1994; Linder, 
1989; Renstrom, Andersson and Marton, 1990; Runesson, 1999). Rather, I intend to use 
the pragmatic intentions of phenomenographic research to represent in general terms what 
I hope to achieve in relation to learners’ experience and understanding of ‘randomness’. I 
use interviews to probe learners’ experience and understanding of what it means to say that 
something is ‘random’, based around the learners’ immediate experience of addressing 
tasks which involve the idea of randomness in some way. For example, this entails 
examining when a subject chooses to describe something as ‘random’ and when as ‘not 
random’, and how a subject describes and reasons about random situations.
5.1.2 Why interviews?
Much previous research into perceptions of randomness has focused on how subjects 
respond to written problems with multiple choice responses (see for example, Green,
1983). Subjects’ written responses are then examined and interpreted. Other research has 
interviewed subjects about problem situations and used subjects’ responses to identify 
heuristics that appear to underpin ‘judgements under uncertainty’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1972; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).
Pratt (1998) took a very different approach. In his study, he created a computer 
microworld for exploring randomness, and interviewed pupils as they worked in this 
microworld. The idea of using computer software to provide an environment in which 
learners make explicit their ideas about randomness is an important one, to which I may
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need to return after the present study. However, my concern in this study has been to 
discover how learners interact with and think about situations that they would usually 
expect to be random. In this study, I considered that to have worked with pseudo-random 
generators would have been an unnecessary additional complication, as discussed in 
section 3.13.
In a recent experimental study of school students’ perceptions of randomness, Batanero 
and Serrano (1999) adopted a quantitative approach. Data was collected from 277 students 
and a series of significance tests was conducted to demonstrate where students’ ability to 
recognise randomness shows significant changes from age 14 to age 17. In follow-up 
interviews, the researchers asked the students to explain how they could tell whether the 
given set of outcomes was ‘random’ or not. The children’s explanations were used to infer 
how the children were reasoning about randomness. Because the children’s explanations 
of how they recognised randomness were based on their interpretation of given sequences 
of outcomes (recognition tasks), I was not convinced that the inferences drawn in this 
study were valid. The recognition of randomness in fixed sequences of outcomes does not 
seem to me to hold the ‘dynamic’ sense of random that I believe is important. This study 
attempted to do something similar to what I wanted to do, but the study had not explored 
the students’ reasoning in depth.
In my study, my intention was to probe subjects’ understanding of randomness to a greater 
extent than had been done previously. Semi-structured interviews were organised around a 
sequence of ‘stimulus’ tasks or activities. The tasks provided a context in which this 
greater depth of insight could emerge. Questions asked in the interviews sought to probe 
why subjects hold the conceptions that they do, and whether there are limitations to the 
circumstances in which subjects will apply these conceptions.
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The style of interview that I envisaged was rather like the clinical interviews used by 
Piaget. In a critical analysis of the clinical interview procedure in mathematics education 
research, Ginsburg (1981) suggested that clinical interviews can legitimately be used for 
three different research purposes: to discover cognitive activities; to identify cognitive 
activities; and to evaluate levels of competence. My purpose in this study has been to 
discover the variety of mental structures, processes and thought patterns that learners use 
as they interact with instances of randomness, and to explore what the learner is aware of 
and to what aspects of the experience of randomness they give attention. I have not been 
seeking to evaluate competence, and before I started this study I did not have a detailed 
map of the variety of thought processes that I might find. My purpose therefore fits closely 
the first of Ginsburg’s three purposes for clinical interviews.
However, it is important to recognise that an interview is a conversation between two 
people: the interviewer and the interviewee. The data arising from the interview cannot be 
seen as independent of the interviewer-researcher, especially when, as in this case, the 
interview is semi-structured to allow freedom to follow the ideas that emerge. The product 
of an interview is, in the words of Kvale “knowledge... created inter the points of view of 
the interviewer and the interviewee” (Kvale, 1996, p i24).
A critical element in the success of these interviews was the choice of probes to be the 
focus for discussion about the idea of ‘randomness’. I assumed initially that this stimulus 
should take the form of a task or activity. However, such tasks can be varied in several 
ways. The development of the tasks used is discussed in section 5.2.
5.1.3 Design and conduct of interviews
The purpose of a qualitative research interview is to obtain a qualitative description of the 
interviewee’s lived experience, and of the meanings that the interviewee interprets from 
their experiences (Kvale, 1996). In a semi-structured interview, one of the aims is to allow
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the interviewee the freedom to talk about what is important to them within the parameters 
of the focus of the interview, and to express their views. No formal script is used, although 
an agenda -  a structure or framework -  for the conversation has been established 
beforehand. The existence of the framework helps to organise the interview to ensure that 
important aspects of the focus are not omitted. The framework also provides an 
organisation for the process of analysis. Kvale has suggested that a semi-structured 
interview:
.. .has a sequence of themes to be covered, as well as suggested questions. Yet at the same time there is 
an openness to changes of sequence and forms of questions in order to follow up the answers given 
and the stories told by the subjects.
(Kvale, 1996, p.124)
An interview with a single interviewee is relatively easy to transcribe from audiotape. In 
interviews with pairs or small groups, it can be difficult to identify from the tape precisely 
who was speaking at any instant. Also people interrupt one another; the transcription can 
become difficult to record accurately. In a one-to-one interview, the opinions and views 
expressed stem only from the exchange between interviewer and interviewee, which can 
help make the process of analysis more manageable.
Questions, probes and prompts need to be expressed in a clear, straightforward way, in 
order not to confuse the interviewee. It is important to avoid using words or phrases that 
are unlikely to be understood by the respondents. The interviewer needs to pay close 
attention to the interviewee’s response to any question in order to be aware of times when 
the interviewee has not understood, or might have misunderstood. Where possible, 
questions should be kept short; lengthy and complex questions are difficult to understand.
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Dynamically, the questions should promote a positive interaction; keep the flow of the conversation 
going and motivate the subjects to talk about their experiences and feelings. The questions should be 
easy to understand, short and devoid of academic language.
(Kvale, 1996, p. 130)
Care is needed in establishing the mood and direction of the interview in the first few 
minutes. The interviewer needs briefly to introduce the purpose of the interview, explain 
the use of the tape-recorder, and invite the interviewee to ask any questions. The first few 
minutes on an interview are very important in establishing a relationship between 
interviewee and interviewer. The interviewer needs to listen attentively, and show interest 
in what the interviewee says. It is also important that the interviewer should be at ease and 
totally clear about what is to be discussed. As far as possible, the early stages of the 
interview should be kept simple, to allow the interviewee and interviewer to get used to 
each other. As the interview progresses, the nature of the questions and the issues 
addressed may become more demanding and searching.
At the end of the interview, the interviewer again allows the interviewee to ask any 
questions or to add any further comments. At this stage, it is possible that the interviewee 
may be experiencing some tension of anxiety, particularly if the interview has been 
searching or demanding, so it is important to allow them time to unwind a little and to 
emerge from the experience (Kvale, 1996).
During an interview, the interviewer listens closely to what is said by the interviewee. 
Interventions from the interviewer are sometimes necessary to direct the conversation in 
productive directions or to encourage the interviewee to reflect more deeply and expand 
upon an idea expressed. However, it is important that the interviewer should limit their 
interventions since the intention is to hear the experiences and reflections of the
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interviewee. Theman noted particularly the need to take nothing for granted in the 
interviewee’s experience and understanding of the focus of the study.
We can never take for granted that we know what our subjects know about a certain phenomenon,
even though we are able to talk about it in very similar general terms.
(Theman, 1979, p3)
Related to this, Theman shows how the interviewer’s interventions can lead to several 
problems. First, he noted, with reference to an interview he conducted, how easily an 
interviewer can unintentionally anticipate the interviewee’s utterances and hence fail to 
record the evidence that a key idea originated from the interviewee. He commented: 
“When the subject... almost says the thing I want to hear, it works like a trigger, it makes 
me immediately take the lead” (Theman, 1979, p5). The interviewer’s intervention means 
that, in the recorded dialogue, the interviewee’s conception is inseparable from that of the 
interviewer.
A similar difficulty can arise from the fact that one of the interviewer’s aims within the 
interview is to bring the interviewee to work on the edge of their existing understanding, 
which means discussing knowledge and understanding that is either new or to some extent 
unreflected. During such discussion, the interviewee is likely to experience significant 
insecurity which might result in a dependency on the interviewer. If the interviewee is left 
out of their depth, then this kind of exchange can pose a threat to the relationship of trust 
between interviewer and interviewee, but if the interviewer provides support too readily 
then the interviewee may come to expect support whenever they experience some 
difficulty, which would undermine the dynamic of the interview process. Theman gave 
several examples of how delicate the balance between challenge and trust can be (Theman, 
1979).
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In a phenomenographic interview, in which the focus is to explore the varieties of ways of 
understanding a topic, one specific difficulty is that the interviewer will need to seek to 
explore the boundaries of the subject’s understanding, and perhaps also watch the subject 
in the process of building new understanding. Theman (1979) drew attention to the 
consequence that, when the interviewee declares they have reached the limits of their 
understanding, it is necessary to check this claim in various ways. For example, it may be 
that the interviewee simply did not understand the last question, and that when the question 
is rephrased they can proceed further. Or it may simply be that the subject has had enough 
and wishes to stop the interview process. In either case, further questioning may be 
perceived as unwelcome. Theman suggested that the interviewer needs to establish a clear 
agreement with the interviewee from the start of the interview that further questioning is 
the object of the research. By establishing a more equal and open exchange between 
interviewer and interviewee, in which the interviewee is encouraged to make use of the 
interviewer as a resource in their search for understanding, Theman hoped that the 
interviewer would be able to probe more deeply the interviewee’s conception.
Theman’s approach illustrates the dilemma faced in conducting interviews of this kind.
The interviewer needs to keep in mind the danger that suggestions made to the interviewee, 
and other interventions made during the interview, will potentially distort the interviewee’s 
expression of their understanding. And yet, a purely objective style of questioning will do 
little to build the relationship of trust between interviewer and interviewee necessary to 
encourage the interviewee to express their ideas openly and honestly.
Having considered the issues discussed in this chapter, I adopted an approach of in-depth 
interviews, along the lines of clinical interviews (Ginsburg, 1981) in which my follow-up 
questions depended on the responses I got from subjects.
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The purpose of my enquiry was not only to identify the variety of ways in which the 
people interviewed thought about randomness, but also to shed light on why randomness is 
hard to grasp intellectually. The analysis of the data is not statistical, but is designed to 
probe beneath the surface of meaning and conceptual development. Thus it was important 
to learn from each interview to inform the next. Issues that emerged in conversation in
earlier interviews sometimes became a focus for more extensive discussion in later
>
interviews. Although the structure of the interviews remained broadly the same, there 
were differences of emphasis, arising both from a desire to probe particular issues, and 
from the serendipitous nature of the tasks that were the focus of discussion in the 
interviews.
5.1.4 Concept maps
A particular kind of probe that was considered was the use of concept maps. A concept 
map offers a method of displaying visually the ideas, words, methods and problems related 
to a central theme. In the case of the present enquiry, the central theme would be 
‘randomness’. Related ideas might include random generators of various kinds, 
probability, chance or disorder. The diagram produced consists of a set of nodes, each 
representing an idea, word, theme or problem, and each connected to related ideas by lines 
or arrows. Where appropriate, an arrow could be used to indicate the direction of a 
relationship between two nodes. The idea behind using concept mapping as a research 
probe is that the map produced by a subject has been found to give insight into the 
subject’s understanding of a mathematical topic, such as function (McGowan, 1998; 
Williams, 1998). My hope was that it might be used similarly to consider students’ 
understanding of ‘randomness’, and could be used later as the focus for discussion about 
the ideas and links included in the map, and what had been left out.
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Various formats are possible for a concept map. Perhaps the most simple is a ‘spider 
diagram’ with related ideas and themes radiating out from the central theme, and these in 
turn connecting to further ideas radiating out from them. Other formats might be a 
‘hierarchy’, using a diagram looking more like a tree diagram, or a system akin to a 
flowchart. Drawing on McGowan’s work on understanding of function (McGowan, 1998) 
the most appropriate format for investigating a learner’s conception of randomness was a 
spider diagram.
Concept mapping has been used in other research studies in mathematics education 
(Williams, 1998; McGowan, 1998). The method has also been used in assessment of 
children’s understanding of scientific concepts (Comber and Johnson, 1995; Roth, 1994). 
McGowan (1998), in a study of students’ conceptions of ‘function’ in mathematics, 
identified a number of constraints on the interpretation of concept maps produced.
• The amount of time the student spends constructing the map.
• How much information and how many connections between elements the student is 
able to record within the constraints of 2 dimensions and limited space.
• The student’s ability to categorise, organise and reflect upon her own perceptions and 
actions.
McGowan (1998) described how, during the course of her study, she revised the 
instructions she gave for creating a concept map. She instructed subjects to conduct an 
initial brainstorming of ideas, and recommended subjects to put these onto small post-its, 
which could then be arranged and rearranged as additional ideas were added. The final 
map was not to be drawn until the student felt she had arrived at an arrangement that 
reflected the organisation and connections appropriately. This approach has the benefit of 
keeping the emerging concept map ‘fluid’ so that the subject can continue to interact with 
it and refine it until they feel happy with the outcome.
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As well as the difficulty for the student of reflecting upon, and then organising and 
expressing, her own ideas about ‘function’ within the constraints of a concept map, there is 
the issue that many students are not familiar with concept mapping, and so need to be 
carefully inducted into the method. Williams (1998), in a report of her use of concept 
maps in a study of conceptual knowledge of function, emphasised that she had instructed 
all her volunteers at some length about what she meant by a concept map. She showed 
participants examples of other peoples’ concept maps of different concepts before asking 
them to produce their own concept maps of ‘function’. Williams’ account indicates that 
there might be an additional constraint on the use of concept maps to add to the list offered 
by McGowan above:
• The extent of the student’s prior experience in producing concept maps and the depth 
of her understanding of the idea of a concept map.
The use of concept mapping with students requires careful explanation to students of what 
is required, and the students need time to formulate their ideas as well as expressing and 
organising them onto paper in the form of a concept map. I have given an account in 
Chapter 6 of some further issues that arose when I used this method with students.
5.2 Methods
I begin this section with a brief outline of the structure of the whole study.
5.2.1 Outline of the study
The study has passed through several stages.
In the preliminary stage, I made an initial exploration of how people use the words random 
and randomness, and what ideas people have about the situations in which the ideas of 
randomness are applicable. In this stage, the methods were informal, taking advantage of 
opportunities to discuss ideas with groups of people who were gathered together for other
Page 101
Chapter 5: Methodology and Methods 
purposes. I used sentence completion tasks and I tried concept mapping. I also tried early 
versions of some of the tasks that were developed later.
The first stage consisted of a series of nine clinical interviews around a collection of 
‘dynamic’ tasks which are described below in section 5.2.3. Interviewees were school 
students aged from 13 to 17. Interviews were recorded on audiotape and, shortly after each 
interview, the tape was transcribed.
In the preliminary analysis of the first stage interviews, a detailed commentary was added 
into the interview transcript. This included a detailed record of the outcomes generated in 
the ‘dynamic’ tasks and a detailed description of my impressions of how the interviewee 
responded to what happened.
When all the interviews had been completed and the transcripts and commentaries 
prepared, the transcripts and the interview commentaries were analysed for themes that 
occurred across interviews. This first analysis was difficult and lengthy; at first it 
produced a very long list of themes, from which emerged four major questions relating to 
randomness, which I considered to provide motivation for the behaviours and utterances of 
the interviewees. The questions were;
• What is randomness?
• How is it expressed?
• How is it recognised?
• Is it caused?
In the review towards the end of the analysis of the first stage interviews, the big idea of 
‘shifting perspectives’ was recognised and described for the first time. In order to 
investigate this idea further, and to see this idea from a different direction, a new task was 
developed. This was the ‘counters’ task.
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The second stage consisted of a further nine clinical interviews with a new sample of 
students, aged between 13 and 17. In each interview in the second round, the tasks from 
the first round were preceded by the counters task. However, a key focus of the interview 
questions in this second stage was to explore further the ways in which the interviewee’s 
way of seeing the tasks changed. By watching the behaviour of the interviewee and 
listening closely to what they said, I tried to see when the interviewee’s attention shifted in 
various ways. Again, the interviews were recorded on audiotape and a detailed 
transcription was made and a commentary was added.
In the analysis of the transcriptions and commentaries of the second stage interviews, I
initially searched for and identified instances of the themes identified in the analysis of the
/
first stage. As a consequence of examining the new data, the themes were reconsidered 
and refined.
5.2.2 Permission
All participants were asked to give their permission for their responses to be used in the 
reported study. Permission was also obtained from parents. In order to respect the 
anonymity of subjects, names used in the report are pseudonyms.
5.2.3 Development of a process task
I discussed in Chapter 3 the varieties of task that have been used in previous studies to 
investigate people’s understanding of randomness. I presented there an analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages of generation tasks and recognition tasks. These 
considerations led me to reject recognition tasks as the main stimulus tasks for my 
interviews, and to favour generation tasks. However, in discussion with colleagues, it was 
suggested that generation tasks might not really be directing the subjects’ attention to the 
randomness of the generating process, as I had hoped. My experience with a subject in an
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early interview reinforced this doubt. It seemed possible that subjects were actually 
generating a set of outcomes with the properties that they believed were characteristic of a 
random sequence of outcomes. There are at least two distinct reasons why this might be 
so. First, the subject may have little awareness of the process aspect of randomness, and so 
be finding alternative approaches to the task. If this were true, then possibly any stimulus 
task would fail to direct attention and awareness towards the process. Alternatively, 
generation tasks may simply not be the best tasks to direct attention towards process.
In an attempt to focus more directly upon randomness as process, I developed a new task 
for use in interviews. In this task, the interviewee is given a random generator, such as a 
die, asked to examine it and use it to generate results, which are recorded by the 
interviewer as they are generated. The interviewee is then invited to consider the outcomes 
so far, and to talk about what they think will happen next. Follow-up questions explore 
how the interviewee has arrived at any prediction, how confident they are in what they say, 
and how they feel about the generator so far. In order to provoke further the interviewee’s 
awareness of the process, the first stage interviews explored the use of unfamiliar dice as 
generators. Most interviews began with the use of a severely biased die. The intention 
was that interviewee’s expectations of how a die should behave might be challenged 
rapidly, opening the possibility for discussion about the interviewee’s preconceptions.
After this a second, unfamiliar die was presented - this time a spherical die - which from 
the interviewee’s perspective may or may not be fair. A third die was a standard cubical 
die, but with a deep crack dividing the whole of one face and parts of two others. I hoped 
that the possibility of bias in each of the second and third die would provoke in the subject 
a conscious awareness of how a random process using a die would be expected to behave, 
and that this would help the interviewee to externalise this awareness during the interview. 
This task and the other tasks used in the stage 1 interviews are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 7.
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From the phenomenographic perspective, there is a danger in using activities such as these 
as the core for the interviews: the interview could become focused on the interviewee’s 
experience, understanding and awareness of the activities rather than the concept of 
‘randomness’ itself. That is to say, the activity could acquire greater significance in the 
interviewee’s experience during the interview than the underlying concept of randomness, 
towards which the activities are intended to direct the interviewee’s attention. In the early 
stages of my research, I could do no more than be aware of this possibility. I consider this 
danger further in my discussion of the lessons to be learned from the first stage of 
interviews in Chapter 8, and I consider a response to the issue in the design of the second 
iteration in Chapter 10. The conduct of the stage 2 interviews is discussed in Chapter 11.
5.2.4 Interventions during the tasks
My approach as interviewer and researcher in this study has been to intervene during the 
interviews in whatever way seemed sensible in the moment, and to describe my 
interventions as fully as possible. My descriptions have included the utterances and 
behaviours from both interviewee and myself that I perceived as leading up to my 
intervention. By providing the ‘thick’ description, I have aimed to preserve the 
authenticity and the trustworthiness of my account, even though I acknowledge that 
complete objectivity is impossible.
The generators used in my process tasks were familiar objects: dice and coins. There was 
therefore a danger that interviewees might consider the tasks trivial and fail to engage with 
the nature of randomness. I hoped that I would generate some element of surprise in 
presenting the biased die first, and that this would draw the interviewee into reflecting 
more deeply on the outcomes and the generating processes. I also proposed to ask the 
interviewee to pause in the process of generating outcomes when I observed sequences of 
outcomes that might be provocative. Examples might be a run of three successive sixes in
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rolling a die, or a run of four or five successive heads when tossing a coin, or later in the 
sequence of outcomes, an under-representation of a possible outcome from the sequence of 
outcomes observed. At such moments, I would invite the interviewee to comment on what 
they saw and to consider what they thought might occur on the next outcome.
An important factor in perceptions of randomness is ‘culture’. Amir and Williams (1999) 
operationalise ‘culture’ as beliefs, language, and experience. I wanted to incorporate some 
interrogation of these aspects of the interviewee’s culture into my interviews and I 
borrowed a little from the framework of Amir and Williams in considering how to do so.
Children might bring to the interviews beliefs, whether religious or superstitious, 
governing their attitude towards chance and their readiness to engage in probabilistic 
thinking. By asking interviewees to consider what they thought might occur next at 
various points in the interview, I was inviting them to express their beliefs. However, I 
was aware that some beliefs might not be articulated without encouragement. I needed to 
value the interviewee’s ideas and to invite them to give more than one-word answers to 
questions such as “What might happen next?” by following up with something like “Why 
do you think that?”
I have already discussed the need to be aware of the limited probabilistic vocabulary that 
some children might have available to them in discussion of the interview tasks. My 
response to this issue required me to be careful in using words such as ‘random’ or 
‘probability’ in my questioning. But I also needed to listen closely to interviewees’ as they 
expressed ideas that might be unfamiliar, to ensure that I was able to discern as closely as 
possible the sense that they were trying to convey.
Finally, I planned to ask interviewees about their prior experiences of playing with or using 
random generators. I expected that most would have had extensive experience of playing 
games with dice or packs of cards, but that there might be some who had not. I also
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wanted to ask what experiences interviewees had had of using random generators in 
mathematics lessons. I was particularly interested in seeing whether they remembered 
exploring long run behaviour, and possibly linking this with their formal knowledge of 
probability.
5.2.5 Analysis of interview data
Analysis of interview data requires close attention to the detail of the exchange in the 
dialogue. This detail resides not only in what is said, but also in the behaviour of the 
parties and in the circumstances surrounding the exchanges. In the context of my 
interviews, I needed to take account of the outcomes generated at each stage from the 
random generators used in the process tasks, and I needed to watch and listen closely to the 
reactions of the interviewee. For example, if an interviewee seemed to express surprise, 
then I needed to check whether this was indeed the case and look closely at what might 
have been the trigger for this reaction.
In a sense, some analysis is almost inseparable from the interview process itself. During 
the course of any interview, I was listening and watching closely for signs of reaction on 
behalf of the interviewee to the successive outcomes. Sometimes -  when I inferred that the 
interviewee had shown unease, surprise or some other reaction - 1 was able to prompt the 
interviewee to speak about this by asking a question. However, this was never going to be 
possible all the time, so the later stages of transcription and more detailed analysis of the 
text were vital to the development of a more detailed and contextualised account of the 
data.
In order that the later processes of transcription and the creation of a reflective commentary 
for each interview should be most fruitful, it was important that they were done soon after 
the interview. My own recall of the detail recorded in the audio-tapes and in the record of
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the outcomes from the random generators was an important resource in providing the detail 
to the reflective commentary on the interview.
During the analysis, when studying each extract of the interview transcript, it was 
important for me to consider the precise question that each interviewee considered they 
were addressing. The nature of the tasks meant that, while sometimes an interviewee’s 
attention might be on the question of whether the process of rolling the die and recording 
the outcome was random, while at other times the issue might be whether or not the die 
was biased. The difference between these two questions is slight, but is potentially’ 
significant for some people. It is possible that a die might be recognised as biased, but the 
outcomes might still be considered to be random.
5.2.6 The next few chapters
In Part 2 of this study, the next chapters report on what happened in the first stage of the 
investigation. In Chapter 6 ,1 report on the initial informal stage of the investigation, 
during which I tried out ideas for data collection and gathered an initial sense of the range 
of ways in which various groups of people spoke about randomness. Chapter 7 contains a 
detailed description of the first stage interviews, of the tasks used in them, and reports on 
the individual interviewees. Then, in Chapter 8 ,1 discuss the data that arose from the first 
stage interviews; I describe how I went about the analysis of the interview transcripts and I 
report on the themes that emerged from my analysis. A major theme to emerge from the 
first stage was the interviewees’ shifting perspectives between randomness and 
distribution, and this is described in detail in Chapter 9.
In Part 3, the theme of shifting perspectives formed the basis for the development of a new 
task for the second stage of interviews, which is described in Chapter 10. A detailed 
description of a revised interview structure used in the second stage interviews, and reports 
on the individual interviewees, are given in Chapter 11. In Chapter 12,1 discuss the data
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from the second stage interviews and show how the themes of shifting perspectives 
developed during stage 2. At the end of Part 3, Chapter 13 contains an analysis that draws 
on the discussions in Chapters 6, 8, 9 and 12.
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Chapter 6: Background to Stage 1 Interviews
In the first few months of this study I made several informal investigations of ways in 
which people think and speak about randomness. At this initial stage I made little attempt 
to be rigorous or exhaustive, and the people used in this stage were groups of people who 
were readily accessible and who were willing to answer a few questions or to take part in a 
few short activities. My intention was to gain an initial sense of the variety of ways in 
which ideas about randomness were expressed.
In this chapter, I report on data gathered from three different settings. I report on the data 
from each setting in turn, and then summarise the lessons I learned from this preliminary 
stage of the investigation. In each setting, one of the tasks was designed specifically to 
elicit a description of what people thought would be meant by ‘randomness’.
At the end of the chapter, I have included an account of an incident that led me to discover 
some unexpected uses of the word ‘random’ in everyday contexts. I have included it here 
because it occurred during this preliminary phase of my work, and it influenced the way 
that I approached the interviews later.
6.1 A level Students
The first setting that I investigated was a small group of three A level students, all girls, in 
the final two months before they sat their A level examination in Statistics. I was the tutor 
for these students for the final two months of their A level course after their regular teacher 
had to go into hospital. These three girls were the only students in their sixth form who 
were taking this statistics module. Remarkably, two of the three girls happened to be 
identical twin sisters! The school is a non-selective mixed RC 13-18 school. During the 
lesson, I asked students to produce concept maps for randomness, but there was some 
discussion about an examination question first.
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Over the weekend before this lesson, the students had been asked to work through a 
specimen paper, and all of them had experienced difficulty with a particular question. The 
students did not know how to respond to part (a) and therefore could not access the 
question. The twins had each made a written attempt, but the third student had been unable 
to start. The students were not used to discussion in mathematics classes and they were all 
very reluctant to offer any suggestions in class to tackle the question in part (a).
6.1.1 The question
Question 2 from Edexcel GCE AS/A Statistics, Unit S2, Specimen paper (2000):
A piece of string AB has length 12 cm. A child cuts the string at a randomly chosen point P, into two 
pieces. The random variable Xrepresents the length, in cm, of the piece AP.
a) Suggest a suitable model for the distribution of A  and specify it fully.
b) Find the cumulative distribution function of X.
c) Write down P(X<4).
(Edexcel, 2000)
The question in part (a) is worded in an open way, and appears to invite students to 
speculate and be inventive. In reality, of course, this is a timed examination; the examiner 
has in mind an ‘obvious’ response and expects a short answer.
6.1.2 The discussion and concept maps
In the passages of dialogue quoted below, the twins are D and S, the third student is R and 
the tutor is T (me in this case).
The dialogue initially revolved around how to solve the question. I invited the students to 
focus upon the words ‘at a randomly chosen point P \  and to consider what this tells us 
about the Point P. I was hoping for some thoughts about the likelihood of the point lying
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at different places on the line AB, as well as the obvious impossibility of the point lying 
outside AB. The response was extremely slow.
D: {after a long silence) It could be anywhere.
R: {after another long silence) It’s not affected by anything else.
It’s gone somewhere. It’s gone where it’s gone.
{pause) I suppose it’s independent of itself.
(pause) I mean independent from anything else.
T: Do you have a picture in your head?
Silence.
I had hoped that a mental image might encourage them to externalise their ideas about 
whether the point P was more likely to lie in some parts of AB than in others. R described 
the following image, and I invited her to draw it on the board.
Figure 6.1: A randomly chosen point P on a line segment AB
The twins had each drawn a similar diagram in their written attempt at the question. I 
asked R if the position of P was fixed in her image. She said it was not, but was free to 
float along the line AB. When invited to comment on this, S said she had a similar image, 
but that P was fixed at where it had been chosen by the child. It seemed to me that R had 
expressed a dynamic sense of the randomness of the position of the point P, while S had 
not. My own image was of the point P floating freely along the line AB, not fixed until I 
needed to fix it.
At this point I introduced the idea of concept maps. As well as wanting to try getting 
people to draw concept maps about randomness, I hoped that this activity might also help 
these students to see some connections.
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I invited them to place ‘randomness’ in a bubble at the centre of the page and then to think 
of all the related ideas they could and write these on the page around the central idea, 
showing how these ideas were related. R produced about 8 ideas, S about 3 and D about 6. 
Their maps were very simple with links radiating out from the central ‘randomness’ and 
almost no links across ideas.
In order to try to extend and develop the ideas they produced and the connections they 
made, I asked them to change pens to a different colour and to consider the ideas I gave 
them. They decided whether each idea should be included on their map and if so where 
and how. Then I gave them a collection of ideas:
Dice, coins, spinners, random number generators,
Chance, probability, distribution, 
uniform, binomial, Poisson, normal, 
sample, random sample, population, 
hypothesis test, significance level, 
risk, accident, Potters Bar.
I asked them to add in any further links or ideas that occurred to them, and then I gave 
them some more ideas to consider.
Likely, Equally likely,
Random variable, discrete, continuous,
probability function, probability density function, cumulative distribution function
I collected the resulting maps and studied them later to consider what I could learn from 
this experience. In the lesson, the pupils returned to discussion of the question, particularly 
to the diagram on the board. With considerable help they were eventually able to arrive at 
a solution.
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6.1.3 Reflections on concept maps
After the lesson, it occurred to me that perhaps the problem for these students arose, not 
from understanding ‘randomness’, but rather from understanding the term ‘model’ in the 
question. However, my experience of trying to elicit concept maps had showed me how 
important it was for subjects to understand what a concept map is. As noted in the 
discussion about concept mapping in section 5.1.4, Williams (1998) gave her participants 
careful instruction in concept mapping, and encouraged them to look at examples of 
concept maps of other concepts before she asked them to produce their own maps of 
‘function’. I had not given my students enough idea of what a concept map might look like 
and what purpose it might serve. In particular, I had not encouraged the students to 
consider the relationships connecting the ideas they had shown on their maps, and to look 
out for clusters of related ideas. As a result, the maps I elicited from the students were not 
very informative.
I considered trying McGowan’s approach of subjects writing their ideas onto ‘post-its’ 
before rearranging them on the concept map (McGowan, 1998, discussed in section 5.1.4), 
but concluded that, while it might be effective, it would be too time-consuming. I also 
considered trying to get subjects to produce concept maps as one activity within a one-hour 
interview session. I concluded that, if I did use concept mapping, this would need to be 
done outside the interview setting, possibly with several subjects in the room together, 
although each working independently. That way, the instructions could be delivered to 
several subjects at the same time. In the end I did not return to this method again.
6.1.4 Words and phrases to describe ‘random’
The concept maps produced by the three students were not at all sophisticated. They each 
had a single bubble at the centre containing the word ‘random’, surrounded by a number of 
single lines leading to a variety of words and phrases. None of them had any connections
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to ideas at a second level. However, I listed the words and phrases used by the students in 
their concept maps, ignoring items that they had included from the list of suggestions that I 
had given them. The list I constructed from the students’ concept maps is shown in Table
6.1 below.
When I examined this list, two things struck me as echoes of ideas from my reading. 
Firstly, several of the ideas were phrased in the negative, describing ‘random’ in terms of 
what it is not. There were also suggestions of this in the short dialogue quoted earlier. 
Secondly, I felt that some of the words and phrases described what might be observed 
about ‘random outcomes’, indicated in Bold in Table 6.1. Others were much more about a 
‘random process’, shown in Italic. The remaining three descriptions, I considered might 
have been about either process or outcomes. Apart from ‘unpredictable’, the words that 
were in the negative were all words that I considered applied to the outcomes. This 
distinction between randomness of process (primary randomness) and randomness of 
outcomes (secondary randomness) had been in my mind from my reading.
Without pattern 
Without structure 
Irregular 
Unorganised
Unpredictable 
Variation 
No specific logic 
Equal chances 
Happens 
Thought o f 
Arrived at
Table 6.1: Words and phrases to describe ‘random’
6.2 Key Stage 3 lesson for Able Pupils
This second setting arose because I was teaching a series of classes for a group of 20 able 
pupils in Years 7, 8 and 9, from neighbouring schools. These pupils had all been 
nominated by their schools to receive an invitation to attend one of a number of different 
courses for able children, and they had then chosen to follow this course of six sessions,
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entitled Exploring mathematics with ICT. During one session, I introduced them to 
randomness, but before inviting them to explore computer-based random simulations, I 
asked them to try some activities away from the computer. I had two aims in using these 
activities: first, I hoped to encourage the pupils to think about the behaviour they expected 
to see from some random processes before they looked at simulations of these; and 
secondly, I hoped to learn something about the range of ideas about randomness that were 
represented amongst this select group.
I used a sentence completion task to elicit pupils’ ideas about randomness. Pupils wrote 
the start of a sentence “I think randomness is ...” and were invited to complete it. After 
they had attempted this, they were given a second sentence to complete: “I would know it 
is random because...”. Finally, they were invited to write down words and phrases that 
they would associate with ‘randomness’. I was aware that in the first task I was taking the 
risk of presenting the pupils with a word whose meaning they might not know. I hoped to 
get a sense of how unfamiliar this word was to able children aged 11 to 14. From the 
second sentence, I hoped pupils would suggest how they might recognise a random 
sequence. Finally, I wanted to explore whether the pupils were aware of situations in 
which randomness might be used as a model.
6.2.1 The data
There were sixteen responses to the three tasks. The final task appeared to give some 
insight into the pupils’ awareness of the word ‘random’, since even amongst those pupils 
who were unable to say much in response to the first two tasks, some were able to 
associate the word with other relevant terms. Twelve of the sixteen appeared to associate 
some understanding of the concept of randomness with the word ‘random’, mentioning 
words such as chance, luck, lottery or probability in response to the third task. However,
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the other four showed no mention of such terms and their sentences showed little 
understanding of randomness.
The responses of the sixteen pupils to each task are shown in Table 6.2 below. As in Table
6.1,1 have used Bold to indicate ideas which say something to me about outcomes and 
Italic font to indicate ideas that are more about process. The words struck out were also 
struck out in the pupil’s script. It is worth noting that, although I did not encourage the 
pupils to collaborate over their responses, there was some surreptitious exchange of ideas. 
This may lie behind the fact that the responses, which are listed in the table in the order in 
which I collected them in from the pupils, show some clustering. For example, numbers 
13, 14,15 and 16 list similar responses in the words and phrases response, and they were 
probably seated near each other in the classroom since their scripts came in to me one after 
the other.
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Randomness means: 
T he sam e as random
2  A  se lec tio n  o f  a group in  different 
orders
3 I d o n ’t k n o w  w h at it is
4  It is  w h ere y o u  change an algebraic  
letter to  a random  num ber to  see  i f  a 
form ula w orks
5 A n y  item  (in  num ber) w h ich  d o es n o t  
fo llo w  a  seq u en c e
6 T he se lec tio n  o f  num bers (or som ething  
sim ilar) w ith  n o  p r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  
se lec tio n . E very num ber has an e q u a l  
c h a n c e  o f  c o m in g  u p , so  any num ber is  
as l ik e ly  to  com e up as any other. T his  
is  best done w ith  the vibrations o f  a 
radioactive atom , or som eth ing  e lse  
w ith  abso lute random ness.
I  would know it is random because:
I f  there is  any num ber p ick ed  out o f  
a hat at ‘random ’
T he num bers w ill  b e  in  a different 
order
Y o u  can ’t te ll
I random ly ch ose  it out o f  all the 
num bers in  m y  head
T h e item s w o u ld  n ot fo llo w  a 
seq u en ce at all
T he num bers w o u ld  fo llo w  no  
pattern w h atsoever
Words and Phrases 
C hance, L u ck , A t any tim e
C hance, random ness, 
probability
R and om , lottery, chance
R and om , luck , chance, 
probability
N o n -seq u en tia l, chance
R ad ioa ctive , chance, 
probability, lottery
7 M aking a chance, and y o u  d o n ’t  k n o w  
th e  o u tco m es
I d o n ’t k n ow , y o u  can ’t tell. L uck, anyth ing, chance, 
probability
8 I d on ’t k n ow I d o n ’t k n ow L uck, chance, probability
9 I f  som eth ing  is  a  random  order it is  in  
a n y  o r d e r  th a t  h a p p en s
There is  n o  sp ec ific  order or pattern A pproxim ate, chance, 
probability, estim ation
10 A s an exam ple , is  to p ic k  a n y  n u m b er  
or an e d u c a te d  gu ess
It w a s  n ot associated P robability, estim ate , 
approxim ation, chance
11 P ic k in g  som eth ing at random  w ith o u t  
k n o w in g  w h a t it  is
I w o u ld  n ot k n ow  w h ich  one is  
w h ich
C hance, lu ck , probability , 
estim ate, gu ess
12 I d on ’t k n o w  w hat it is I d idn’t ch o o se  it. I ju st p ick ed  it 
straight aw ay.
Probability, ch an ce, luck , 
estim ate, gu ess
13 (W hen  the num bers keep  g o in g  and  
d o n ’-t-stop-with-the-num ber y o u  think-is 
right) D o n ’t k n ow
I4iave-read all about I h ave a 
num ber seq uence
R elation sh ip s, groups, 
seq u en ces
14 a group o f  data that h a s  n o  
r e la tio n sh ip s
I f  it w a s in  a seq uence that d oesn ’t 
repeat it s e lf
R elationsh ip , seq u en ce
15 I d o n ’t k n o w  w h at it is It’s ju st random S eq u en ces, odd  and ev en  
num bers
16 I think it m eans som ething that is  taken D o n ’t k n ow T aken, estim ate
Table 6.2: Responses of pupils to sentence completion tasks
The following list of bullet points summarises the kinds of response received from the 
sixteen pupils to the first task.
Words and phrases used by KS3 pupils
• A selection of a group in different orders
• Any item which does not follow a sequence
• The selection of numbers with no preference to the selection
• Every number has an equal chance o f coming up, so any number is as likely to come up as any other
• Making a chance, and you don’t know the outcomes
• A random order - in any order that happens
• To pick any number
• An educated guess
•  Picking something at random without knowing what it is
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• A group of data that has no relationships
• I think it means something that is taken
Within these responses are further examples of randomness being thought of in terms of 
what it is not: ‘not follow a sequence’; ‘no preference’; ‘you don’t know the outcomes’;
‘no relationships’. Inevitably these responses are less clear and precise than the responses 
given by people in the other two settings.
A second theme within these responses is that randomness is to do with selection or 
‘picking’. I guess that children hear many uses of the word ‘random’ that involve 
randomly selecting or choosing an item from a set of similar items. This may also help 
explain why some people identify randomness with equal likelihood. The classic ‘urn’ 
model of randomness, which lies behind the idea of ‘picking at random’, carries the idea of 
‘equal likelihood’ implicitly in the context.
Finally, a surprising number of these pupils (I think seven) suggested interpretations of 
randomness that referred to algebra, or sequences of relationships. Whilst it would clearly 
be foolish to emphasise the detail of these responses without questioning the pupils further 
about what they wrote, there are suggestions here that some pupils had a restricted 
understanding of the word ‘randomness’ and a few were unable to interpret the word at all. 
Where people apply restricted meanings to a word, they may be drawing upon a restricted 
range of examples of the use of the word. While I have no evidence to suggest this was the 
case here, I can imagine that pupil 4 in Table 6.2 might have recalled a particular example 
of the use of the word ‘random’ in a mathematics lesson, where perhaps he had been asked 
to choose a ‘random’ value to substitute for a particular letter in an algebraic expression. 
The problem with this usage is that the selection of a value to substitute is unlikely to be at 
all random, and is best thought of as an ‘artful’ selection, either to reveal some property of
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the expression or to test a conjecture. Pupils with such a restricted sense of the word 
random might experience difficulty in interpreting the dialogue in a lesson on probability.
6.3 Colleagues in a Workshop
The final setting was a meeting of colleagues in an informal seminar during which I ran a 
workshop to try out some activities for eliciting ideas relating to randomness. One of the 
tasks that I asked colleagues to do was to write down, in just a minute of two, how they 
would describe ‘randomness’. The data surprised me as I had not anticipated the 
contradictions that emerged in what was written. It is important to note that these 
contributions came from people who work in mathematics education, and they are 
therefore not typical of a wider population. However, there are ideas in these words and 
phrases that resonate with things that arose in the previous two settings.
The following list summarises the words and phrases used in these brief descriptions.
• Unstructured, uncoordinated parameter
• Unpredictable dimension
• The result of a process that has no history, hence not possible to predict what will 
happen next
• Without pattern
• You think something is happening at random until a pattern emerges
• An ideal against which we can compare things or a model
• Weather is unpredictable, but not random!
• “Variability” from a statistical norm
As before, there are attempts to think of randomness in terms of what it is not: without 
pattern, unstructured and unpredictable. However, it was surprising to see the suggestion 
that something could be unpredictable but not random. Another interesting idea here was
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the suggestion that ‘randomness’ is a provisional model for thinking about any situation 
“until a pattern emerges”. There was also a hint in the idea of an emerging pattern, and in 
the idea of randomness as “variability from a norm”, of a global view of randomness, 
involving a sense of an underlying distribution. I was curious to see whether such views 
might also be held by learners in school.
Although there were some suggestions in this list that appeared more sophisticated, I found 
this list more remarkable for the similarity of many of the suggestions to those in previous 
lists.
I tried a version of the dice tasks with colleagues in this third setting and was encouraged 
by the dialogue that was generated. I distributed dice to colleagues working in pairs in the 
workshop. I asked people to roll their die a few times and then consider what they thought 
might happen next. People quickly engaged in discussion about possibilities, and some 
became quite animated as disagreement emerged within pairs about what to expect next.
6.4 The Incident of the Random Stapler
The colloquial usage of the word ‘random’ was drawn to my attention while I was working 
on this initial phase of my research, when I heard someone call out in frustration: “Has any 
one seen a random stapler?” I was curious about this phrase, and decided to explore what 
might be understood by it. I could envisage three different possible meanings that might 
be inferred from the idea of the ‘random stapler’.
• A stapler that releases staples in unpredictable places, at unpredictable times and / or in 
an unpredictable fashion.
• A stapler that is to be found in an unpredictable place -  a stapler that is lost!
• A stapler chosen at random from some large set of staplers -  the sample space of 
staplers for this purpose.
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Looking at these ideas now, I see that my own view of ‘randomness’ was strongly inclined 
towards the idea that ‘randomness is unpredictability’.
When I asked two colleagues of my own generation what they thought might have been 
meant by a ‘random stapler’, there was some disagreement. One preferred the second 
possibility, but the other thought it could be either the first or the third, as the context did 
not provide enough information for him. Later, I had an email conversation with an 
undergraduate student, who informed me that the word ‘random’ was widely used in this 
way amongst her acquaintances who were aged from 19 to 21. She did not agree with any 
of the alternatives I had proposed and suggested in her email the following.
“A ‘random’ stapler would, for me, simply be a spare stapler, or one not needed at that time. I would 
take the ‘randomness’ of the stapler to come from the fact that, until my arrival, it was not needed and 
so was ‘randomly’ lying about.”
This was different from what I had considered, but nonetheless, I could recognise the idea. 
She went on to suggest further examples of ways in which the term might be used by her 
friends.
The first example was when people open a conversation or introduce a new topic into a 
conversation with a phrase such as “This is a bit random, but...” or “I’ve got a random 
question.” She suggested that this usually also implies that it will be a brief conversation. 
I have since become aware of this usage appearing in my own discourse, particularly with 
my children or with students.
The second usage she identified was that her contemporaries might speak of “random 
people”, or “randoms”, when discussing who was at a party or other event. So a typical 
usage might be the following.
“What was the party like?”
“Good but full of randoms”
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She described the idea of ‘random people’ in the following extract.
Random people are most often people that you don’t know, that infringe on your day in some way -  
being a student, I’ll often hear about a ‘big group of random boys’ who cause a scene in a pub. They 
are random to an individual because they have no knowledge or control over the presence of these 
people.
Random people can also be people that you already know but who you see in circumstances you 
wouldn’t expect. In this situation I might say I saw ‘some random physics people’, the ‘randomness’ 
coming from the incongruity of seeing people where I would not expect to.
This idea of ‘random people’ as unknown or unexpected people who enter my experience 
seemed to me to go beyond the idea of the ‘random stapler’ from which I had started. I 
also thought that these uses of the word were significantly different from the formal use of 
‘random’ in mathematics and statistics. These examples illustrate new uses of the word, 
with which I was not previously familiar. I suspect that this is an example of how use of 
the word ‘random’ is changing even as I am engaged in this study.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, I have my preliminary investigations, before the first stage of interviews. I 
considered informal evidence from a variety of different settings involving groups of 
people with different levels of experience. In this summary I discuss some of the themes 
that emerged and which later became significant in the interviews that formed the second 
and third stages of the investigation.
Several themes resonated with ideas from my reading about randomness, and some were 
seen in more than one setting. However, there was a striking similarity across the three 
sets of responses from these very different groups of people. In each setting some 
responses were either meaningless or obscure, illustrating the difficulty of explaining or 
defining randomness.
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Common across the three settings was a tendency to think about randomness in terms of 
what it lacks: order, pattern, control, prediction. This was not a surprise and it may 
indicate how natural it is to speak of randomness in these terms. I expect these ideas to 
feature in my interviews
In the first two settings, some suggestions appeared to identify randomness with equally 
likely outcomes. I had expected this idea to be confined to younger learners, but I later 
met the same suggestion, only much more strongly expressed, from a colleague in a 
seminar to discuss my research. My colleague was adamant that, if the outcomes were not 
equally likely, then the situation was not random.
The idea of randomness as variability or variation occurred in the final two settings, 
although not in the first. Perhaps the concept of variability is less well developed in the 
mathematics curriculum at age 14. The Mathematics Framework (DfEE, 2001) from the 
Key Stage 3 Strategy does not mention measures of variation such as range, interquartile 
range, or standard deviation until Year 9.
Key Stage 3 pupils were the only group to suggest that luck was associated with 
randomness. The fact that it was not suggested by either of the other two groups may 
suggest that increasing education (whether in mathematics or statistics or neither is not 
clear) tends to reduce the individual’s reliance on luck to account for chance phenomena. 
However this is a very tentative suggestion.
The group of able pupils in Key Stage 3 showed a variety of views about the meaning of 
randomness. A surprising number expressed ideas that had more to do with algebra and 
sequences than with randomness, suggesting that they shared a different understanding 
from my own. Association of the word ‘random’ with the act of picking or choosing was 
another theme in the responses from these pupils. This was particularly interesting, as it
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indicated that some pupils might hold a concept of randomness that was both apparently 
correct but also possibly incomplete.
I expected that colloquial uses of the word ‘random’, like those described in section 6.4, 
would be important in interviews. I intended to look for evidence that people used the 
word in a different sense from that usual in a mathematics classroom.
The experience of using concept maps in the first setting did not encourage me to try them 
again. I was not sure that the time investment was fruitful. However, the experience gave 
me an indication of how difficult the topic of randomness is, even for A level students.
The sentence completion tasks were interesting but seemed only to touch the surface of 
people’s thinking about randomness. After these preliminary studies I was sure that I 
needed to develop ‘dynamic tasks’ and talk to individuals interacting with these as their 
ideas evolved.
In the next three chapters I describe what happened when I used my dynamic tasks in 
interviews with individual pupils.
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Chapter 7: Stage 1 Interviews
In this chapter, I provide a description of the processes involved in the conduct of the 
interviews in the first stage of the investigation. I describe the stimulus tasks used in the 
interviews, the participants and how they came to be selected, and the processes involved 
in the transcription and analysis of each interview.
7.1 The Interviewees
There were nine interviews in stage 1. Table 7.1 lists the interviewees in the order in 
which they were interviewed and gives some information about each. A fuller description 
of each interviewee follows later in this chapter.
Name Gender Year Age Maths set
1 Lara F 12 16y 10m AS
2 David M 9 14y lm set 1/6
3 Alex F 10 15y 3m Set 2/6
4 Ben M 10 15y 7m Set 2/6
5 Dom M 8 13y 5m Set 2
6 Nick M 10 15y 6m Set 2
7 Joe M 8 13y 5m Set 1
8 Abby F 12 17y 7m AS
9 Belle F 10 14y 11m Set 1
Table 7.1: Interviewees in stage 1 interviews
7.2 The tasks
Three kinds of tasks were used in the first stage interviews. First were three process tasks, 
using three different dice, which were described in section 5.2.3, and which I discuss 
further in 7.2.1. Secondly, there were two coin tossing tasks, which are described in 7.2.2. 
Finally, I asked interviewees to consider what other situations they were aware of in which 
ideas o f ‘chance’ and ‘randomness’ might be used.
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7.2.1 The dice tasks
Three dice were used in the first stage interviews: a biased die, a spherical die and a 
cracked cubical die.
The biased die looks like a standard cube, except that it has two faces labelled 5 and no 
face labelled 3. However, it also has a weight in the face labelled 1, resulting in it being 
heavily biased in favour of 6.
The spherical die is a hollow sphere containing a small bead. The hollow interior is so 
shaped that the weight of the small bead contained in it causes the sphere to come to rest in 
one of six different orientations when it is rolled on a flat surface. The surface of the 
sphere is marked symmetrically with the numbers 1 through 6, in the same manner as a 
standard cubical die. Thus the spherical die behaves like a standard cubical die, in that it 
always comes to rest with one of the six numbers uppermost, and if the die is correctly 
balanced, each of the six possible outcomes should be equally likely.
The cracked cubical die is damaged. It has a split running across the face labelled 6, and 
spreading partway across the faces labelled 2 and 5. I expected the crack to raise in the 
interviewee’s mind the possibility that the die might be biased, especially as they met this 
die after their experience with the first die which is heavily biased. I expected that it would 
be slightly biased, but it is definitely not a serious bias and I do not know which faces are 
favoured. Whether the cracked die is in fact biased is not my concern, and I have not 
tested it.
In each of the three dice tasks, the interviewee was first given the die, asked to comment 
on its appearance, and then to consider how they expected it to behave when rolled several 
times. When they had commented on the die, they were invited to roll the die a few times, 
perhaps six times, before commenting on the outcomes they had observed and considering
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what they might see if they rolled it again. Throughout these tasks I encouraged the 
interviewees to talk about their thinking. I watched their behaviour closely as they 
observed successive outcomes. If the interviewee appeared to be bothered by a run of 
outcomes, or even by an individual outcome, I invited them to explain what they were 
thinking.
The three dice used in the dice tasks were chosen to provoke awareness in the interviewee 
of some of the issues that had been identified in the literature review and in the preliminary 
investigation described in Chapter 6. For example, I hoped that the use of the biased die 
and of unfamiliar dice, such as the spherical die and the potentially biased cracked die, 
would unsettle the interviewee enough to cause them to become more consciously aware 
of, and possibly question, their unspoken assumptions about how they expected dice to 
behave. As they became more aware, I hoped that interviewees would be able to 
externalise their assumptions. In particular, I hoped that these tasks would provoke the 
interviewees to be able to talk about the idea of equally likely outcomes and whether these 
were a necessary condition for them to consider the die to be behaving ‘randomly’.
7.2.2 The coin tasks
The second set of tasks consisted of two tasks relating to coin tossing. One was a 
generation task in which I mimed handing the interviewee an imaginary coin, explaining 
what I was giving them as I did so, and asked them to toss it 20 times and record the 
outcomes in the order that they occurred. My intention here was to observe the 
interviewee’s behaviour as they performed this task, and then to talk to them afterwards 
about their experience. I wanted them to discuss what they had experienced and what they 
had been paying attention to as they made up the successive outcomes.
Immediately after the coin generation task I moved on to a coin tossing task, which I 
conducted as a process task in the same manner as I had conducted the dice tasks. Once
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there were twenty outcomes from the real coin to consider, I asked the interviewees 
whether they considered that the made up sequence from the imaginary coin was visibly 
different from the sequence that arose from tossing the real coin. This comparison of the 
two sequences enabled further discussion of what the interviewee had been looking for in a 
random process.
7.2.3 The review task
In the final task I was concerned to broaden our discussion beyond coins and dice as 
random generators. I asked interviewees to suggest other situations or circumstances in 
which they might describe things as occurring randomly. Recognising that this might be a 
difficult question, particularly for the younger students, I was prepared to suggest 
possibilities to them if necessary, such as spinners, playing cards, road accidents, results of 
football matches. Although this might be seen as feeding ideas to the interviewee, I felt it 
was important to elicit some response to ideas beyond dice and coins, even where the 
interviewee was unable to offer suggestions of their own.
In closing each interview, I asked about the interviewee’s mathematical background, their 
previous experiences of studying probability and randomness, and especially practical 
work using random generators.
7.3 The selection of participants
Interviewees were school pupils aged between 13 and 17, and came from two sources. 
Some were children of neighbours or colleagues. I approached their parents directly, and 
their parents invited them to participate in the study. Interviews with these learners took 
place at weekends, during early evenings or during school holidays, in my home or in the 
interviewee’s own home.
Page 130
Chapter 7: Stage 1 Interviews 
Others were pupils at a local mixed 14-18 comprehensive upper school. I approached an 
Assistant Head Teacher at the school, who was also a mathematics teacher. She agreed 
that pupils could be invited to participate, and she sent a letter to parents of selected pupils 
requesting parental consent. I had asked the teacher to select pupils in Years 9 and 10 who 
would be able to express their ideas confidently. These interviews took place in a small 
office on school premises during mathematics lessons.
7.4 The interviewees in detail
In this section I give a brief description of each interviewee in turn. The interviewees were 
all either in the top two maths sets out of 6, or in selective schools, so they were all above 
averagely successful at mathematics. The descriptions in this section are drawn from my 
interview notes made shortly after each interview, as I transcribed the audiotapes.
7.4.1 Lara
Lara was in Year 12, aged 16.10, in a mixed comprehensive school, and was studying AS 
Mathematics, including a module in Statistics. She was described by her teacher as hard­
working and conscientious in school. However, she claimed that she lacked confidence in 
Statistics, because her teacher did not appear confident in understanding the material. She 
needed constant encouragement to express her ideas in the interview, and was very softly 
spoken. This made the audiotape difficult to transcribe.
Lara’s was my first interview and I did not use the biased die, but started with the spherical 
die, followed by the cracked die. The interview took place during an evening in my home.
Although I had emphasised to Lara at the start of the interview that I wanted to hear her 
talk about each of the activities as she worked on them, she was often reticent. Thus the 
interview did not contain as much contribution from Lara as I had wanted.
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7.4.2 David
David was in Year 9, aged 14.1, in a mixed comprehensive school, and was in the top set 
for maths. His teacher considered him to be unusually articulate, but he sometimes 
pursued ideas in unusual directions not typical of pupils of his age. The interview took 
place in a private office in the school, during a mathematics lesson.
During the interview with David, I tried to avoid using the word random until later in the 
interview. Therefore during the early activities I framed my interventions in terms of 
‘chance’.
7.4.3 Alex
Alex was in Year 10, aged 15.3, in a mixed comprehensive school, in set two out of six for 
maths. She was positive about mathematics, and was very happy to talk about her ideas. 
However, according to her teacher, she sometimes found the subject difficult. The 
interview took place in a private office in the school, during a mathematics lesson.
7.4.4 Ben
Ben was in Year 10, aged 15.7, in a mixed comprehensive school, in set two out of six for 
maths. He claimed that he enjoyed mathematics and he appeared very confident in the 
interview. The interview took place in a private office in the school, during a mathematics 
lesson.
7.4.5 Dom
Dom was aged 13.5 and was in Year 8, in set 2 for mathematics. Dom was not very 
articulate, and I found it difficult to get him to talk much in this interview. I began by 
telling him that I was interested in people’s ideas about randomness and asked him if the
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word meant anything to him. He replied with a monosyllabic “yeah”. This seemed to set a 
pattern for much of the interview. The interview took place in my home.
7.4.6 Nick
Nick was in Year 10, aged 15.6, and in set 2 out of 8 for mathematics. In my opening 
remarks, I emphasised to Nick that I wanted him to tell me what he was thinking about the 
tasks as he worked on them. The interview took place in my home.
7.4.7 Joe
Joe was aged 13.5, and attended a selective independent school. He was in Year 9, in set 1 
for maths, having been advanced one year in his schooling. He was highly able and 
articulate. The interview took place in my home.
7.4.8 Abby
Abby had been in Year 12 in a mixed comprehensive school for part of the autumn term, 
before she had to be absent from school for a prolonged period. She had studied AS 
Mathematics, including a module in Statistics, and was now hoping to return to start Year 
12 again in the next September. She gained A* in Mathematics at GCSE. Aged 17.7, she 
was highly articulate in the interview, and needed no encouragement to express her ideas. 
The interview took place one day in the summer term at her home.
This interview lasted much longer than others: Abby’s enthusiasm to express her ideas 
without prompting meant that this interview diverted frequently into discussion of other 
examples offered by Abby herself. '
Page 133
Chapter 7: Stage 1 Interviews
7.4.9 Belie
Belle was in Year 10, aged 14.11, at an independent girls’ school. She was in the top set 
and is one of the best mathematicians in her year group. She was highly articulate. 
Although she was aware that I was investigating children’s ideas about randomness, she 
did not know in advance what I was going to ask her to do.
7.5 The conduct of the first stage interviews
The first stage interviews were planned to last about 50 minutes. In the event, some 
interviews lasted only about 40 minutes, but a few lasted as long as 90 minutes. At the 
start of each interview, I told the interviewee that I was interested in how they thought 
about situations involving chance. I emphasised that, in the activities that followed, I 
would be interested in what they were thinking as they worked; it was therefore important 
that they tried to tell me as much as possible about what they were thinking as they 
worked.
Almost all interviews followed the same structure and used the same tasks. All interviews 
except one opened with the dice tasks as described above, using each of the three dice in 
turn: the biased die, the spherical die, and the cracked die. The exception was the 
interview with Lara, the first interview that I did, in which I omitted the biased die and the 
coin tossing. At the time that I interviewed Lara, my plans for the tasks to use were still 
evolving and I was concerned that the biased die might be too heavily biased. After Lara 
had spent a long time discussing the coin generation task, I was concerned that she was 
becoming bored so I went straight on to the review task.
Throughout the interviews, especially when interviewing younger students, I was 
concerned to use the word ‘random’ very cautiously. In some interviews, where I felt that 
the interviewee did not appear to understand me, or where they appeared unsure of what
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was required of them, I reworded questions using the words ‘by chance’ instead of 
‘random’. This may raise some difficult issues for the analysis and interpretation of the 
interviews, and the interviewee may infer a quite different meaning when they hear the 
term ‘by chance’ from that they would infer from hearing the word ‘random’. Where I 
became aware of some such difference during the interview I tried to follow this up, but I 
cannot be certain that I succeeded in spotting every case where this occurred.
Each interview was recorded on audiotape and later transcribed. During the interviews, I 
made some notes of particular issues that caught my attention, and kept a record of the 
outcomes from the dice-rolling and coin-tossing activities.
7.6 The analysis
The initial analysis of the interviews was in several stages. I began by transcribing each 
interview in detail. I then went through each transcript and made a second account of the 
interview consisting of my commentary woven around substantial quotations from the 
dialogue. The third stage was to work through each account, identifying significant 
themes, particularly any which recurred in more than one interview. In identifying 
important themes, I drew initially upon the issues identified previously from the literature 
review.
I began by making a full and detailed transcription of the interview from the audiotape.
This enabled me to recall the detail of each interview and I started to consider issues and 
themes to follow up. As well as the audiotape, I also drew from a paper record of the 
outcomes observed in each of the dice and coin tasks, and any notes I had recorded by 
hand during the interview. I tried to make the full transcription within a few weeks of the 
interview in order to capture from memory the details of the interviewee’s behaviour and 
any other events, such as the way the die rolled, that would supplement the audio record. It
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was not always possible to transcribe sooner than this as I sometimes recorded as many as 
four interviews in a week, and each transcription took two or three days to complete. The 
transcription was a complete record of all that was said throughout the interview, and by 
whom, including a record of any pause of 5 seconds or more.
The second stage of the analysis of each interview was to prepare a commentary around 
extracts from the transcript. In writing the commentary, I highlighted the actions and 
decisions made by me and by the interviewee. I omitted unnecessary detail from the 
transcript that was not relevant to my work. My commentary on each interview began with 
a brief description of the interviewee, their age and gender, experience of learning 
mathematics and probability, and their apparent disposition during the interview. I also 
described the setting in which the interview was conducted. Within my commentary, I 
provided accounts of key moments and incidents from the interview. I described the 
interviewee’s response to each activity. I have drawn upon excerpts from the 
commentaries in Chapters 8 and 9.
In the course of analysing the first stage interviews, a problem emerged, which applied to 
all the interviews in stage 1. I had repeatedly asked, “What do you think will happen 
next?” during the process tasks. My intention had been to encourage the interviewee to 
consider the impact of the observed outcomes on her preconceptions of how she expected 
the die to behave, and to say how she felt about the “randomness” of the die. I did not 
want the interviewee to feel compelled to give a precise prediction of the outcome that she 
thought would occur next, but I hoped that she would be encouraged to use probabilistic 
language to describe the likelihood of different outcomes. In fact the question produced a 
narrower set of responses than I had hoped for, and in too many of the responses the 
interviewee tried to give a precise prediction.
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In the third stage of the analysis, I identified common themes that occurred in more than 
one interview, often on several occasions. In looking out for these themes, I initially had 
in mind the issues identified in both the literature review in Chapter 2 and in my 
preliminary investigations reported in Chapter 6. I subsequently sorted and refined my list 
of key themes, connecting together themes that I considered to be related under a single 
heading. The refined list of key themes became the framework by which I structured my 
account of the findings from the first stage on the investigation, reported in Chapter 8.
A particular theme highlighted in the literature review in Chapter 2 was the distinction 
between the randomness of the generating process (primary randomness) and the 
randomness of the outcomes generated (secondary randomness). As I pondered this idea in 
the interview commentaries, I became aware that many interviewees sometimes appeared 
to focus upon a small number of particular outcomes that they had observed, perhaps six or 
seven, and to try to make inferences from these outcomes. At other times their attention 
was more upon the generating process, how it worked and why it might be thought of as 
random, and they had much less regard for what the particular outcomes were. It appeared 
that the interviewees were not necessarily aware of how their attention was shifting from 
moment to moment. This shifting of the interviewee’s viewpoint during the interview 
became an object of study for me. However, this theme was different from the themes I 
had identified initially in that it did not show up in isolated incidents within the interviews, 
but rather had to be tracked through a sequence of interactions over a longer period of 
time. The analysis of these sequences required attention to longer passages from the 
commentaries. I have written more extensively about this idea, which I have termed 
‘shifting perspectives’, in Chapter 9.
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7.7 Summary
In this chapter, I have described the tasks that were used in the stage 1 interviews. These 
tasks were designed to embody the dynamic view of randomness outlined in Chapter 3. 
Individual interviewees working on these tasks engaged with ideas about randomness and 
this provided a focus for discussion in the interviews.
I have described briefly each of the interviewees. Excerpts from the interview transcripts 
are included in Chapters 8 and 9, in which I discuss the themes that emerged from the 
interviews.
Finally I have described briefly the process of analysing the interview transcripts and the 
detailed commentaries that were written around each transcript.
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Chapter 8: Themes in Stage 1 Interviews
In this chapter, I present the themes that emerged from the analysis of the stage 1 
interviews. Themes emerged in the early analysis and were organised under three 
headings:
• Interpretations of the idea of randomness
• Strategies for recognising randomness
• Shifting perspectives
Each of these three headings is described in the following sections, before being discussed 
in greater detail and illustrated with extracts from the interviews.
8.1 Interpretations of the idea of randomness
In the course of discussion about the tasks presented in the interviews, interviewees spoke 
about what they expected to see in these situations, and of their interpretation of what they 
observed. I have chosen to refer to the ideas under this heading as interpretations rather 
than meanings, since it seems to me that the interviewee’s ideas here were often emerging 
and evolving in the moment while trying to make sense of successive outcomes from the 
tasks. I have grouped the interpretations discussed in this section into three clusters. The 
first is discussed in 8.1.1 and deals with interpretations relating to equally likely outcomes 
and to the unpredictability and lack of pattern in the short run sequence of outcomes. 
Fairness, unpredictability and irregularity (lack of pattern) are three of the local meanings 
of randomness that were identified by Pratt (1998), which were discussed in Chapter 3.
The second cluster of interpretations, described in 8.1.2 relate to the idea that the outcomes 
are caused or brought about by some outside agency. This second cluster has something in 
common with the idea of ‘unsteerability’, the fourth of the local meanings of randomness 
identified by Pratt (1998). Some of the interpretations considered in these first two clusters
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are related to the strategies considered under the next heading. The final cluster is 
presented in 8.1.3 and relates to the interpretation of randomness as a model for situations 
of incomplete knowledge, as discussed in Chapter 2. This interpretation expresses the idea 
that I can consider randomness to be a model for any situations in which I have insufficient 
knowledge to describe a deterministic process.
8.1.1 Equally likely, fair, unpredictable
In this section I present a selection of interview extracts from three interviews, with Alex 
(age 15.3), Nick (age 15.6) and Joe (age 13.5). These three interviewees illustrate 
contrasting interpretations that were assigned to the term ‘random’. Alex considered that 
randomness, in the context of dice and coin tasks, implied that the outcomes were both 
equiprobable and unpredictable. She also needed to be able to trust that the outcomes were 
chosen ‘without cheating’. Nick considered that randomness could express uncertainty, 
and did not require either equally likely outcomes or fairness. For Joe, randomness of the 
die simply meant that the outcomes did not follow any pattern.
8.1.1.1 Fair: Alex
For some interviewees, the idea that a die could be described as ‘random’ was closely 
associated with the idea that the die should be ‘fair’. Alex displayed this association very 
strongly. The following extracts from the interview with Alex illustrate this. In these 
extracts Alex was working with the dice rolling and the coin tossing tasks.
When I asked Alex if the biased die was ‘random’, she initially appeared to be extremely 
puzzled, as though she did not understand the word ‘random’. However, when I rephrased 
the question in terms of chance, she made clear that she considered the behaviour of the 
biased die was not due to chance.
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When she was introduced to the spherical die, Alex appeared to be able to incorporate 
chance into her account as a way of accounting for when the die stops -  “It’ll stop 
whenever it wants to” (line 55) -  “it stops because the ball-bearings are weighing it down 
in a particular place” (line 60).
In spite of apparently having been confused by my use of the word ‘random’ earlier, Alex 
was later able to use the word for herself when talking of the first four outcomes from the 
spherical die: 4 5 14.
I: OK. So, if you throw it again, what do you think you might get next?
Alex: Um. I can’t tell, because... the numbers have been random so far, apart from the 4, which has
come up twice.
(Lines 61-64)
Her caveat “apart from the 4” referred to the fact that she had seen two 4s and only one of 
each of the other observed outcomes. She was pointing out that she saw the possibility of 
an emerging evidence of bias in the occurrence of the second 4. There is evidence here 
that Alex is using a strategy of predicting and pattern-breaking, like that described in 
section 8.3.2.
After a number of attempts to predict future outcomes from emerging patterns in the list of 
observed outcomes, Alex became more circumspect and cautious. She concluded, “I can’t 
really make a prediction, because it’s like not going in any pattern now” (line 96). Thus 
the outcomes from the spherical die were, for her, unpredictable.
When tossing a coin, Alex found it very difficult physically to spin her coin in the air, and 
very often it only managed half a turn. On one occasion it did not spin at all, and she 
insisted on throwing it again, claiming that she would know what the outcome would be so 
it was not chance.
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Alex: Well, I threw it up flat, so that it would come down and then I would turn it over and I would know
what one it would be.
I: So, that’s not random? {Pause 5 seconds) That’s not chance?
Alex: No that’s not chance, that’s kind of like, {laughs) me cheating!
(Lines 352-353, 356-357)
Note that, again, she appeared to be uncomfortable with my use of the word ‘random’. On 
the other hand, she was happy to suggest that ‘chance’ behaviour implied ‘unpredictable’. 
The idea that ‘chance’ produces an outcome that she cannot know is important for Alex. If 
she were able to know the next outcome then that would be ‘cheating’: controlling the 
process.
Alex: It has to be fair, like where you can’t cheat at it.
(Line 367)
Alex seemed to express the idea that, for the coin to be ‘fair’, she needed to trust it. This is 
of course at the core of the difficulty with ‘randomness’, since a truly random generator is 
essentially like a ‘black box’: you cannot inspect the process to predict what will happen 
next, since if you could it would not be random. Neither can you know for sure whether it 
is random, for although ‘random’ is defined in terms of not showing pattern, even a truly 
random process might produce a pattern for ‘a while’!
To summarise Alex’s view, the idea of randomness in a die was associated with the idea 
that the outcomes should be unpredictable. She also emphasised the idea of ‘fairness’ 
although, for her, this meant more than that the outcomes were equiprobable. There was 
apparently an element of being able to ‘trust’ the die or the coin to choose the outcomes 
fairly -  ‘without cheating’ -  as she suggested when tossing the coin.
8.1.1.2 Unpredictable: Nick
The next set of extracts comes from the interview with Nick, who was also working with 
the dice rolling activities. In contrast to Alex, Nick showed a different understanding of
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‘randomness’. When he rolled the biased die, he observed, after only four outcomes (6 2 2 
6), that the die seemed “a bit biased towards 2 and 6” (line 30). At this point he predicted 
that he might get a 2 or 6 when he rolled again. After a total of 12 outcomes ( 6 2 2 6 6 6 4  
6 6 6 6 6) he stated, “It’s mainly getting sixes, so maybe the other two were just accidents, 
and it’s just biased towards sixes” (lines 56-57). Having heard Nick suggest that the die 
was biased, I asked him directly if he thought that the die was random. This question 
caused him to pause and consider, and his reply was thoughtful and cautious, with many 
hesitations and breaks.
Nick: Yeah, maybe. Yeah, could be. (Pause 5 seconds.).
I: What do you mean when you say it may be? What’s going on for you? What are you thinking?
Nick: (Pause 5 seconds.) .. .I’m not really sure... (Pause 4 seconds) Yeah, cos it keeps... it could be
just random between six, four and two. So... we haven’t had three, five and one... (Pause 5 
seconds.)
I: So, when you say it could be random between six, four and two, what do you mean?
Nick: Those three could come up at any time... (Pause 6 seconds.) .. .It’s ... biased towards those
three... and it’s just chance which ones it comes out as.
(Lines 59-70)
He dealt first with the fact that he had seen 6, 4 and 2 as outcomes, suggesting that the die 
could be random between these three outcomes, and he noted that he had not seen any 
occurrences of 3, 5 or 1. When I prompted him to explain what he meant by “random
j
between 6 4 and 2”, I had wondered if he would suggest that these three outcomes were 
equally likely. He did not, but avoided any discussion of the relative chances of these 
outcomes. His phrase, “it’s just chance which ones it comes out as”, was as close as he got 
to suggesting equiprobability.
It was interesting that Nick made no attempt to look for a physical explanation for the bias 
in the die. Before I took the die back, I invited him to look closely at the face labelled 1, 
where the weight had been inserted. He spotted the weight, and agreed that the die was
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heavier on that side. When I asked him if the presence of the weight would affect his 
judgement of whether the die was random, he acknowledged that the situation seemed 
different, but he still considered the events to be random.
Nick: I think it’s not as random. I think ... the chances are that you’re going to get six, but there are
random events that occur... that make it different.
(Lines 84-85)
Nick’s suggestion that “it’s not as random” had a hint of the idea of ‘degrees of 
randomness’ (see section 8.1.3). His precise meaning was unclear as he had made a 
comparative statement, but had not specified what he was comparing with what.
Later, when he was working with the spherical die, Nick enlarged on his view of what it 
means for a die to be biased.
Nick: It’s not as biased as the last one. It changes... more frequently. ... Cos you get... less of the
same... score.
(Lines 106,115).
When Nick considered whether the die was biased, his attention appeared to be on the 
extent to which successive outcomes were different from one another. After twelve 
outcomes from the spherical die, Nick became aware that he had still not seen a 6, but he 
said he was not concerned, claiming “It could just be random that we haven’t had a six” 
(line 186). When I questioned him further about this after just one further throw, it 
became apparent that his opinion was rather unstable.
Nick: “I would have expected to get a six about now, so if it didn’t come up in a couple of throws, I
would think it was a bit biased against six.”
(Lines 207-208)
After three more throws, he concluded hesitantly, “Actually, I think it is biased against six, 
so ... it makes a six roll away from...” (lines 224-225). After a total of twenty throws,
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and still no 6, he was sure: “Twenty throws and we haven’t had a single six, so... I think it 
was pretty biased against six” (lines 237-238).
When I asked him whether his conviction would be shaken if he got a 6 on the next throw, 
he said that his view would not change as one 6 in twenty throws would be “just a flukey 
chance” (line 241)! However, when I asked if he thought the die was producing random 
outcomes, Nick was still in no doubt that it was “.. .random except for the fact that it’s not 
got sixes. But the rest, I think it is random” (line 243).
When handed the cracked die, Nick noted immediately that it was cracked, but was sure 
that this die was otherwise normal. He stated, “It doesn’t feel weighted at all,” and he went 
on to suggest, “I expect that any number could come up at any time, and that it’s purely 
chance what the... result is” (lines 251, 255-256). When he was asked to suggest what 
might be the outcome of the first throw of the die, he again stated, “it could be anything; it 
could be any one of these, cos it’s just random ... whatever number it is, it’s just totally 
random” (lines 259-262). At this point he was clearly expecting that the behaviour of this 
die would be characterised as unpredictable.
For Nick, randomness expressed any uncertainty in predicting the outcome of rolling the 
die, or tossing the coin. Fairness was not necessary for randomness, and neither was 
equiprobability. Even when the physical cause of the bias was apparent to him, he still 
reasoned from the element of unpredictability in the observed sequence of outcomes to 
conclude that the die was random. I take this to be an expression that there was some 
randomness, since he also suggested “It’s not as random...”
At a deeper level of thinking about the spherical die, and again later with the cracked die, 
Nick did look for each of the possible outcomes to be represented in relatively short 
sequences of only between 12 and 20 outcomes. However, he did not pay attention to the 
relative frequencies of the outcomes.
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Nick gave the impression that his primary focus when considering the randomness of a die 
was whether or not the successive outcomes were predictable. To the extent that he was 
able to conclude that they were not, the die could be described as ‘random’.
8.1.1.3 Fair / Unpredictable: Joe
Joe seemed to hold a view of randomness that was both very simple and yet also 
comparatively sophisticated. When he used the biased die, he suggested after seeing only 
one outcome that this die was weighted, would always land on a six, and was therefore not 
behaving randomly. He said, “No, it’s not random, because it can’t land... it can’t do 
anything, if you see what I mean” (lines 29-30). He experimented with balancing the die 
on an edge and demonstrated that it could only settle onto the six if it was carefully 
positioned on an edge so that it could not fall in any other direction and could not bounce 
once it had fallen.
When Joe rolled the spherical die, he rolled 6 5 6 4 and suggested “that one is... random, 
because it can land on anything” (lines 44-45). It was remarkable how quickly he arrived 
at this conclusion, given that he had seen only four outcomes, all high scores. When I 
asked him to explain what he meant by “random” in this case, he replied, “I mean that it 
doesn’t . .. follow a pattern... Whereas the other one always was a six unless you placed it, 
this one is going where it likes...” (lines 53, 61-62). A little later, when he was 
considering the cracked die, Joe stated again what he meant by “random” in this context.
Joe: Something that’s not definite, that doesn’t follow a pattern... you can’t ever predict random... I
couldn’t roll a normal dice and say for definite, I’m going to get a six, because it’s random.
(Lines 104,107, 109-110)
Again he emphasised that, for him, a die was considered random if the outcomes did not 
follow a pattern and were unpredictable. A little later, he stated something a little
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different, suggesting that he did not believe the cracked die was random because it was not 
fair.
Joe: .. .It’s not random, but it’s not fixed, it’s not definite.
(Line 127)
Even though the outcomes from the cracked die were not completely predictable, the 
process was not considered to be random. Joe’s understanding of ‘random’ seemed to 
have changed from line 110 to line 127, in only a few seconds.
8.1.2 Agency, luck, lack of control
Alex was unusual in appearing to ascribe to some ‘outside agency’, real or imagined, much 
of what she considered to be ‘chance’. In our discussion of ‘chance’ events in everyday 
life, she discussed many examples which each carried this idea.
Finding money on the pavement was ascribed to a lucky chance. (Lines 373-374). She 
considered that she had been lucky that the teacher was in a good mood “when she told me 
off. I didn’t make her happy. She just happened to be happy” (lines 385-390). She 
considered it could be chance to win on the lottery “if it’s your lucky day” (line 418).
She described how some people are just lucky, and she gave the example of her lucky 
auntie who ‘always’ won when she played the lottery (lines 427-432). She described 
chance as being like a game.
Alex: It’s kind of like a game. It doesn’t matter whether you’ve done something or not. It’s whether it
chooses to happen. So that... we didn’t make it happen, but the thing which you’re deciding on, 
that makes it happen... You’re just kind of like the force which pushes it and makes it come like, 
move, but when it stops, unless you’re cheating and stop it yourself, it -  you can’t like tell for 
certain unless it’s got all the same number or all the same things on whatever you’re deciding on 
the chance about.
(Lines 435-440)
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When she considered the behaviour of a rolled die, she said that the die stops where it does 
because of gravity, but you don’t know where it will stop “unless you’re psychic”! (line 
449). I found it interesting that she believed some people are psychic (lines 450-470), 
since such a belief seemed consistent with her beliefs that chance could be ‘caused’ by 
some agency.
When she discussed accidents, she said they could be considered as ‘chance’ if the people 
affected did not do anything to cause them! (lines 487-494). On the other hand, if she got a 
puncture, this would not be chance because something caused it, unless it is caused ‘by 
chance’! (lines 500-504). Football results are not chance, because they are the result of 
many causal factors (lines 509-516). Similarly, the weather is not chance because “it’s 
whatever nature decides to do” (line 520). There are so many factors contributing to the 
weather being as it is at any time (lines 522-524).
Alex seemed able to identify something as a chance phenomenon when she could see no 
other factor causing the outcomes. In this sense, she appeared to see chance as the cause 
when nothing else was identifiable. Thus, she seems to see chance as the cause, the active 
instigator, of events that occur ‘by chance’. There was a sense throughout this discussion 
that Alex saw ‘chance’ as capricious and unpredictable, but also as an independent agency 
acting on real events. Thus, she was also able to see some things, such as getting a 
puncture, as though they were chance events, when the outcome was essentially 
unpredictable, in spite of there being a clear cause. I found her remarks suggestive of the 
blind Goddess Fortuna, whose intervention was considered by the Greeks and Romans to 
be necessary to govern the occurrence of unusual or rare events.
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8.1.3 Model of incomplete knowledge
When I asked David (age 14.1) to think of examples, other than dice and coins, where 
things happen ‘by chance’, his first suggestion was ‘football matches’, although he went on 
to qualify this example by excluding factors such the skill of the teams.
David: Football matches. Because even if it was ... someone like Bradford playing Manchester United,
everyone would say Manchester United are going to win, cos they’re the best team. But although it 
is sometimes in football down to skill, a lot of it can be chance and good luck, so I’d say they could 
still have a chance to win. It’s still just two teams and one of them has to win. So you couldn’t 
ever know definitely which one’s going to win.
(Lines 458-462)
Unlike Alex, David saw the result of a football match as being partly down to chance or 
luck, not as an external agency, but as a model to account for the remaining uncertainty 
about the result after taking account of what he knew about the skill of the teams. This 
informal way of thinking is reminiscent of the way in which a statistician using analysis of 
variance will think of accounting for a proportion of the variability and look on the residual 
variability as due to ‘chance’.
A few pupils were able to articulate quite sophisticated ideas about the application of 
randomness. For Ben (age 15.7), when discussing what he could consider to be random, 
the very large number of factors that affect the outcomes was the critical element in 
making something random. However, when he tried to apply this reasoning to an imagined 
person involved in a recent rail crash, for which no cause was yet known, he stated that the 
outcome was strictly not completely random because there are contributing factors that 
affect the outcome, and these could be predicted. Nonetheless, the number of contributing 
factors appeared to be so large that it became difficult or impossible to predict the 
outcome, and so the situation could be considered random.
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I: If I ask you now to tell me in your own words, what does it mean to say that something is random,
what would you say?
Ben: Well it would have to be something that occurs because o f ... millions and millions of variables
that just can’t be controlled... just sort of controls themselves... they just change for no reason, or 
they have sort of a reason, but can be affected... The reasons could be other variables, which 
would make it even more complicated...
(Lines 589-594)
Here Ben was quite clearly suggesting that randomness could be a useful model for events 
where the causes are unpredictable or unknown.
8.2 Restricted use of the word ‘random’
When interviewees chose to use the word “random”, their use often echoed the meanings 
identified from the literature in Chapters 2 and 3. “Randomness” was often described in 
terms of not being something, as in unpredictable and without pattern.
While I was conducting the first round of interviews, I became aware that, for some 
interviewees, the word ‘random’ had meanings that I had not foreseen. Almost all the 
interviewees made some use of the word ‘random’ during their interview. Even Alex 
(discussed in the previous section), who had initially appeared not to understand the word, 
used it later in discussion. However, the word was sometimes used in ways that were 
surprising.
Two distinct categories of use of the word ‘random’ were identified from the interviews. 
The first focuses on the contrast between the mathematical meaning of the term and the 
more colloquial usage that was emerging amongst young people in the late 1990’s. The 
second considers a more subtle distinction between, on the one hand, seeing randomness as 
an absolute -  a situation is either random or it is not -  and on the other hand, seeing it as a 
matter of degree.
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8.2.1 Colloquial and technical uses of the word ‘random’
The example in this section illustrates the way that use of the word ‘random’ may not 
match the accepted mathematical use. In this example David appeared to use the word 
‘random’ in a restricted sense.
When I asked David to identify examples of situations in which events could be described 
as occurring ‘by chance’, he readily identified some. The first was the result of a football 
match and the second was trying to open a book at a particular a page, but being unlikely 
to get it exactly right. However, when I asked him if he saw the word ‘random’ as the 
same as ‘by chance’, or whether he would distinguish these two ideas, his reply surprised 
me. He restricted the meaning of ‘random’ to situations in which someone had to choose 
an item from a set. He used the word in the context of ‘picking at random’ and used the 
word ‘guess’ to describe what he means. Thus he could say that he guessed the outcome of 
a football match, by picking a result at random, but he would not speak of the result of the 
match as random.
David: Random -  something you pick out of free will basically. Something you choose. Because when 
you do something at random or pick something at random, it’s more like a guess. .. .And it’s your 
will saying, “Oh I think it might be that one”, b u t... like with a coin if I picked Tails at random, 
there’s still a 50-50 chance it could land on Heads, or Tails. So random is just... your free will 
basically, thinking of it.
I suppose, a lot of the time, for instance, like with the coin, picking one at random... there’s a 50- 
50 chance it can land on it, so you’ve got quite a high probability. But if, like a page, if you picked 
one at random, and then said to your friend, “which one did I just pick”, and it’s a 600-paged book, 
then, if they just picked one at random, they’re probably not going to get it. So it’s just a guess 
really, a guess of what you think.
(Lines 477-486)
It is interesting to note that David has used the example of choosing a page from a book to 
illustrate his explanation. He could not use the example of the football match.
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In contrast, David used the word ‘chance’ to describe whether something can happen and 
sometimes how likely it is to happen. His use of the word ‘chance’ seemed to merge into 
the idea of ‘having a chance’ as in ‘having an opportunity’. If something has a chance, 
then it can occur.
I: What would you say is the meaning of chance? If things happen by chance, what are we saying?
David: That everything has a chance. I mean... you wouldn’t try something that didn’t have a chance.
But I would say if they had a chance... for instance... if a man fell off a cliff, there is still some 
chance, it might not be very high, there is still some chance that he would survive. And it’s within 
a lot of things. Chance is involved. .. .1 mean, people say “chance” every day, usually, don’t they?
.. .There’s a chance you’ll get higher than me in the test, or there’s a chance that you’ll score from 
here, or... there’s a chance that the keeper will accidentally drop it in. ... Everything has a chance, 
usually.
I: So is there a difference between those two words? ‘Random’ and ‘Chance’?
David: Yeah. Because ‘Random’ is a guess of your own free will, and ‘Chance’ is how much chance have
you got of either getting that or not getting it. So I would say there is a difference.
(Lines 487-498)
The somewhat restricted meaning that David assigns to the word ‘random’ could lead him 
to experience difficulties understanding the use of the word in mathematics when he has to 
interact with the school mathematics curriculum. The difference between his meaning and 
a more generally accepted mathematical meaning is subtle, but important.
8.2.2 Degrees of randomness
In reflecting on these interviews, I saw that important terms were often used loosely and 
that this led to some confusion between related ideas, for example, between randomness 
and fairness, randomness and distribution, distribution and probability. Fairness was a 
term used by many interviewees, as well as by me, to describe ‘equiprobability’, and yet it 
was sometimes used to mean ‘random’. A ‘fair’ die is seen as being ‘more random’ than 
the biased die. This leads to the idea that some people think about ‘degrees of .
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randomness’: some processes are seen as random, but less random than others. I was 
surprised to discover that the term ‘degree(s) of randomness’ is used in various contexts on 
Internet websites, including some academic sites in fields such as geography, mathematics 
and linguistics. This may indicate that the term is emerging in wider use of language, and 
it might not be surprising to find that children are using the underlying idea in their 
discourse about randomness.
N
This theme is remarkable for the surprising differences of opinion that I found relating to 
it. In an early seminar in which I presented my developing ideas to a group of colleagues, I 
commented that some pupils, to whom I had spoken about their ideas of chance and 
randomness, had indicated to me that they considered some situations were more random 
than others. I suggested that this seemed to me to be quite a sensible idea. My suggestion 
provoked a vigorous response from a colleague in the meeting, who was convinced that 
‘randomness’ was a black and white concept: something was either random or it was not!
The idea of ‘degrees of randomness’ really relates to a fundamental philosophical issue 
about the nature of randomness. If randomness is unpredictability, then a probability 
distribution may be considered to be a measure of the degree to which an outcome is 
predictable. Considering a situation in which there is a finite number of possible 
outcomes, the situation has maximum unpredictability if the outcomes are equally likely 
and this situation might therefore be considered to be the most random. The extent to 
which the biased die is biased is the degree to which it is predictable, and in that sense bias 
is the antithesis of randomness. On the other hand, if randomness is considered to be 
absolute -  the opposite of deterministic -  then any situation in which the outcome is not 
completely determined might be considered to be subject to a random effect. There were 
hints of each of these views in the interviews.
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Several interviewees compared the degree of randomness shown by the three dice in the 
dice tasks. David (age 14.1) used this idea after he had finally recognised the bias in the 
biased die (after 23 throws): he commented that he still thought the behaviour of this die 
was ‘chance’, “but not as well as a normal dice” (line 134). This seemed to be a 
reasonable comment in view of the fact that the outcomes from the biased die were certain. 
Later, when considering the spherical die, he commented “this dice is more chance than the 
other one, because... it was high numbers then low numbers” (lines 187-188). Ben (age 
15.7) said something similar after ten outcomes from the spherical die, when he 
commented that this die appeared to be “a lot more random than the other one... although 
we’re getting lots of Is and 5s” (lines 60, 62), referring to the biased die. He meant by this 
that it didn’t “seem to be so biased” (line 64). Note that neither Ben nor David were 
saying that the spherical die appeared to be completely random, as both were still 
concerned about aspects of the outcomes that they had observed so far.
Soon after this, when discussing the cracked die, Ben seemed to suggest that he could 
control the degree of randomness in the outcomes by the way he chose to roll the die.
Ben: If you pick it up like that, and then roll it... off your fingers... it’s more likely to get... a number on
one of these faces, so long as it’ll land straight, and doesn’t bounce. And then if you just... pick it 
up and chuck it, then... that’s more random, rather than just keep rolling it all the time, which is 
what I’m doing on this table. Because if I just... chuck it, it would bounce around on the carpet a 
bit and go away. So you’re more likely to get... the same type of numbers recurring over again. 
Well... it might not be the same numbers, but it will be less random because, if we’re always 
picking it up in the same way and rolling it in the same way, then it should start occurring in a 
pattern rather than... just completely random.
(Lines 311-320)
He suggested that, by rolling the die in controlled manner along the table, he could restrict 
the outcomes, whereas if he were to “chuck it, it would bounce around on the carpet a 
bit...”
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Finally, Ben thought sporting results (football, or horse-racing) were essentially 
determined by factors that could be known, and were to some extent predictable by people 
in the know. However, he still insisted that these events had an element of chance.
B: They’re not completely random, but there will be some anomalies that just... turn up. So, I’d say
that they’re almost not random, but they sort of are as well.
(Lines 552-553)
He mentioned very rare events, such as “getting knocked over by a bus if you walk 
outside” (line 554), and commented “it’s such a small chance, hopefully, that... you just 
don’t treat it as anything random at all -  it’s just not going to happen” (lines 555-556).
This remark suggests that he may have been thinking of probability as a measure of the 
extent to which something is not determinate, and hence ‘random’.
These examples from sport are complex situations in which there are clearly causal factors, 
but Ben was able to see that, in spite of these, a random model could be applied 
appropriately.
8.3 Strategies for recognising randomness
Because the tasks presented in the interviews were dynamic, and had been selected to 
encourage the interviewee to be aware of what they expected to see as outcomes from a 
typical random generator, interviewees used a variety of strategies to try to make sense of 
their observations. Three strategies are discussed under this heading: pattern breaking, 
representativeness and physical characteristics. I make no claim that these three strategies 
are exhaustive - indeed, there were indications within some interviews that other strategies 
were also used - but these three appear to be distinct, they cover most observed cases and 
they give an indication of the variety of strategies.
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8.3.1 Ben: No pattern / Pattern-breaking / Representative
Having worked on all three dice activities, Ben was unusual in identifying three features 
that he looked for in the context of rolling a die. No other interviewee summarised their 
approach in quite this way.
Ben: Numbers occurring in.. .no particular... I can’t really see a pattern that much b u t... if something’s
random it couldn’t have any sort of pattern at all.
And ... something that was completely random would have a bit of everything in it... and that sort 
of has a bit of everything...
It starts off with only 5s, 2s and 6s, and then... moves about a bit.... If it was completely random, 
you would expect that to happen a couple of times. Else it wouldn’t be completely random. ...
You just sort of expect all the numbers to appear in absolutely no order whatsoever.
(Lines 329-337)
His reply identified three features that he looked for in a dice context: no particular pattern 
(“if something’s random it couldn’t have any sort of pattern at all”); a bit of every different 
possible outcome (“something that was completely random would have a bit of everything 
in it”); and some bits of pattern that then break down (“It starts off with only 5s, 2s and 6s, 
and then sort o f .. .moves about a bit”). This is a more sophisticated explanation than he 
offered after the spherical die activity.
Later, when discussing the coin generation task, Ben did something similar. He identified 
three features to which he had paid attention: there should be runs of each kind, Heads and 
Tails, but not usually longer than three, and there should be balance between frequencies of 
Heads and Tails. These three features are closely parallel to two of the three features that 
he identified for the dice activities.
Ben’s summaries encapsulate both the pattern-breaking strategy and the desire for the 
random outcomes to be representative of the underlying process.
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8.3 2 Pattern-Breaking
The coin generation task provided an interesting insight into the ways in which people 
recognised randomness. When I asked David what he had been paying attention to as he 
made up twenty outcomes from tossing a coin, his reply showed a surprising awareness of 
randomness.
David: I was trying to forget about the number I had put. Every time I put one, like a heads or a tails, I
would go to underneath and I would try to forget the one I put before. And I would just think of
one in my mind to see what one came and popped up first.
I: Good. That’s interesting. Why were you doing that?
David: Because I thought if I thought about the one that were a heads or a tails before, then I would try and
make a more interesting sequence than just random. Because it’s just a probability, one out of two 
chance.
(Lines 308-314)
I had not expected such a clear articulation of the idea of independence. David was clearly 
aware of this property and that it would be difficult to reproduce in this generation activity. 
Nevertheless, it was interesting to note that his sequence had no runs longer than four, and 
had a high degree of switching between outcomes.
When I asked him if he would be able to tell the difference between his made up sequence 
and one produced by tossing a real coin, he was sure he would not. However, he 
recognised that a particularly difficult time at which to ‘forget’ previous outcomes was 
immediately following a run of three or four of a kind.
I: You were trying to forget what you had written down for the previous one. Were there times when
you found that difficult to do?
David: Yeah. When I had... lots of heads in a row. And I just... thought, “Oh well, I’ll forget that one”,
and another head came up, and I thought oh there’s four in row, and I thought, “oh no, I don’t want 
to think that cos I just want it to be probability”.
I: Tell me more about that.
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David: I think, because I knew there were three Heads in a row, and it would be... quite peculiar... for a
coin to have four Heads in a row, I kept on... The one that popped up first was a Head, because I 
was thinking of it, at the time -  so I think that changed it from what it would have been if I’d’ve 
just done one and then got a Tails afterwards.
(Lines 320-329)
David has expressed the tension that many people feel between ‘knowing that the next 
result is independent of what has come before’ and the salience of recent history in their 
memory. Any run that is experienced in a random process is ‘expected’ to change soon. 
People feel excitement waiting for it to change, and may experience relief when it does.
8.3.3 Representativeness
The interviewees who demonstrated this strategy did so most clearly while working on the 
dice throwing and the coin tossing activities. They were looking for evidence that all the 
possible outcomes occurred within a relatively short sequence. Where one outcome was 
not present they expressed concern, either anticipating its occurrence in the next throw 
(negative recency), or, perversely, predicting that the missing outcome would not occur at 
all (a kind of positive recency). Some interviewees shifted between these two ideas, as 
Lara (age 16.10) did when working on the spherical die.
Lara was very reticent throughout her interview. In the first six throws, Lara had obtained 
1 2 2 6 4 3; this represented at least one of each possible outcome except 5. When I asked 
her what might happen next, she suggested it would be a two.
Lara: A two... Because I’ve had two 2s already.
(Line 34)
The next throw produced another 1. Lara was not surprised, but when asked what might 
happen next, she again chose the outcomes which had occurred more than once, keeping to 
the positive recency strategy that she had used before.
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I: What do you think might happen next time?
Lara: Two or a one... Because I’ve had them more.
(Lines 43-44,46)
Although Lara used the frequencies observed so far as a guide to what might occur next, 
she said she was not strongly committed to her prediction and she stated she still believed 
the die was unbiased. However, she changed her strategy after the next throw, a 6, and 
stated that anything could happen. She now agreed that the outcomes so far were not a 
reason to modify the unbiased assumption.
After the next outcome, a 3, Lara emphasised again her view that the die looked ‘normal’. 
However, when invited to say what might happen next, she reversed her previous strategy 
and opted for 5, the only possible outcome that had not yet occurred. This strategy 
supposes the die to be fair, and that short sequences will be representative of this ‘fairness’.
I: So what do you think might happen next time?
Lara: A five? Just because no fives have come up...
I: You think there might be a 5 next?
Lara: Well probably not, {laughs)
(Lines 72-75)
Even so, Lara was not committed to this strategy, as the extract above illustrates. After the 
next outcome, a 4, Lara had observed ten outcomes, but had not seen a 5. She noticed this 
and suggested that the next outcome might be anything except a 5, reverting back to her 
original strategy.
Lara: Anything but a 5.
I: Anything but 5. Does it feel like a fair dice?
Lara: No.
(Lines 86-88)
Lara had now expressed more concern than before about the absence of a 5. When I asked 
her to explain why she was concerned, she simply repeated her concern.
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Lara: Because, you would have thought there would have been a 5 by now.
(Line 92)
When the next throw produced a 1, Lara said that she felt the absence of a 5 was odd, but 
she did not feel strongly about it. The twelfth throw produced the missing 5, and Lara 
laughed. When thinking about what might happen next, Lara stuck to her original strategy 
of picking the outcome that had occurred most often.
Lara: One? .. .There’s more ones so far.
(Lines 112,114)
Lara’s preferred strategy for considering what might happen next appeared to be to select 
the most frequent outcome. This assumed that the die might be biased. In addition, the 
spherical die clearly looked unusual. In spite of this, she still felt that the spherical die did 
not behave very differently from an ordinary die.
Lara: .. .It’s not like an ordinary dice.
I: In what way?
Lara: Well, it’s round. (Laughs)
I: OK. Does it feel as though it behaves differently?
Lara: No.
(Lines 121-125)
After the next outcome, a second 5, Lara expressed more clearly why she felt that this die 
was unbiased. She was looking at the frequencies of the various outcomes and noting that 
they were fairly even. In fact, this particular sequence of thirteen outcomes had been 
remarkably even, with exactly two occurrences of each possible outcome, except 1, which 
had occurred three times. However, Lara did note that she had “not rolled it that many 
times yet” (line 136).
Throughout her work with the spherical die, Lara’s attention was almost entirely focused 
on whether the short sequence of observed outcomes included each of the six possible 
outcomes. She expected the outcomes to be representative of her view that the die was
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unbiased. Often, in her ideas about what might happen next, she appeared to see the 
hypothesis of equal likelihood as one to be challenged and suggested that the next outcome 
would be one of those which had occurred most often. Occasionally she reversed this 
argument and suggested that the missing outcome would come up next. However, all 
along, she did not feel strongly about these suggestions and she held to her original belief 
that the die would be fair.
8.3.4 Physical characteristics
When asked if the spherical die was like a normal die, Alex (age 15.3) expressed some 
concern about its unusual physical behaviour. Eventually she concluded that the outcomes 
were equiprobable.
Alex: Well, the chances of it coming up on the same number are... one in six... or, it depends...
(Line 115)
However, in spite of this, she was not happy to consider it a ‘fair’ die, because the moving 
ball inside “makes it go on a specific number” (line 183) and that meant “that dice is 
unfair” (line 189). For Alex, the moving ball inside the sphere was causing the behaviour 
of the spherical die, which meant that she did not consider the die to be fair.
Later, when she considered the cracked die, Alex was again more concerned about the 
physical characteristics of the die than whether the outcomes were equally likely. Initially 
she was concerned with where the crack lay: “.. .it’s got more cracks in the 6. Then it’s got 
some in the 2 and the 5” (line 193).
Later she concluded that the outcomes were occurring fairly.
Alex: It’s ... come up a fair amount of each different number. So, it’s had Is, it’s had 2s, it’s had 3s, it’s
had not many 4s, but it’s had some, so I would be happy to use that dice in a game.
(Lines 238-239)
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However, when I asked her if she thought this die behaved by chance, she discussed the 
physical characteristics in terms of symmetry and seemed to suggest that it was symmetry 
that made it fair and hence behave ‘by chance’.
8.4 Different perspectives
The ideas considered under this heading relate to the phenomenographic nature of this 
study. The analysis revealed distinct ‘ways of seeing’ the phenomena represented by the 
interview tasks. Some of these ‘ways of seeing’ were clearly related to one another, and 
interviewees were seen to shift between these as they attempted to make sense of the 
emerging outcomes.
This theme of distinct perspectives, to which interviewees appeared to hold lightly and 
between which they moved rapidly, began to emerge when I studied the interview 
transcripts more closely and attempted to identify the focus of the interviewee’s attention 
as the outcomes emerged. Changes in the focus were particularly apparent when 
interviewees were working with the dice tasks and were unsure whether a die was showing 
a bias. At first, I saw this constant shifting of position as an expression of an interviewee’s 
uncertainty about how to interpret their experiences. As I examined the transcripts, I 
recognized that the interviewee’s shifting position seemed to be related to the way that 
their attention moved between different features of the randomness of the die as more 
outcomes were generated and observed.
The most distinctive collection of ways of seeing was what I have termed local, global. In 
this section I describe local and global ways of seeing and how they differ. My intention 
here is to try to clarify the distinction between these two perspectives on randomness. In 
Chapter 9 ,1 present a more extended discussion of the ways in which interviewees were 
seen to shift between them.
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I begin in 8.4.1 by illustrating how the two perspectives are present in the way 
interviewees approach the activity. I present a brief description of Lara’s work on the 
cracked die. Later sub-sections present further examples of each of the local and global 
perspectives.
8.4.1 Lara: two perspectives
Lara was not much interested by either the biased die or the spherical die. When she 
started to work on the cracked die, her initial reaction was that it was a normal die and she 
was sure that the crack would not affect its fairness. She appeared quite dismissive of my 
questions about what might happen next. However, after nine outcomes she noticed that 
she had not yet seen any occurrence of 1 or 3, and when this was still the case after twelve 
outcomes, she expressed suspicion about the fairness of the die. Her attention was drawn 
into the task as she noticed something that she did not expect and began to anticipate 
whether this would change or persist. The thirteenth outcome was 1, but she had still not 
seen a 3 after 28 outcomes. She became certain that the die was biased, and she became 
sure that 3 was less likely to occur than any other possible outcome. Then, the 29th throw 
was a 3. On the way from the 12th to the 29th outcome, Lara’s way of viewing the situation 
changed frequently, as did her approach to predicting what might happen next. She 
became increasingly unsure, and asked me on two occasions to tell her whether this die 
was really fair. I could not tell her, because I did not know, and I told her so.
When Lara’s attention was first drawn into the activity by the absence of some possible 
outcomes, she was using the strategy of representativeness, as she had done earlier when 
working on the spherical die (see section 8.3.3). Her attention was in the local perspective, 
as she was concerned with the individual outcomes unfolding in front of her. This changed 
between the 12th and the 29th outcomes, and when 3 occurred on the 29th throw, her
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attention was more focused in the global perspective of the aggregated distribution of 
outcomes.
8.4.2 The local perspective
When Dom (age 13.5) worked with the spherical die, he worked almost entirely within the 
local perspective, although initially, he was concerned more with the physical aspects of 
the die. When he first rolled the die and noted a 4, he sat and thought for several seconds, 
preoccupied by the motion of the moving weight. He stated that the die was ‘random’ and 
cited the movement of the weight inside as the die rolled.
Dom: Well, this is random, because the weight moves. So, depending on which way you roll it, is going
to determine where the weight lands, and which number... is facing down or up.
(Lines 72-74)
He rolled the die a further five times. The first six outcomes were 4,4, 3, 2, 3 and 1. He 
stated that he had “no idea” what might happen next but, when I asked him if he had any 
preference, he argued from the list of outcomes seen so far (“because there’s most of 
them”) that he might get a 4 or a 3. However, he also recognised that the die might ‘land 
on something completely different’.
Dom: It could land on... it might land on a 4 or a 3. Because there’s the most of them. But probably it’s
going to land on something completely different.
(Lines 83-84)
Although Dorn’s reply suggested that he considered no outcome was any more likely than 
any other, the form of the argument that he used, reasoning from the sequence of six 
outcomes observed so far, suggests that he was working in the local perspective.
He rolled the die twice more and got a six each time. Dom still thought this die was 
random but, when I invited him to say more about what he meant, he still reasoned from 
the mixture of outcomes in the short sequence observed.
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I: What do you mean when you say that that is random?
Dom: That it can land on absolutely anything, every time you throw it.
(Lines 89-90)
Although Dom’s view of randomness here was like saying that outcomes are equiprobable, 
he was not reasoning from any aggregation of outcomes and so his reasoning appears to be 
still within the local perspective. It is notable that he arrived at this conclusion after only 
eight outcomes. The sequence of outcomes observed was 4, 4, 3, 2, 3, 1, 6 and 6, which 
does not yet include any 5, but it may be that he had not noticed this fact. Insofar as Dom 
was using the data, and reasoning from the observed results, he was reasoning in the local 
perspective.
The local perspective was also important within the coin generation task. This is 
illustrated in Dom’s discussion of his experience of generating twenty outcomes from the 
imaginary coin. While he was aware at the end that the numbers of heads and tails were 
approximately the same, he suggested that he had not monitored the frequencies while 
generating the outcomes.
Dom: Well, there’s almost the same number of heads as of, the same number of tails. Because there’s
only two different things you can put down... so if you tossed a coin fifty times, you would be 
probably likely to get about 25 heads, and 25 tails, or close to that. {Pause 8 seconds.)
I: So, were you watching for that as you wrote down your sequence? Were you monitoring how
many heads and how many tails?
Dom: No, I was just... seeing what came into my head first, head or tail.
(Lines 157-163)
However, he commented that he had sometimes been aware of changing the next outcome 
in his head to avoid continuing a run.
Dom: Sometimes if I put... about... 3 tails, it... would change to a head. It got too many of one thing.
I: So, were you consciously thinking it shouldn’t be another tail?
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Dom: ... Sometimes. If I ... didn’t want to put too many of one number, of one tail or one head.
(Lines 166-170)
Dom’s description of his uncertainty about how the coin will behave on any one throw 
expressed the essence of how I saw the local perspective on randomness at this point. 
Although he was aware of the idea of a prior distribution, his description of the behaviour 
focused on the uncertainty of the next few outcomes. He was not concerned with any 
aggregation of the data.
Dom had concluded that the spherical die was fair after only eight outcomes and without 
appearing to move out of the local perspective. Several interviewees appeared to reach 
conclusions in this way, but this was most common when working on the biased die. 
Because the bias was quite strong, people were sometimes drawn to conclude after very 
few outcomes that the die was not fair.
For example, Belle (age 14.11), looked surprised as the first five outcomes unfolded and, 
after the third 6, she expressed this aloud.
Belle: OK (rolls) 3. (rolls) 6. (rolls) 6. (rolls) 6. What on earth... (rolls) 6. OK. Again?
(Lines 36-42)
After the fourth 6 ,1 invited her to consider what might happen next. She already suspected 
strongly that the die was biased, and that she was likely to get a six next, but she was 
perturbed about the three on the first outcome.
I: What do you think might happen next?
Belle: Six.
I: Why?
Belle: ... Biased dice, maybe... which confuses me, because the first one was a 3.
(Lines 43-48)
It may be that Belle was trying to express a global perspective here to account for the run 
of sixes, but that it clashed with the evidence of the 3 in her local perspective. Belle rolled
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the die again and got another 6. She continued to believe that the next outcome was likely 
to be 6, but she tried to explain the first outcome of 3 as an aberration caused by her doing 
something wrong. She appeared to need a reason for the first outcome being different.
I: Do you think it’ll be a six again?
Belle: Yeah. And probably it was only a 3 the first time because I did it at the wrong angle, because the
three’s next to the six.
(Lines 50-52)
Fortuitously, the next outcome was a three, causing Belle to feel quite uncomfortable. She 
even suggested that I might be controlling the outcomes with my mind! However, when I 
asked her directly, she did not believe that I could be doing so.
Belle: If I didn’t know better, I’d think you were controlling this one with your mind...
I: Well. Do you think I am?
Belle: (laughs) No. It would be a bit hard, too complicated for that to happen.
(Lines 54-57)
The occurrence of the second 3 shook her attempt to express a global perspective and left 
her still in the local perspective. She speculated that the die might be biased.
Belle: So threes and sixes. Which implies that it’s biased at about between the 1 and the 4... if at all.
(Line 58)
However, she did not appear to examine the die to find a source of bias.
Belle’s reasoning is not entirely within the local perspective, but insofar as she reasoned 
from the outcomes 3 6 6 6 6 6 3 6  she was reasoning locally.
8.4.3 The global perspective
When Belle later found the weight in the biased die, she became much more confident in 
her expression of the bias.
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Shortly before she found the weight, she continued to throw sixes. She appeared to be 
getting quite frustrated, and did not know what else she could say about the die.
Belle: What else is there to say? Six, six, six, six.. .with the occasional threes.
(Lines 67, 70)
The statement has a hint of the global in it, but it could still be interpreted as reasoning 
about short run behaviour. After several more throws, each generating a six, I suggested 
that she pause and look at the die. This time she spotted the weight in the face labelled 
one. Initially, she thought that this was a magnet, and suspected that the tray on which she 
had been rolling the die was metal.
I: Take a look at it.
Belle: In what way? Like that bit? Some holey magnet style thing. Is this {indicating the tray that she
was rolling the die onto) made of metal? {Taps the tray) No. So it can’t be a magnet.
I: No the tray’s not made of metal.
Belle: It looks like something’s been done to the dice. Something been stuck on it or something. On the
one, just opposite the six. I not quite sure how the threes came up, unless that was just because it 
landed at the wrong angle and turned to tip that way. OK {Laughs)
(Lines 86-94)
Seeing the weight in the face gave Belle a rational explanation for the sequence of 
outcomes that she had observed. However, she still struggled to account for the 
occurrences of 3. She tried again to suggest the 3s were an aberration because the die 
‘landed at the wrong angle’, rather than accepting that such a run of outcomes might occur 
by chance. However, she was now clear that the die was biased. I was interested to see 
whether she still saw the biased die as being random, since this might enable her to account 
for the occasional outcome of 3. She was clear in her response that the die was not random 
as she could predict the outcomes.
I: Is the outcome random?
Belle: No. Because you can predict what the outcome’s going to be.
Page 168
Chapter 8: Themes in Stage 1 Interviews
I: And what is the outcome going to be?
Belle: Most probably a six, maybe a three.
(Lines 99-102)
In spite of her view that the outcomes were not random, Belle still used informal language 
of probability in describing what the outcome of rolling the die could be: ‘most probably a 
six’. I was interested in her use of these words and I asked to explain further what she 
meant. Her response conveyed that she was aware that there were other possibilities than 
six, but these came up rarely. Again she implied that these other possibilities occurred 
under strange circumstances: ‘it could land at a weird angle’.
I: .. .I’m just interested by ‘most probably’. What does that mean?
Belle: Well, it means that once or twice it came up as a three, so it could... be a three. It could land at a
weird angle and end up if it is a biased dice, which... is almost certain as far as I am
concerned, then even biased dice you don’t necessarily get the number it’s biased to, because it 
depends on how it lands.
(Lines 107-113)
In this last exchange Belle was beginning to express informally a view of a probability 
distribution of the outcomes. I suggest this is the beginning of a global perspective on 
randomness, even though Belle herself has not recognised these outcomes as random.
Joe (age 13.5) showed understanding of the global perspective when he discussed his view 
of the cracked die. He was convinced that, while any outcome was possible, the relative 
chances of each outcome could be affected by the asymmetry of the cracks in some of the 
faces.
Joe: It should... land on any number, if you roll it. I dunno what... But it could be influenced by the
cracks.
(Lines 77, 79, 81)
Page 169
Chapter 8: Themes in Stage 1 Interviews 
Later, he repeated his view that this die might not have equally likely outcomes because of 
the cracks. He explained his understanding of the relationship of long run frequency to 
probability -  a view which approaches the global perspective.
Joe: .. .This one... has the capability of landing on another number ... the crack seemed to affect it in a
way, like we haven’t actually got a single one or a six. And that might be because of the cracks, or 
it might not...
I: How could you find out?
Joe: Well, you could roll it a number of times and record your results and see... whether it seemed to
favour one side... But then that could be just luck or chance. So there’s no definite way of finding 
out, really. But you could, if you rolled it a number of times, say ten times, say a hundred times, 
and you didn’t get a single six or a single one, then... it would probably be in your mind that six 
and one... they had less chance of being rolled. So... it’s not random, but it’s not fixed, it’s not 
definite.
(Lines 113-120, 122-127)
Joe appeared to be aware that rolling the die “a number of times... say a hundred.. would 
tell him something about the underlying possibilities; if one outcome failed to occur in so 
many trials then he might conclude that outcome was less likely to occur than the others. 
However, he did not go as far as suggesting the idea of the law of large numbers: that with 
increasing number of trials the relative frequency of an outcome approaches its probability: 
Thus Joe appeared to be working in the global perspective, insofar as he was discussing 
what he would see if he aggregated the results of a large number of trials, and he was 
expecting that this would enable him to say something more than he was able to say from 
the local perspective.
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8.5 Summary
The themes identified from the stage 1 interviews are broadly in four categories.
First, interviewees demonstrated several interpretations of randomness, when they talked 
about what they believed was random in the dice activities. These interpretations are 
similar to the local meanings identified by Pratt (1998). For some interviewees, random 
outcomes needed to be approximately equally likely, as in Pratt’s local meaning of 
‘fairness’. For others it was enough that the outcomes have an element of unpredictability. 
However, a few interviewees moved between interpretations of randomness, as was the 
case with Joe in 8.1.3. Interpretations are not fixed, but appear to change and adapt to 
circumstances in subtle ways. However, I have no sense that an individual can control 
these changes of interpretation.
Two different ways of interpreting the word “random” were considered in this chapter. 
David seemed to adopt a narrow sense of the word, possibly arising from having heard the 
word used in restricted contexts. This is different from the colloquial meaning discussed in 
Chapter 6, but might also have arisen from particular social interactions. The second idea 
was ‘degrees of randomness’. Some interviewees considered some dice to be more 
random than others, while others considered a die was either random or it was not. It 
seems plausible that the idea of degrees of randomness might be a reverse of believing that 
randomness requires equally likely outcomes.
In the third category I considered three strategies that interviewees appeared to use to 
identify whether outcomes were random: pattern-breaking, representativeness, and 
examination of the physical characteristics of the system. People using pattern-breaking 
looked for short patterns in the sequence of outcomes and expected them to be quickly 
broken. Looking for runs of the same outcome was a special case of pattern-breaking, 
which emerged in the coin generation task: runs of length three were expected, but not
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longer. Pattern-breaking may be related to Pratt’s local meaning of “irregularity”, in which 
a child might refer to an experiment as random if there is no evidence of patterned 
sequence in the observed results. A person using representativeness expects a random 
process to produce all the possible outcomes within a short sequence. This strategy seems 
closest to Pratt’s local meaning of “Fairness”. The third strategy of looking at the physical 
characteristics of the system differs from the other two. I identified in Chapter 2 the 
distinction between seeing randomness in the process and in the outcomes. Whereas the 
other strategies focused on looking at outcomes, this one examines physical aspects of the 
generating process.
Finally, I have distinguished two perspectives on randomness: local and global. The local 
perspective is concerned with short sequences of outcomes, and seeing local disorder, 
unpredictability and irregularity. At the global level, an individual becomes aware of an 
emerging frequency distribution. In Chapter 9 ,1 look more closely at the relationship and 
movement between these two perspectives.
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Chapter 9: Shifting perspectives in Stage 1 Interviews
9.1 Randomness and Distribution
When used in a mathematical sense, the terms ‘random’ and ‘randomness’ have quite 
precise meanings (although there are considerable differences between the meanings and 
interpretations used by different mathematicians -  see Chapter 2 for examples). In 
contrast, when used by non-specialists, and particularly children, these terms are much less 
precise. However, the interpretations and meanings given to these words in everyday 
contexts form an essential part of the context in which any learner is working when they 
are introduced to these terms in school mathematics lessons.
In both mathematical and everyday contexts ‘randomness’ is often thought as without 
pattern and without order. Yet, in order to develop ideas of probability and distribution, 
the pattern and order that emerge from the long run behaviour of random phenomena are 
critically important. This apparent contradiction, between ‘randomness’ as without 
pattern, and ‘distribution’ as a pattern that emerges from random behaviour in the long run, 
may cause difficulties for learners.
In Chapter 8 ,1 described two contrasting perspectives -local and global -  which were 
apparent in discussion about the outcomes from the dice tasks, and which appear to 
correspond to seeing disorder in the local perspective and seeing order in the global 
perspective. In this chapter, I examine the relationship between these perspectives in the 
interview data from the first round of interviews and I describe the ways in which 
individual interviewees appeared to shift between these perspectives.
I discussed in Chapter 2 the idea of distribution as order that emerges from the aggregation 
of disordered outcomes in the long run (Wilensky, 1997). The aggregation of observed 
outcomes from a random process produces an emergent pattern, which becomes clearer as
Page 173
Chapter 9: Shifting perspectives in Stage 1 Interviews 
the process generates more outcomes. This pattern may be described as the distribution of 
outcomes. To the extent that a person has intuitions about the nature of this distribution, 
they will have expectations about the outcomes that will arise from the process in the short 
run.
Before I started this study, I thought of the development of the ideas of randomness and 
distribution as being hierarchical: I considered that the individual would first be aware of 
the disorderliness of random outcomes, with the notion of distribution developing in the 
individual learner much later. A person gains experience of randomness in the short run 
from everyday interaction with random phenomena. Later, as experience builds, the 
learner may begin to discern patterns that emerge in the long run. Such discernment may 
be encouraged if the learner is able to interact with computer-based random simulations, 
which allow collation of results from large numbers of trials in a short time. The concept 
of distribution develops in the learner with experience in a similar way to that in which a 
distribution emerges empirically from examination of collated long run behaviour. In 
thinking this way, I was seeing distribution both as an emergent phenomenon (Wilensky, 
1993 and 1997), and, in parallel, as an emergent concept. As a result I expected that any 
shift of perspective between local and global would be in one direction: from local to 
global.
In a person with a sophisticated understanding of stochastics, the two ideas of randomness 
and distribution constitute two different, but complementary, perspectives. They are two 
ways of seeing and thinking about a stochastic situation. The perspective of randomness is 
appropriate for the short run, for examining the situation on a micro level; and distribution 
is more useful for reasoning at a macro level. Even here, I had been thinking of the shift in 
perspective as being from randomness to distribution. I was ignoring the possibility of 
shifts in the opposite direction: from distribution to randomness.
Page 174
Chapter 9: Shifting perspectives in Stage 1 Interviews 
When I began to explore what it might mean to shift one’s perspective from a distribution 
at a global level to the randomness of a small number of outcomes at a local level, my first 
thought here was of sampling from a distribution: of seeing ‘randomness’ in the outcomes 
in a small sample from a known distribution. Here, I think, is a natural shift from global to 
local.
The shift from global to local can be seen to be possible in very young children too. An 
individual in a class might see the ‘distribution’ of the heights of all pupils in the class, and 
then consider their own height as a single value within the distribution.
However, I found further examples in my interview tasks (described in Chapter 7), where I 
invited interviewees to consider what they expected to happen next. This required them 
first to form an idea of the ‘distribution’ that they expect (a prior distribution) and to 
reconsider this in the light of the random outcomes that emerged.
The idea of distribution has two distinct forms. There is the empirical frequentist idea, 
which is the emergent phenomenon referred to by Wilensky (1993), and there is the 
theoretical a priori distribution, with which my interviewees were experimenting when 
they worked with the biased die. The prior belief about a distribution is also global in a 
sense, but in a different sense from the emergent frequency distribution. Distribution is 
essentially a probability concept and, in this chapter, I am discussing the shifts between the 
perspectives of randomness and two different approaches to probability, theoretical and 
frequentist.
The shifting of perspective from local to global and back again seemed a useful way to 
examine the interview data. When I began to do so, I recognised that I needed to treat the 
two forms of distribution as distinct global perspectives. In the extracts discussed below I 
have selected passages to illustrate what I see as ‘shifting perspectives’ between the local, 
the global frequentist and the global prior. These changes in perspective emerged in the
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interviews over time, so it has been necessary to discuss a few passages at length, to show 
how the interviewees’ expression of their ideas changed.
I observed interviewees using random outcomes to evaluate their preconceptions about the 
expected distribution. An interviewee, when handed a die, usually had a preconceived idea 
of what the distribution of possible values 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6 would be. For example, when I 
gave Nick the cracked die, he expressed his view that the six possible outcomes were 
equiprobable. He stated that he thought the outcome would be ‘random’ and explained, “I 
expect that any number could come up at any time, and that it’s purely chance what the... 
result is” (lines 255-256). When I invited him to predict the first outcome he enlarged on 
this: “It could be anything, it could be any one of these... It would have been randomly 
selected” (lines 259-261).
When an interviewee rolled the die and considered the observed outcomes, they evaluated 
their expected distribution against the observed sequence of outcomes. When Nick 
observed 6, 3, 5,2, 5, 5 from rolling the cracked die, he noted that the cracked faces of the 
die were 5, 6 and 2, and then commented.
Nick: I notice that 5, 6 and 2 came up quite... regularly... There was only one other number that wasn’t
a 5, 6 or 2, which was a 3.
(Lines 266-268).
After only six outcomes he had observed that the partition of the outcomes into ‘cracked 
faces’ and ‘non-cracked faces’ showed an imbalance of five to one.
In section 9.2,1 discuss the interview responses from a learner, David, in Year 9, who 
displayed a developed understanding of these three complementary perspectives.
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9.2 David’s shifting perspectives: the biased die
My first example of shifting perspectives between local and global is from my interview 
with David (age 14.1) when he worked with the biased die. In the following account, I 
show how David’s attention moved between his prior beliefs about the probability 
distribution of the six possible outcomes and the emerging sequence of observed outcomes 
as he rolled the die.
David initially stated that the faces were equiprobable, even after observing two sixes and 
a four in the first three throws.
David: It’s all the same probability, but it gave me more sixes than any other number.
(Line 17)
He went on to generate two further sixes and expressed some disquiet.
David: It seems to always land on six.
(Line 25)
Here his attention was shifting from his prior view of the probability distribution to the 
local level of the sequence of observed outcomes. On the seventh throw, David obtained a 
five, and he tried to articulate a pattern that he thought was emerging.
David: It seems to land on higher numbers than lower numbers.
(Line 31)
David’s attention was still at the local level on the short sequence of observed outcomes, 
but he was now attempting to create a new global view from the pattern he saw in this 
short sequence (6, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5). However, he had still not given up on his prior view 
that the outcomes should be equiprobable, as was shown by what he said next, referring to 
the number of sixes.
David: .. .It’s just chance.
(Lines 35)
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Two further sixes did not shake his view that the large number of sixes observed could be 
“just chance”. He adopted a ‘negative recency’ argument (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) 
to suggest that ‘chance’ would correct the imbalance by producing something lower.
David: I think it’ll be a lower number next.. .because there’s been too many higher numbers. It could be
any -  it could be any of the six numbers. I think it might be a lower one.
(Lines 38,40-41)
David was still holding on to his prior belief about the equiprobable distribution, but he 
tried to modify the behaviour of a ‘chance’ process to be self-correcting. On observing yet 
another six, David adopted an extreme version of this prior view, choosing the lowest 
value available as his prediction to maximise the degree of correction.
David: {Silence for 10 seconds) I think it -  might be a one .. .because it’s landed on 4, 5 and 6 and on each
of the sides it’s close to 2,4 and 1.
(Lines 44,46)
David seemed to be quite uncomfortable with the idea that the outcomes were 
equiprobable. The long pause before he commented suggests he was unsure how to 
respond.
David had now observed 10 outcomes: 6, 4, 6, 6, 6, 6, 5, 6, 6, 6. On the eleventh throw he 
obtained a 5, and changed his prediction completely in favour of one based on ‘positive 
recency’.
David: {Throws) Five... I think it might land on another six. {Laughs)
I: Why have you changed your mind?
David: Because ... I don’t know actually. Because it seems to always land on high numbers, and I’m not
sure why, it just always seems to land on a high number. It hasn’t landed on any under four has it? 
See if it will land this time. {Throws) Another six.
(Lines 48-52)
In his explanation, David seemed to accept that the die was behaving in a biased way.
From here onwards, he appeared to view the die as biased, although he had not yet
Page 178
Chapter 9: Shifting perspectives in Stage 1 Interviews 
articulated this explicitly. His local view of randomness through the lens of the emerging 
sequence of observed outcomes had become so much at variance with his prior belief that 
he began to feel unable to continue in that belief.
However, even after two further sixes, he still struggled to explain his new view. When I 
asked him if he still held to his previously expressed prior view, that the next outcome 
could be any number, he restated, rather hesitantly, the idea that the outcomes were equally 
likely.
I: You started off by saying that it could be any number... Do you still think it could be any number?
David: I think it can be any number yeah. But it’s just... cos there’s a one in six chance of getting every
number there.
(Lines 61, 63-65)
David went on to examine the die closely, looking for an explanation for the global 
distribution that was emerging. He spotted that the die was incorrectly labelled -  it had an 
extra five in place of the three -  but he recognised that this did not explain what he was 
observing.
David: Yeah but that means it should land on 5 more, but it doesn’t. {Silence 9 seconds) .. .but there is 
still one in six chance of getting a 6. {Throws) Another 6. {Davidpicks up the die to examine it.) 
(Lines 77-81)
Again, his language in predicting the next outcome reverted to equiprobability, although he 
seemed to be actively seeking a reason to suggest that the die was biased. The disparity 
between the evidence of the observed outcomes at the local level and his prior belief in 
equiprobability was now driving his search for an explanation, but he had not yet 
abandoned his prior belief.
When I asked how many sixes he had observed, he counted 13 sixes in 16 throws. Even 
now, he clung to the idea that the faces should be equally likely and, at the same time, that 
chance would correct the imbalance of outcomes.
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David: I’m not sure... there should be a one in six chance of getting a 6. ...I’m hoping it’s going to land
on a low number. (Laughs)
(Lines 90, 92)
After throwing another six, he eventually expressed a global view that the die was biased.
David: I think the probability of getting 6 is higher now. Because just of the outcome. I’m not sure why.
(Line 94)
David was now convinced that the die was biased but he still had no explanation for his 
new global view. From now on, he spent time examining the die after each throw. 
Eventually, he spotted the metal weight in one face and quickly proposed an explanation 
for the observed global distribution of outcomes.
David: (Examines the die again) Is it cos that bit there -  is metal? So, it’s going to... put more outcome
onto 6, put more chance onto it... Well, I’m not sure cos... there’s two 5s, but it would have to... 
go on the other side of that... metal part. And that only happens when it slides across. But every 
time I actually roll it, it always lands on a 6. So I think it might be that, it’s heavier, so it’s landing 
down further, and there’s more force going down, so it’s going to stick down on it.
(Lines 123-124, 128-132)
At last, David was able to construct, in his own terms, a global view of the ‘probability’ 
distribution that he could reconcile with what he observed at the local level. Because he 
had observed 6 so often, he argued that the weight “is heavier” and the die is “going to 
stick down on it”. Until he found this explanation, he could not be comfortable about 
rejecting his prior belief, and he could not reconcile the observed outcomes with his global 
sense of distribution.
David’s response to the biased die was unusual in that it was so protracted. He appeared to 
have been deeply committed to his prior idea that the die should be fair and he continued to 
seek justification for this view, even when he had observed 13 heads in 16 throws. The 
manner in which he attempted to justify that his observations could arise from a fair die 
indicated that he was aware that a random process might not produce outcomes
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representative of the long run. However, he carried this to an extreme, possibly because he 
was not aware of how much variability to expect in the outcomes of a fair die.
9.3 David: shifting perspectives and unpredictability
I saw further examples of David shifting between the prior, the local and the global views 
when he was working with the other activities. However, these three perspectives 
supported one another in the spherical die and the cracked die, since the observed 
frequencies were not very different from his prior belief that the outcomes would be 
equally likely. As he considered these dice, it became apparent that David was also 
looking for the sequence of outcomes to be unpredictable.
9.3.1 The spherical die
The first seven outcomes that David observed from the spherical die were: 6, 6, 3, 5, 5, 3,
5. He expressed concern that he had not seen a 1, although he could see that the spherical 
die was behaving quite differently from the biased die. In his discussion of the sequence of 
observed outcomes, he focused on the ‘alternating’ behaviour of the sequence, and 
discussed whether each successive outcome was higher or lower than the previous one.
David: We still haven’t had a 1, but it’s changed from... Well this dice is more chance than the other one,
because... it was high numbers then low numbers. But it still hasn’t been ... what I would like 
from a high then a low, like that... but I still say it’s chance, this dice.
(Lines 187-189, 191)
The fact that the sequence had shown “high numbers, then low numbers” was evidence for 
him that this die was “more chance than the other one” (the biased die). Here he was 
focussing on the local level, looking closely at the sequence and trying to reconcile it to his 
global prior that the six possible outcomes were equally likely. In spite of the fact that the 
sequence was only seven outcomes, David was concerned that he had not yet observed a 1.
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Shortly after this, David threw a 1 and became increasingly convinced that the spherical 
die was “normal”. The task of predicting what might occur next when the die was 
apparently fair was difficult. Although I had not intended him to make precise predictions, 
he tried to do so, and was drawn into basing his predictions on short sequences of the most 
recent outcomes.
David: Looking at how it’s been, in about the last five throws, I’d say it will land on a high one, 5 or 6.
(Rolls) .. .a 3! (Silence 6 seconds) .. .1 think this one will just be down to chance, because 3 is in
the middle... I would say this is quite a normal dice, quite fair. I think it will land on a high one 
though. (Rolls) 2.
I: Two. So, it didn’t land on a high one.
David: No... I this is a fair dice, cos it’s harder to predict.
(Lines 207-214)
David based his predictions around whether the outcome would be high or low. He 
suggested that the outcome would “be down to chance” and yet he still attempted to predict 
“it will land on a high one though”. When it did not, he quite reasonably suggested that 
this appeared to be “a fair die” because it was “harder to predict”.
9.3.2 The cracked die
In a similar way, when he worked with the cracked die, David quickly adopted the prior 
view that this was a fair die and that the crack was not going to affect the behaviour of the 
die. This was shown in his first comment.
David: Well it just looks normal. It’s got a crack in it, but I don’t think that’d affect it.
(Line 250)
A few moments later he restated this view.
David: .. .1 think this, at the moment, is a fair dice. It’s just down to chance. I’ve already had four throws.
(Lines 259-260)
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David clearly believed that the outcomes were equiprobable. After seven throws (6, 3, 6,
5, 4, 2, 5) I asked him what he thought might happen next. His reply showed further his 
commitment to the prior belief that this was a fair die. However, when he suggested that 
the next outcome would be more likely to be a 1, he was looking for the ‘fairness’ of the 
die to be represented in the short sequence of outcomes.
David: I would say anything could happen... I’d think it would be more likely to be a 1, because that
hasn’t showed up yet... This, I think this is a fair dice though, so I think it would just be a one out 
six for every number, cos I think that seems fair.
(Lines 265-267)
David had almost simultaneously expressed two apparently ‘contradictory’ views. He 
played with the idea that “it would be more likely to be a 1” but appeared to reject it 
because he thought “this is a fair dice” and therefore the probability should be “a one out 
six for every number”. He was testing his prior view of the distribution against the short 
sequence of observed outcomes.
David obtained a 1 on the eighth throw and he predicted a 5 for the ninth, arguing in the 
same way as he had done with the spherical die from the pattern of the observed sequence. 
When he threw another 1, he was not put out, but reiterated his prior conviction that the die 
was fair. In explaining why he believed the die was fair, David again used the idea that the 
sequence was unpredictable.
David: Because it’s all down to chance. You can’t - 1 mean you can always predict what’s going to come
next, but you can’t ever really know, as with the first dice. I sort of knew it was going to be a 6 or 
a 5 most of the time, because that was just all that it landed on. But this one - 1 think it’s just a fair 
dice... It’s landed on every number in about 10 throws, so I think that’s about a fair dice.
(Lines 276-280)
As he had done with the spherical die, David argued that the observed sequence had not 
enabled him to predict outcomes. He saw this as evidence that the die was random (“it’s
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all down to chance”). However, the fact that he had seen the die land “on every number in 
about ten throws” was seen as evidence supporting the idea that the die was “fair”.
9.3.3 Coin generation and coin tossing
I described, in 8.3.2, the remarkable insight that David showed into the independence of 
the successive outcomes during the coin generation task. He had also explained 
graphically the tension he experienced in deciding the next outcome after a run of 3 
successive heads.
Therefore, when he started the coin tossing activity, David was aware of run length as an 
issue. After five outcomes, he had obtained HTTTT, and I expected that the 4 successive 
Tails would make this an interesting point at which to explore further the difficulty David 
had experienced in the generation task. His response suggested that he thought the coin 
more likely to correct the imbalance in the observed sequence, although he understood that 
it had no memory and that successive outcomes were independent. Here is another 
example of two contradictory views being expressed simultaneously.
David: .. .1 think it would, it could land on any of them. But I’d say a Heads, because there have been 4 
Tails in a row.
(Toss) Heads.
It could just be any one.
(Toss) Tails.
It’s thrown more Tails, but I think more Heads will come.
(Toss) Heads.
(Toss) Tails.
(Toss) Heads.
(Line 354-362)
David had now seen three successive alternations of TH in the last six outcomes, so I 
intervened again. This time, his response showed that his attention was on the length of
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runs rather than the alternating pattern that I had noticed. Instead, he noted that there had 
been no run of two of a kind recently.
David: I’d say another Heads, because there haven’t been more than one Head in a row. So, I’d say
another Heads.
(Toss) Heads
I’m not sure. It could be anything.
I: OK. Goon.
David: (Toss) Tails.
I think it will just be the same, just anything, cos...
(Lines 364-370)
After sixteen outcomes, David had seen four successive heads. He paused in silence for a 
while when he recognised, without my intervention, that this situation deserved comment. 
The run of Heads lengthened and David became increasingly uneasy. He knew that the 
chances of getting a Head or a Tail remained the same but, as he said, “It’s hard!” 
Nevertheless, he reaffirmed that the chances were equal, even after eight successive heads.
David: (Silence 8 seconds).. .1 don’t think it’ll make a difference that there’s been 4 heads in row, because
it’s still... just a coin. The chance of getting a Tail is still one out of two -  the chance of getting a 
Head is one out of two. I think that’s just chance of getting 4 Heads in a row. So, I’m not sure 
what will come next.
(Toss) Oh it’s another Heads.
(Silence 7 seconds) That’s just the same -  I’m not sure -  there could be another Heads, but it could 
be a Tails as well.
(Toss) a Head.
(Silence 9 seconds) I think it will just be the same. Cos it can be a Tails and -  when you just look 
at it you think -  Oh it’s obviously going to be a Tails, cos there’s been six Heads in a row, but it’s 
still just a one out of two chance to get a Tails. Same with Heads.
(Toss) Heads.
(Toss) Heads again.
I: Hmm. What next?
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David: (Silence 7 seconds) It’s -  Ah -  It’s hard. (Silence 4 seconds)
(Lines 375-389)
David’s final comment before the run of heads ended showed how good an understanding 
of randomness he had: if you look at a long enough sequence then you will see long runs of 
Heads and of Tails.
David: .. .it is just the same chance. I think -  ah yes, it is chance that I’ve got so many heads. Because
that could, if I kept on going, if I did a million tosses, I think that would happen for Tails as well. 
(Lines 395-397)
In this passage, David appeared to refine and develop his understanding of what can 
happen in a random sequence of Heads and Tails to take account of the long run of Heads 
with which he was faced. Although he struggled, his belief that tossing a normal coin 
should be fair, and his knowledge that successive outcomes were independent, led him to 
recognise that long runs do occur with a fair coin.
9.4 Alex: random means unpredictable
My next examples of shifting perspectives come from my interview with Alex (age 15.3).
I have described, in Chapter 8, Alex’s view of randomness as unpredictability and fairness, 
and her need to trust that the process would choose fairly. However, she also demonstrated 
shifting perspectives.
Alex was not comfortable about the spherical die. Her initial discussion revolved around 
the physical mechanism inside the sphere. She saw a similarity with a set of jumping 
beans that she had owned long ago. After four throws, she stated that she could not 
comment on what might happen next as “the numbers have been random so far”. Here she 
was concerned only with the local level of the apparent disorder in the sequence.
Later she began to make reference to patterns that she saw emerging in the sequence.
After she had observed 4, 5, 1,4, 5, she confidently suggested that the next throw would
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give a 1. When it was actually a 6, she laughed and commented on the 6 having thrown 
the sequence “off a pattern so far”.
Alex: Well the 6 has come up throwing it off a pattern so far, so I might get 4.
(Line 79)
Alex’s attempt to find pattern in the sequence can be seen as trying to impose order on the 
apparent disorder of the ‘random’ sequence. She was trying unsuccessfully to move 
towards an organising structure for the sequence. This might be seen as an attempt to 
move towards a global view, albeit unlikely to be productive.
The seventh throw produced a 4, matching Alex’s prediction. She predicted 5 for the 
eighth throw, and was correct again: two successes in a row. I did not ask her about this in 
the interview, but her predictions appeared to be an attempt to follow the pattern that she 
had discerned earlier. The sequence {4 5 1 4 5 6 4 5 }  showed a recurrence of 4, 5.
Asked what she might get next, she was more cautious, opting for two outcomes, 6 and 4. 
However, her justification for this referred to the 6 that had “just kind of popped up on its 
own”.
I: What are you going to get next?
Alex: .. .Maybe a 6 or another 4... Because the 6 just kind of popped up on its own. (Rolls.) 2.
(Lines 86-87, 91)
Alex became more cautious in her predictions after this, using phrases such as “can’t be 
sure” and “it’s not going in any pattern now” to indicate her sense that the outcomes were 
not predictable.
She compared the physical properties and behaviour of the spherical die to a normal 
cubical die. As she looked for similarities she eventually recognised that the probabilities 
of getting each different outcome on the spherical die could be considered as equal.
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Alex: Well, the chances of it coming up on the same number are... one in six, or it depends...
I: So you think this one has the... equal chances for each face as you would get...
Alex: Yeah, the same probability.
I ... as you would get with a normal die?
Alex: Yeah.
(Lines 115-119)
This was the first time Alex had expressed a global view about a probability distribution 
for the six outcomes from the spherical die, and she did not refer to it again in this activity.
A few throws later, Alex observed and commented on a run of three 5 s in succession.
When I asked her whether she thought the chance of getting a 5 on the next throw was 
more or less than 1 in 6, she replied without any strong commitment either way.
Alex: There’s kind of like a recurrence in the 5s. I keep on having them.
I: And what’s going to happen next?
Alex: .. .It will probably either be a 5, or it will drastically change and...
I: Do you think it’s more likely to be a 5 than it was before, or less likely to be a 5 than it was before,
or just the same.
Alex: .. .The same, because you can’t really tell.
(Lines 168-173)
This non-committal reply seemed to convey the idea that the outcome was unpredictable. 
She seemed to stay with her earlier expression of the probability distribution.
In summary, Alex expressed a local perspective and looked for patterns to bring order to 
what she saw. After several unsuccessful attempts to follow patterns, she expressed a 
belief that the outcomes were unpredictable, and linked this to a statement of her prior 
view that the outcomes were equally likely. However, she continued to search for patterns.
Throughout the interview, Alex rarely show awareness of ‘distribution’, unlike other 
interviewees, but there was still evidence that she tried to find a global organising view to
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counter the disorder of the ‘randomness’ at the local level. Alex clearly understood that 
something that behaved randomly, or ‘by chance’, should be unpredictable.
9.5 Ben
Ben (age 15.7) had spotted the weight in the biased die after only four throws. I have 
included here an account of nearly all Ben’s work with the spherical die, as it shows his 
struggle to reconcile the frequency distribution he expected from a fair die with the 
disorder that he observed in the short sequence of observed outcomes.
9.5.1 The spherical die
When he began to work with the spherical die, Ben was sure he had never seen anything 
like it before. His first two throws each showed 5, which led him to be mistrustful, until 
the third throw showed a 1. As Ben put it, he “thought it might be another weighted one”. 
The strange movement of the die, due to the moving weight inside, fascinated him.
After seven throws (5, 5, 1,4, 1,6, 1), I asked Ben what he thought might happen next.
His initial response was to look at the ‘pattern’ in the outcomes so far. He noted that there 
had been no “3s or 2s” and appeared to use a ‘negative recency’ argument to suggest that 
the next outcome would be not a 1.
Ben: Well, we haven’t had any 3s or 2s, so it could be one of those, but it looks -  well, it’ll probably be
another number than a 1.
I: Why?
Ben: Just from following the pattern. If it wasn’t a die, that’s what I’d say.
(Lines 39-42)
By working initially from patterns in the sequence of outcomes, Ben was working at the 
local level. When I encouraged Ben to take account of the fact that this was a die, he said 
that the next throw could be anything, showing that he recognised that all outcomes were
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possible. This may also indicate that Ben understood at some level that the outcomes of 
successive throws of the die would be independent, in spite of claiming “it’ll probably be 
another number than a 1”.
Ben actively looked for an explanation for the absence of 2s and 3s, and wondered whether 
he might be rolling the die in the same way each time.
Ben: It might be the way I’m throwing it though. Or when I picked it up, I’m throwing it the same way.
Or it could just be chance.
(Lines 58-59)
Ben was keenly aware that the sequence of outcomes so far was still short, and this 
awareness led him to look for a structure to the generating process. I see this as an attempt 
to create a global level understanding of the process.
Without my asking him, Ben commented after ten outcomes that this die appeared to be “a 
lot more random than the other one... although we’re getting lots of Is and 5s” (lines 60, 
62). I asked him what he meant by “more random”.
Ben: The other one just had to be 6s, but this one doesn’t seem to be so biased. Just seem to get a lot of
1 s and 5s. Could be just the weight inside jumping.
(Lines 64, 66)
However, out of concern that he had not seen any 2s or 3s, he checked carefully that the 
die was correctly labelled. On the fourteenth throw he got a 3 and cheered.
For the next few throws, Ben showed more interest in the physical factors affecting the 
outcomes than the distribution. He played deliberately with the die between rolls, and 
considered the shape of the weight moving inside the sphere.
Because he still appeared to be concerned, I asked him how he would know whether this 
was a fair die. In his reply he showed that he understood that a large number of trials
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would be needed, and he expressed for the first time his prior belief about the probability 
distribution.
Ben: A fair dice?... You just have to keep rolling it. It should in the end even out if it’s a fair dice. If
it’s not a fair dice it’ll... keep on staying away from the 2s and 3s, like it is at the moment.
I: Are you worried about it at the moment, being fair?
Ben: .. .No, not really. ...It could just be one of those things. Just probabilities and stuff like that.
I: So it could just be...
Ben: It could just be chance. If there’s a 1 in 6 chance of getting each different number... I just haven’t
got a 2 yet, which is strange. Although I’ll probably get a 2 now, if I roll it...
(Lines 121-128)
Ben seemed to switch between two contrasting views about this die. On the one hand, 
while his attention was at the local level on the sequence of outcomes, he was looking for 
the first occurrence of a 2, and he expressed concern that he had not seen it after fifteen 
throws. On the other hand, when his attention was at the global level on what he expected 
of a fair die, looking for a frequency distribution that matched his prior belief, he still 
accepted that “It could just be chance”. By changing the focus of his awareness he adopted 
two quite different perspectives on the process and arrived at two different explanations for 
the absence of 2 from the sequence of outcomes.
Ben’s next two throws each produced a 5, and he became very quiet. In spite of what he 
had just said about the probability distribution, when I suggested that he was still disturbed 
that he had not yet had any 2s, he agreed. He experimented with the die, very gently 
rolling it around in his hand without talking for 13 seconds, before commenting on the 
fairness of the die.
Ben: It seems pretty fair. But it depends what happens when you roll it.
(Lines 139-140)
This comment again brought into focus the tension Ben felt between the apparent ‘fairness’ 
of the generating process, and the imbalance he detected in the outcomes.
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He rolled the die and got a 6. In order to resolve the tension that he was experiencing, he 
now very much wanted the die to show a two. It was as though he wanted to remove the 
anticipation of waiting for a two to occur, and by experimenting with the way he rolled the 
die he was trying to make it happen. On the very next throw, he succeeded and was very 
pleased.
Ben: (Rolls it gently in his hand again) .. .oh land on a 2. (Rolls) Eee!
I: A 2!
Ben: There you go.
(Lines 144-147)
Ben’s experimentation with his method of rolling the die had been associated in time with 
the occurrence of a rolling a two. This fact lent support to his idea at the local level that 
the way he rolled the die was affecting the outcomes. He reflected on the implications of 
his idea, noting that both 2 and 3 had occurred only once each, and that his theory that the 
axis of rolling affected the outcomes did not entirely explain this as 2 and 3 were not 
opposite to each other on the die.
I: What are you thinking?
Ben: Just seeing... if I was always rolling it in a way so it only lands on 6, 5 1,4. But that wouldn’t
work, or make sense... But so it stays away from 2s and 3s, but it won’t cos they’re not next to
each other- but they are.
(Lines 150-153)
He continued to look for an explanation for the relative rarity of 2 and 3, and suggested 
that the sphere might be heavier on one side, between the 2 and the 3, than the other.
Ben: It might be weighted more heavily on the 2 and the 3, on the inside, I was just thinking. If the
weight’s heavier there it will be less likely to turn that way round.
(Lines 155-156)
His next throw was a 1, and he remarked that the die now seemed “more random”. He 
appeared to hold two ideas in tension -  randomness (by which he means equiprobability)
Page 192
Chapter 9: Shifting perspectives in Stage 1 Interviews 
and bias -  and he expressed them alternately. These two ideas seemed to be conflicting 
global interpretations for Ben -  the one his prior belief and the other, a global frequentist 
view, possibly emerging from the aggregation of the observed outcomes. As soon as he 
had expressed the idea of randomness, he reverted to discussing the bias.
Ben: It seems to be more random now. The more you do it, you know, the more different... But at the
start it was all the same. So the more you do it the better the results you get, I suppose. (Rolls a 5)
I: What do you mean, the more you do it the better results you get?
Ben: Well. It should, unless it’s weighted, be completely random. But at the start it just seemed to be 5s
and Is. But then it... just got a lot more mixed as it went down, so I suppose it... it’s just... more 
and more of a dice and, sort of less chance that the odd number will count for so much. You got a 
couple of 5s at the beginning, then, later as you go on, you’ll get more of the other numbers as well. 
In theory, I think.
I: OK. Try again?
Ben: Although I haven’t got that many 2s still. (Rolls another 5) But I have got quite few 5s I think.
I: Another 5!
Ben: But that could just be the way that I’m rolling it.
(Lines 160-174)
In the next few throws, Ben’s concern about bias diminished as he obtained more 2s and 
3s. He remarked again on the apparent randomness.
Ben: Maybe it’s just... I suppose it could just be a completely fair dice...
I: So you think this could be a completely fair dice?
Ben: It could be, yeah. It does have quite a few 5 s, but that just might be me rolling it, rather than the
dice would be weighted or something.
(Lines 182,185-187)
Ben’s external expression of his ideas appears to have been affected by short run behaviour 
of the die. When the sequence of recent outcomes did not include one or two of the 
possible outcomes, he tried to explain the apparent bias. When the missing outcomes had 
appeared once or twice, he described the behaviour of the die as “random”. Ben appeared 
to be trying to explain patterns in short sequences of outcomes, and he reverted to
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describing the sequence as “random” when he had no alternative explanation. Sometimes 
Ben seemed to think of “random” as “the absence of pattern”, and this cue seemed to be 
switched on and off by short-term changes in the sequence of outcomes.
When I invited Ben to consider what were the factors affecting the fairness of the die, he 
mentioned again the way that he rolled it and agreed that he could change both the speed 
and the direction of rolling.
Ben: .. .Well, sort of the speed and the direction it’s going in... I can change the, yeah I can change the
way I roll it, yeah. If I sort of shake it before I roll it and stuff each time, I should get different 
numbers.
(Lines 191-194)
I encouraged Ben to use the experience of this activity to think more generally about what 
he would look for in something that was truly “random”. He readily did so, although the 
way he expressed himself was a little unclear.
Ben: .. .If something’s really random, I wouldn’t expect the same number to come up so many times.
Because, although it was completely random, it seems that 5 will come up more than the other 
ones. Even if it is a fair dice that wouldn’t necessarily happen but it just does seem to do that, 
which is strange.
(Lines 197-200)
A difficulty for Ben appeared to be that he did not have any clear sense of how much 
variability to expect from a fair die. For example, he did not know for how many throws 
he might reasonably expect to need to wait until all six outcomes had appeared at least 
once. And he did not have a sense of how often he could expect the most commonly 
occurring outcome to appear in the first n throws of the die. He therefore had no way of 
judging whether the number of 5s he had observed was unreasonable, or whether the 
waiting times he observed before the first 3 and the first 2 occurred, were appropriate in a 
fair die. In order to refine his judgement of whether a die was fair, he needed to develop 
his intuitions about variability. An understanding of variability, and how this varies with
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the number of trials, is an important ingredient in reconciling the local and the global views 
of randomness.
To encourage Ben to think about this I asked him to count the number of 5s and the total 
number of outcomes so far. Unfortunately, he initially miscounted the number of 
observations as 24, when it was in fact 29. He decided that he wanted a round number of 
outcomes, 25, so he threw once more. When I asked him how many 5s he would expect in 
this total from a fair die, he correctly stated that he expected about four (recognising then 
that the arithmetic would have been easier if he had kept to 24). He thought that ten or 
more occurrences of a 5 in 25 trials would be unacceptable.
He found he had in fact seen eleven occurrences of a 5, but when he checked the numbers 
of occurrences of the other outcomes, he recognised that he had miscounted the total.
There were now thirty recorded outcomes in total.
Ben: Oh right. Oh in that case there should be five of each number, shouldn’t there. So, yeah, it does
kind of make sense. .. .It’s just a lot of 5s, which is just... strange.
I: So eleven compared to five that you would have expected. It seems all right does it?
Ben: Yeah. So looking at that, you’d say that... 5 is... got a 1 in 3 chance instead of a 1 in 6 chance, and
the other ones have got a lot less. Like 2 and 3 and 6 have only got a 1 in 10 chance of coming up. 
And they should all each have a 1 in 6 chance. Just, I suppose, like, just from rolling it. I suppose 
if you rolled it a load more times it would even out probably -  eventually.
I: OK. So at the moment you’d be happy to use that die again would you?
Ben: Yeah, pretty much. 5 s just m ust... have been the way I was rolling it I suppose, that made 5 come
up more than the others.
(Lines 225-234)
By the end, Ben seemed to have decided that eleven 5s in thirty trials is a bit unusual, but 
not completely unreasonable. He even suggested that the imbalance might even out 
eventually with a larger number of throws. In fact eleven or more of one outcome in thirty 
trials of a fair die has a probability of only 0.7%, so is quite unusual. However, Ben was
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arguing intuitively, and he lacked experience by which to evaluate how unusual was eleven 
in thirty. My view is reinforced by the fact that finally he reverted to justifying the number 
of 5s he had observed by the way he had rolled the die.
This account of Ben’s attempts to make sense of his experiences of the spherical die shows 
that his struggle to construct a stable global perspective was complicated by his uncertainty 
about what would be an appropriate model. Is the die biased, or are the outcomes equally 
likely? His repeated attempts to articulate a global perspective, and to explain to himself 
the physical process by which the process might be biased, were constantly interacting 
with the latest outcomes from rolling the die. Initially he tried to work intuitively with an 
impression of the observed frequency distribution, but later, with encouragement from the 
interviewer, he counted the number of observations of each possible outcome. However, 
he was unable to resolve the uncertainty that he experienced, possibly because he did not 
have a sense of how far the observed frequencies might be expected to depart from the 
expected frequencies.
9.5.2 The cracked die
When I gave him the cracked die, Ben considered that the crack might affect the symmetry 
of the weight distribution, but he was confident that any effect on the fairness of the die 
would be very slight. After the first six outcomes (5, 2, 6, 6, 6, 2) his comment was that all 
the outcomes so far had been cracked faces, focussing on the asymmetrical feature of the 
die.
Ben: The numbers that have come up so far are only the ones with cracks in the faces. So ... it could be
something to do with the cracks that’s making those numbers come up.
(Lines 255-256)
I had seen that the three successive sixes had surprised him as they occurred, but when I 
asked him about this, he seemed to have decided that the crack was the important factor.
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Ben: I thought it just might be the way I was picking it up each time and throwing it in the exact same
way, so it would bounce the same way. But I think it seems pretty fair.
(Lines 258-260)
His focus here is on the local perspective, and he is attempting to explain his observations 
by pattern spotting (the run of sixes) and by recourse to the physical attributes of the die. 
When I asked him to consider what might happen next, he argued that another 6 was most 
likely, using the features that he had considered so far.
Ben: Well, well the 5s, 6s and 2s have all appeared, but the 6 has appeared more than any of them and
that’s got die biggest crack in it. So I’d say that the 6 is going to appear most often and the 5 and 2 
next often, from what’s happened so far.
(Lines 264-266)
Ben rolled the die a further 18 times, with occasional comments, and at the end of this he 
commented on the manner in which he threw the die. However, his subsequent explanation 
showed that he was aware of the emerging balance between the frequencies of the six 
possible outcomes, and that he was still monitoring the frequencies of the cracked faces.
Ben: I think this dice is different from the other dice, because, if you pick up... it’s got to be exactly the
same way each time... the same way each time. And you get the same... It depends on... If you
roll it that way, and it hits straight like that, it might bounce straight over to a 6 or anything. And 
that other one’s a bit different because it would depend on how hard you rolled it, rather than what 
angle it lands on when you drop it...
I: OK
Ben: But this one...I see I’ve got lots of 6s and 5s... {Counts the throws so far) ...18, so 12 out of 18
throws, were 6s, 2s, and 5s. That’s just over, not really that much over half really. So it might not 
be a biased dice at all. .. .I’m just thinking, because at the beginning it was just 6s, 2s and 5s, and 
then the other numbers sort of just started creeping in. It’s just like on that one there; it started off 
being all 5s and Is, and then the other numbers, sort of started appearing the more you threw it. 
(Lines 289-299)
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Here he was moving from the local into the global perspective, seeing the frequencies as 
representing the distribution to some extent. His explanation of why this die might not be 
biased showed awareness of the need to consider a longer run of outcomes. His phrase that 
the other numbers ‘started creeping in’ was particularly evocative of the gradual revelation 
of the nature of the process. Even at this stage, he was still holding two ideas in mind: the 
physical attributes of the process were still being monitored as shown by his remarks about 
the way in which he rolled the die. But now the frequencies of the cracked and the non­
cracked faces, and indeed the frequencies of each of the six outcomes, were also being 
monitored.
After a few more throws, Ben stated he was confident that this die was sufficiently fair to 
use in a game. His comment on this refers to a gradual revelation “as you got more 
numbers”.
I: So, do you think this is a fair die that you would be happy to use in a game?
Ben: Yeah, pretty much. At the start, it didn’t seem so, but as you got more numbers... it seemed more
fair. Yeah, I think that’s a pretty fair dice as well.
(Lines 323-325)
He had been gradually moving towards expressing the global perspective with greater 
conviction, and in this quotation he appeared to have reconciled the global with the local to 
his own satisfaction.
I commented at the end of section 8.1 that Ben held quite sophisticated ideas about the 
application of randomness. His ability to reconcile the local and global perspectives in his 
work with the spherical and the cracked dice was similarly effective.
9.5.3 Coin tossing
Before he started the coin tossing activity, but after he had completed the coin generation 
task, Ben discussed an idea that he learned about coin tossing from a discussion in a lesson.
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Ben: I remember a while ago we were doing something... if you flip a coin up and catch it, and ... you
get a tail or whatever,... you find that if you keep flicking the coin up with the same strength, and 
it turns the same amount of turns, you catch it and you put it down, so either it always stays a head 
or it always stays a tail, or it just keeps alternating, almost exactly.
(Lines 374-379)
He appeared to have learned from this that it was possible to control the repeated tossing of 
a coin to produce either a sustained sequence of the same outcome, or an alternating 
sequence of heads and tails. If one really wanted the coin to be ‘random’, then Ben’s view 
could be a problem.
When I asked him how he could get around it if he needed to make the coin behave 
randomly, he appeared to be fascinated with the idea.
Ben: .. .completely randomly? Well you have to throw it up at different strengths each time, but then
you’re controlling how hard you throw it. I would have to say you were controlling how many 
turns it had, so if you’re practised in flicking coins, then you can probably control how many turns 
you want it to do.
I: Are you practised at flipping coins?
Ben: No. I was just saying that you could.... You’d have to... just guess, try and do it... differently
each time, try and do a... different method, sometimes flicking it and sometimes throwing it... 
(Lines 390-396, 398-399)
When I gave him the coin for the coin tossing activity, he was influenced by the idea of 
needing to make the coin behave “completely randomly”. He tossed the coin hard each 
time and had little control over where it might land, let alone which way up! However, the 
sequence of 20 outcomes that he produced was remarkable for having no runs longer than 
2, and it alternated frequently between heads and tails, so much so that the outcomes 
suggested the possibility that Ben had been controlling the outcomes by striving so hard to 
make each throw different from the one before.
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After seven outcomes, there appeared to be an alternating pattern emerging (HHTTHHT). 
Ben noticed this and talked about the next outcome. In noticing and thinking about the 
alternating pattern, Ben was working in the local perspective: trying to follow a repeating 
pattern in short sequence of outcomes.
Ben: Head or Tail next. (Looks at the list o f outcomes so far) Head, no it should be another Tail. It
seems to be in groups of twos. Well, it shouldn’t be another Tail. It should be either a Head or a 
Tail, but it looks like from that, it should be a Tail.
I: So do you, in your head do you still think it’s going to be equally likely a Head or a Tail next time?
Ben: No. I think it’ll be a Tail. Well, now I’ve said that, it’ll probably be ahead, but if I was going to
bet on a Head or a Tail, I’d say a Tail. It just looks like it’s going to do that. (Toss) Oops. It’s a 
head. (Laughs)
(Lines 424-430)
He seemed to switch between selecting the outcome to continue the pattern and choosing 
the other to break the pattern. In the end, he opted for continuing the pattern.
When he had tossed the coin twenty times, I invited Ben to comment on the sequence he 
had produced. Again he commented at the level of local pattern.
Ben: Well, it does look like it follows a pattern. It’s gone Head Head Tail, Head Head Tail, Head Head
Tail, Head!
(Line 458-459)
Ben agreed that there were more patterns in this sequence than there were in the sequence 
that he had made up earlier, but his justification for this surprised me. He attributed the 
patterns to the way in which he had been flicking the coin! After the lengths to which he 
had gone to ensure that his coin tossing was ‘completely random’, I had not expected him 
to suggest that nevertheless this had caused the patterns. He elaborated by suggesting that 
his attempts to make the process random, such as flinging the coin across the room, were 
the reason why the patterns had not continued!
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Ben: I was trying to make it more random. But still, me trying to make it random... changes whether
it’s going to be a head or a tail, depending on what I want to do... Once I’d thrown it across the 
room, then... it’s... like me deciding to throw it across the room, rather than me just flicking on my 
hand each time. Because if I was flicking it in my hand each time, I’d get... a pattern... Head Tail 
Head Tail Head Tail. But then if I throw it across the room on purpose, or whatever... then that 
pattern... it’s less likely to continue, if I start throwing it about. But that’s me making it more 
different... I think.
(Lines 471-478)
It seems that Ben was aware of having controlled hiss coin tossing to break any run or 
alternating pattern that he noticed. Any control would have been incomplete because of 
the wild manner in which he was throwing the coin in different directions and with varying 
degrees of spin. However, he seemed to believe that he had made the outcomes ‘more 
random’ than they would have been if he had tossed the coin in a more conventional 
fashion. In this analysis he seemed to work solely in the local perspective.
Ben: Yeah, the coin is... generally, pretty random. ... It’s just that these patterns just sort of occur. If
you were to do... a lot more times, then it would get other patterns. ... It’s just sort of strange that 
the Heads... comes up with Head Head, and there’s only one Head by itself the whole way down. 
And there’s never, there’s only one time when Tails come together.
I: So the heads have always appeared in pairs.. .apart from that once in the middle.
Ben: Yeah. And the tails have always appeared singly, apart from at the very beginning... which is just
one of those things. Strange. It’s not strange, it should happen, but it’s just in that little list it looks 
different.
(Lines 480-483,485-488,490-491,493-494)
Ben appeared to recognise that some patterns were inevitable in a random sequence. He 
recognised that this sequence was “pretty random” and that if “you do more times” then 
“other patterns” would occur. Nonetheless, his ideas showed elements of two 
contradictory views being held almost simultaneously. For example, he continued to be 
surprised by the fact that Heads nearly always occurred in pairs, while Tails did not, saying 
it was “strange”, and yet “it should happen”.
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9.6 Abby
Abby (age 17.7) was highly articulate in the interview, and needed no encouragement to 
express her ideas.
9.6.1 The biased die
Abby had recognised that the biased die was weighted as soon as I gave it to her. She 
rolled the die a few times, obtaining six on most occasions and expressing mock surprise. 
However, on one throw she got a four and appeared to be more genuinely surprised.
Abby: It’s weighted! (Laughs) It is! It’s a weighted dice.
(Rolls) Oh, I’ve got a six (mocking tone).
(Rolls) Oh, I’ve got a six. How surprising!
(Rolls) Oh, I’ve got a four! (surprise) Ooh!
(Lines 35-38)
Although Abby had perceived the biased nature of the die very quickly, her mocking tone 
when she first threw the die -  “Oh I’ve got a 6, how surprising!” -  may indicate that she 
had expected the outcomes to be entirely determined. Thus, her third throw, provoked a 
tone of genuine surprise.
She rolled the die a few more times, obtaining mostly sixes, but also a five. She then 
examined the markings on the faces and noted that there were two faces marked five and 
no face marked three. When I asked her whether the behaviour of the die was ‘random’, 
her reply was hesitant. She appeared to have some difficulty in deciding how to answer 
my question, but eventually settled on describing it as only “a bit random”.
Abby: Well, it’s not completely random. It is a bit. I don’t know. It’s really complicated...
I: You say it is a bit?
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Abby: (Laughs) It’s a bit random. Well, you’re more likely to get a six than you are to get a one,
statistically. But the likelihood of you getting a 2 or a 4 is equal. And a 5 is the same but twice. 
(Pause) .. .It’s not very random. (Laughs)
(Lines 76-80, 82)
Her remarks about this being “really complicated” seem to have arisen from her 
recognition that the die was incorrectly labelled, as a result of which she was trying to 
apply reasoning based on symmetry to determine the probabilities of the various faces.
9.6.2 The cracked die
When she saw the cracked die, Abby commented that it was “broken”. She expected this 
to make some difference to the fairness of the die, although she did not expect the die to be 
as unbalanced as the biased die had been.
When she rolled the die a few times, she soon described the effect of the crack on the 
shape of the faces and speculated about possible effects on the likelihood of each outcome. 
Abby switched from the local view to the global, attempting to link the observed outcomes 
to the physical attributes of the die as she did so.
Abby: Right, the break is mostly on the side where the 6 and the 5 are, and it’s also down where the 2 is.
.. .So it’s mostly where the 6 is. So it makes that side bigger. So it’s not an even shape the whole 
way round. Because the 1 and the 4 and the 3 are smaller.
(Lines 112-118)
When I asked her if she thought the outcomes from this die would be ‘random’, her reply 
was hesitant. She recognised that the numbers were not equally likely, yet the outcomes 
were clearly not determined.
Abby: No! Yes! I don’t know. Well it’s a bit random. It’s not completely.... There isn’t the same
chance of you getting every number, b u t.. .1 don’t know whether there’s more chance of getting the 
broken numbers or more chance of... I think there’s more chance of getting the broken numbers. 
(Lines 121-124)
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Abby was able to use her reasoning about the effect of the crack to consider a modification 
to the uniform distribution. She was able to articulate a global view of the distribution of 
the possible outcomes. She expected the cracked faces to be more likely than the others. 
However, it seems from her initial hesitation in responding to my question that she may 
have held a conception of ‘random’ that required ‘equally likely outcomes’. This global 
view is really a prior view, being largely based on her view that the die would be only a 
little unbalanced, and not really using observed frequencies.
When I asked how she could find out whether broken faces were more likely, she replied 
in two ways, possibly indicating some tension between two different ways of thinking 
about the outcomes of rolling the die. The first part of her reply suggested the classic long 
run relative frequency approach to determining probability. Abby had previously 
articulated a view based on a modification of equally likely outcomes, but here she showed 
that she was aware of a global frequentist view. However, her second comment, “you 
could ask a physics person” indicated a sense in which the ‘deterministic’ laws of physics 
might govern the outcomes of a die rolling experiment.
Abby: By doing it hundreds and millions of times. (Laughs) Well, you could... Or you could ask a 
physics person.
(Lines 126-127)
Abby considered the surface area of each face in more detail. She suddenly recognised 
that each spot on the die was in fact a tiny depression in the surface and that the different 
number of spots on each face might affect the weight on each face of any die. She was 
trying to relate the physical features of the die to her global prior view of the distribution.
Abby stated again that, because of the crack, the faces were not exactly equally likely. At 
this point, she appeared to resolve for herself the dilemma of whether ‘random’ implied 
‘equally likely’.
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I: Right, so you would feel that that one would not be...
Abby: It’s not exactly the same chance for every number.
I: So is it random?
Abby: It is random. But it’s not equal.
(Lines 136-139)
Abby had now explicitly separated the ideas of randomness and equiprobability.
Previously she had said that the outcomes from the die were “a bit random”, but here she 
stated unequivocally “it is random”.
I tried to use this discussion to move on to a more general discussion of the concept of 
randomness. Abby’s reply was long and included many examples to illustrate her 
meaning. She began by thinking of random as ‘unpredictable’ and, to illustrate this, she 
chose an extreme example of an elephant falling on the die! The problem with this 
example is that it is unpredictable really because it is so unlikely!
I: So the question now is ‘what do you think randomness is?’
Abby: {Pause 5 seconds) .. .It’s a word in English. .. .It’s when you can’t predict what’s going to happen.
Well, you know that something’s going to happen, but... I mean, when you roll a dice, what’s the 
chance of an elephant falling on the dice? That would be very random, if an elephant fell on the 
dice. But... You know that it’s likely that one of six things is going to happen, or it’s going to fall 
off the table or something like that... but you don’t know which of those six things is going to 
happen.
(Lines 144-150)
Unfortunately, the idea of random as unpredictable led her into a difficulty when she 
considered the outcome of rolling a die, since the outcome was (almost) certain to be one 
of the six possible outcomes. Abby was not yet thinking of randomness as an idealised 
model of the real situation, but was trying to see reasons why an a priori model with a 
defined finite set of outcomes did not perfectly apply.
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In the next sentence, Abby acknowledged the need to simplify the situation when she said 
“let’s just pretend.. As she considered this further, she moved to thinking of random 
outcomes as impossible to influence.
Abby: .. .Which one happens out of the six things that are likely to happen...? Well, let’s just pretend that
they’re certain. I mean, because, you could get some bird come down and eat the dice before it 
lands or something like that, but that’s not likely. But say that these six things are certain to 
happen. One of the six things is certain to happen. But you don’t know which is going to happen, 
and you can’t - with a normal, a fair dice - you can’t... influence which one’s going to happen -  
well you could if you dropped it down -  but, no, if you do it properly then you can’t influence it.
So there are six things... one of them is going to happen, and you can’t influence which one’s 
going to happen and you can’t know. And one of them, whichever one, is going to happen.
(Lines 152-158,161-162)
Abby had defined an idealised outcome space for the process of rolling a die, but she had 
stopped short of specifying that the outcomes were equally likely. Although something 
could occur to prevent one of the six outcomes occurring, she proposed to model the 
situation as though the only possibilities were the six outcomes.
Abby went on to draw a parallel between the randomness of rolling a die and the 
randomness of the lottery. Initially, she focused on describing the physical process by 
which the lottery balls are selected, emphasising the idea that the process was “up to 
chance completely”. She emphasised that each ball was equally likely to be chosen and 
she appeared to state that this made the process random. I reflected that statement back to 
her, which led her to identify again a distinction between ‘random’ outcomes and ‘fair’ 
(equally likely) outcomes.
Abby: It’s like on the lottery—if it’s not fixed, which I haven’t worked out whether it is or not yet—the
balls, they’re just thrown around, and one falls down, and one happens to go into the little dent 
before all the rest. And because all the balls are supposedly the same weight, and they’re being 
blown at the same force, and all these things that you leam in GCSEs about doing a fair test in 
science... then it’s up to chance completely which one of—how many is it? 49 balls? —falls into
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the little gap.
And, they always bring up the statistics about “this ball has appeared 966 times this week,” and 
umm, that doesn’t matter. If it’s completely fair, it doesn’t matter how many times it’s done it 
before, because the chance of that ball, or the other ball, coming down is the same, so it’s random.
I: Right. OK. So, it’s because all the chances are the same that makes it random.
Abby: No. But that makes it fairly, fairly random. Not fairly as in quite, but fairly as in... fair.
(Lines 163-173)
So, Abby seemed to suggest that ‘equally likely’ outcomes were those ‘random’ outcomes 
that were also ‘fair’. She had drawn a distinction between situations in which random 
outcomes were equally likely, which she called “fairly random” and she believed were 
exemplified by the lottery, and those in which outcomes were random but not equally 
likely, as she thought might be the case with the cracked die. Her understanding of 
randomness seemed to be evolving as she spoke.
She contrasted her idea of “fairly random” with the example of the weighted die that she 
had looked at first. In that case, outcomes were not ‘equally likely’, the die was clearly not 
‘fair’, and yet outcomes were still somewhat random, since each possible outcome had 
non-zero likelihood. As she said, “it’s random, but it’s not as random as having six things 
that are the same likelihood”. Abby seemed somewhat surprised by her conclusion that 
some things are more random than others.
Abby: But, like, the weighted dice - 1 don’t know the exact numbers, because I haven’t learned it. But
your weighted dice - it’s most likely to fall on a six... But it could fall on a one, probably - 1 didn’t 
manage to make it do it, but it probably could - or it could fall on a five, a four, or a two. So there 
are five things that could happen. And the likelihood of them is different: one is probably quite a 
small likelihood; six is a high likelihood; five is higher than four and two; and four and two are the 
same likelihood. So, it’s random, but it’s not as random as having six things that are the same 
likelihood.
(Lines 176-182)
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During her examination of the cracked die, Abby appeared to have developed her ideas 
about randomness. While she began with an idea that the die was “a bit random”, by the 
end she had articulated the idea more clearly by providing an analysis of the likelihood of 
different outcomes. She had also clarified her understanding of the relationship between 
‘equally likely’ outcomes and randomness.
Abby’s remarks about the biased die, and her early remarks about the randomness of the 
cracked die, indicated that she initially thought of randomness as requiring equally likely 
outcomes. Even the cracked die was initially described as “only a bit random”. Her later 
discussion of the parallel between rolling a fair die and the lottery draw seems to have 
helped her to a different way of expressing the relationship between randomness and 
equiprobability, in which she used her idea of “fairly random”.
As she worked within the local perspective on the observed outcomes, she began to 
articulate a global view. She expected the die to be slightly biased by the crack, and she 
tried to articulate this expectation by modifying the standard model of a fair die. However, 
when asked how she could discover the extent of any bias, it became apparent that she was 
trying to deal with two different global perspectives. On one hand she saw the relevance 
of the frequentist approach, and on the other hand she saw the behaviour of the die as 
subject to the laws of physics and therefore as a phenomenon that could be analysed and 
described deterministically by an expert (“a physics person”). This dual view might be 
required in order to understand randomness as a model for a deterministic situation in 
which the person making the judgement has incomplete knowledge.
9.7 Summary
The extracts discussed in this chapter illustrate how the attention of interviewees moved 
frequently between a prior perspective on randomness and a local perspective. In the local
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perspective, interviewees were acutely aware of every successive outcome and whether it 
matched their expectation according to their prior belief.
The interviews also provided insight into the process by which an individual begins to 
reconcile the local perspective with an emerging global view. Where there was a genuine 
mismatch between a strongly held prior belief and the long run frequency distribution, the 
tension within the individual was seen to mount with each successive outcome. David’s 
work with the biased die and Ben’s struggle with the spherical die both stand out in this 
regard. The interviewee’s attention shifted rapidly between the three conflicting 
perspectives, and the mounting anxiety seemed to fuel the level of uncertainty experienced 
by the interviewee about what to attend to.
The shift to a truly global perspective requires awareness and understanding of 
distribution. Without a developed sense of distribution a person would struggle to express 
either prior or frequentist views. However, the extracts from the interview with Alex give 
some insight into this difficulty. While it is not possible to state precisely what 
understanding Alex had of the idea of a distribution, her reluctance to make statements 
about a frequency distribution suggests that she might have had difficulty with the idea. 
However, she was able to express the simpler idea of equiprobability as a prior belief. To 
the extent that she saw the outcomes as unpredictable, she saw her prior belief as 
supported.
While the shifts between prior, local and global perspectives have been most prominent in 
this chapter, I am also aware of other shifts. For example, Abby’s view of randomness as 
requiring equiprobability changed so that, by the end of the interview, she was expressing 
“degrees of randomness”.
The dice and coin tasks that I have used in the stage 1 interviews have all invited the 
interviewee to express a prior belief based upon a set of equally likely outcomes. In that
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sense these tasks were all very similar and I needed to consider the development of a 
different task for the next stage of interviews. The next chapters cover stage 2 and, in 
Chapter 10,1 address the development of a new task.
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Chapter 10: Background to Stage 2 Interviews
In the course of examining shifting perspectives in stage 1, it became apparent that each 
interviewee approached the dice activities with preconceptions about the distribution they 
expected to see when they rolled the die. In the case of the biased die, that preconception 
was usually that the die would be fair, although a few interviewees were alerted to the 
possibility of bias in the first throw, possibly by the way the die moved as it bounced on 
the surface. In the later dice activities, interviewees sometimes showed suspicion of me, 
and of the die that it too might be biased, but the predominant expectation was still that the 
die would be fair. In reviewing the findings at the end of stage 1 ,1 became more aware of 
the significance of preconceived prior distributions in the dynamic of the shifting 
perspectives. In Stage 2, the focus of my attention moved towards investigating the 
interviewees’ shifting attention as they worked to interpret the emerging frequency 
distribution.
The emergence of the phenomenon of ‘shifting perspectives’ raised the need to design an 
additional task to explore this phenomenon. The reasons are set out in section 10.1. Then, 
in section 10.2,1 describe how the idea for an appropriate task was developed.
10.1 Review of stage 1 tasks
The first three process tasks used in stage 1 were described in Chapters 5 and 7. In these 
tasks, the interviewee rolled three different dice and considered what they expected to 
occur next. The nature of the task and my questioning led the interviewee to work mainly 
within the local perspective. In many cases, it was apparent that the interviewee held a 
prior conception of the distribution of outcomes that they expected to see when they rolled 
the die. The fact that the first die was heavily biased caused some interviewees to question 
their assumption that the six possible outcomes were equally likely. When working on the
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cracked die, some interviewees were concerned that the crack would bias the die; the 
preconception of ‘fairness’ was sometimes modified to an expectation that one or more 
faces would be favoured over the others. As the list of observed outcomes grew, 
interviewees were sometimes able to compare a preconceived ‘prior distribution’ with the 
observed frequency distribution they saw in the emerging sequence. These preconceived 
ideas of an expected distribution seemed to exist before the interviewee had observed any 
outcomes, and the ideas evolved in interaction with observation of increasing numbers of 
outcomes. The ideas express a ‘global prior’ perspective on randomness, which is 
different from perspective given by the emerging frequency distribution as observed 
outcomes are aggregated.
Thus the dynamic of shifting perspectives between only two perspectives -  the local and 
the global -  could be seen to be an over-simplification. The global perspective existed in 
the interviews in two forms: the global frequency distribution emerging from the 
aggregated outcomes, and the global ‘prior’ or expected distribution that was an expression 
of the interviewer’s beliefs about the task before they observed any outcomes. I therefore 
became aware that there could be shifts between three perspectives, rather than only two.
In each of the dice activities, the interviewee was presented with a theoretical prior 
distribution in the context of an apparently fair die. Interviewees used this as a starting 
point when they tried to interpret the outcomes. Similarly, the coin tossing activity gave 
them a uniform prior distribution to work from. In the dice activities and in the coin 
activities, it was natural to work from an assumption of equiprobability. None of the tasks 
in stage 1 presented the interviewee with a context in which they needed to work explicitly 
from the observed data to form a global perspective. A new task was required to probe the 
relationship between the local perspective and the global frequentist perspective. This new 
task would need to cause the interviewee to express explicitly their ideas about the
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emerging frequency distribution, and enable the interviewee to interact with the generating 
process to alter the frequency distribution.
10.2 Task ideas
Several practical considerations were important in deciding what task was possible. There 
was limited time available for the development of the physical resource, and I did not want 
to introduce unintended biases in the process of building a physical resource.
After discussions with colleagues, I focussed on the idea of using two random generators 
and requiring the interviewee to make some comparison between them. The idea was to 
develop a task that would involve matching an unknown distribution in one random 
generator with another random generator in which the distribution was controllable. I also 
needed to consider the form of generator to use. All the previous tasks had used dice or 
coins as generators. The tasks were also the precursor to a more general discussion in the 
interviews about the variety of contexts for which the interviewee saw randomness as a 
suitable model. I therefore considered there might be advantage in presenting the new task 
using a different kind of generator, such as an urn or a spinner, as this might open the 
interviewee’s mind to a wider variety of possibilities.
Some early ideas arose in discussion with colleagues and the consideration of these helped 
to form a clearer sense of what was required in the new task. An initial idea was to 
construct a spinner with adjustable regions, and a sampling box with the contents hidden. 
The task would be to sample repeatedly, with replacement, from the sampling box in order 
to try to estimate the distribution of the contents (2 or possibly 3 different outcomes in 
different proportions), and to adjust the regions on the spinner so that the distribution of 
outcomes from the spinner would be the same as the distribution of outcomes from the
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sampling box. A mechanical refinement would enable the user to inspect a large sample 
from the sampling box to obtain more precise estimates of the distribution.
There are some disadvantages to using a spinner as the generator with a known and 
adjustable distribution. First, it is difficult to ensure that a spinner is well-balanced and 
therefore ‘fair’. Spinners are often biased in favour of stopping at or near a particular 
position, especially when a spinner is home-made, as this one was going to be. Secondly, 
creating a spinner with easily adjustable regions might not be easy, especially bearing in 
mind the first difficulty.
Another issue was that the user needed to be able to convince themselves that the random 
generators in the task had the properties that they expected, such as unpredictability, or 
independence. The aim of the research at this stage required not only that the interviewee 
should be able to pay attention to the local perspective as much as they needed to, but also 
that their attention should be drawn to the global perspective to consider the emerging 
frequency distribution.
Consideration of these issues led me to consider two different possibilities. One was to use 
a computer simulation of the real spinner and urn to lead the interviewee to turn their 
attention to the global perspective. A computer simulation would allow the user to 
generate the results of a large number of trials in a short time, and display these as a 
distribution. This would give the interviewee ready access to the global perspective on 
randomness and would enable them to see directly the effects on the distribution of 
changes in the underlying process. However, I needed such a simulation to enable the user 
to experiment with individual trials in order to examine the process from the local 
perspective. It was important for my examination of the relationship between global and 
local perspectives that interviewees should be required to think at both local and global 
levels and that they should be able to move easily between different perspectives. In a
Page 215
Chapter 10: Background to Stage 2 Interviews 
computer simulation it is easy to move from simulating individual outcomes to replicating 
many outcomes in succession, but it is not natural to move in the other direction. I was 
concerned that a computer simulation might produce a separation between local and global 
in the way that the user interacted with them, and so remove the need for the user to 
reconcile in their own mind the potential contradictions between local and global 
perspectives. I was also concerned that the user might need to be convinced that the 
simulation truly represented a spinner and/or urn. With these concerns in addition to those 
that I discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.13), I was therefore still uncomfortable with using 
pseudo-random generators in this research to explore people’s perceptions of randomness.
The second approach was to dispense with the spinner entirely, use two much simpler urns 
containing only a small number of beads of two different colours, abandon the requirement 
to be able to view the results of many trials quickly, but use instead the fact that the 
contents of the urn can be inspected at the end. This second approach became the basis for 
the design of the counters task.
10.3 The proposed task
In the new task, the interviewee is presented with a supply of black and white counters, and 
two sampling bags (or urns), A and B, each containing a total of ten counters, some black 
and some white. The content of each bag is hidden and can only be inspected by sampling 
with replacement one counter at a time. The task is to sample from bags A and B and then 
to adjust the contents of bag B by adding counters to replicate the estimated contents of 
bag A. Only at the end of the task can the contents of each bag be inspected to make 
known the distribution of black and white counters in each bag. To help the interviewee 
manage the two bags, the interviewer looks after bag A, draws counters from it when 
required, and keeps a record of the outcomes. The interviewee manages bag B, drawing 
counters and recording outcomes, and then adjusting the contents when appropriate.
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Many variations of this task are possible. Some of these are listed below.
• The number of counters in each bag (ten in the version above) could be unknown.
• The total number of counters in bag A might differ from the number in bag B.
• The contents of bag B might be adjusted only by adding single counters, either black or 
white.
• The content of bag A, the one that is not to be adjusted, might be made known at some 
stage.
These were all considered and some were tried in early trials of the activity, but they were 
not adopted in the task as used in the interviews. The task needed to be kept simple to 
avoid interviewees misunderstanding and to prevent any difficulty of mastering the task 
from masking the discussion of randomness that was the primary purpose.
A decision had to be made about what proportion of Black and White counters to place in 
each bag at the start. It was decided that the two bags should initially contain different 
proportions, but not so obviously different as to be apparent after 10 draws. The 
proportions used were 7:3 in bag A and 5:5 in bag B. These proportions were arrived at 
from experimentation with Excel simulation, in which it appeared that the differences 
between the two were almost always suggested but not totally clear after about 20 draws.
It is important to remember here that the purpose of this task is to provoke discussion of 
randomness, and particularly to create the uncertainty that encourages awareness of 
randomness at the micro level. If the differences between the proportions in the two bags 
were too clearly apparent, then the interviewee might spend little time dwelling in 
uncertainty.
A final consideration was whether to motivate the interviewee to see their decision as 
important by attaching some kind of reward to a successful match between the two bags. I 
felt that to do so would change the focus of the discussion from the phenomenon of
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randomness to the interviewee’s decision-making strategies and behaviour. However, in 
order to encourage the interviewee to look for differences I decided to tell them from the 
start that the proportions in the two bags were different.
Early versions of the task were trialled with two Year 7 pupils and, later, in a workshop 
attended by eight colleagues, who worked in two groups. As a result of the trials, I was 
prompted to consider more carefully how I worded the instructions for the task. The key 
lessons from these trials are summarised in the following bullet points.
• Stating the aim of the participant in this task as “To match the proportions in the other 
bag exactly” was not helpful, since it is essentially impossible to be sure that the 
proportions are exactly matched. Stating the aim of the participant as “To match 
proportions as closely as possible” was better.
• The word “proportion” was not understood in this context by one of the Year 7 pupils, 
whereas the word “probability” was. I decided to use “probability” in the first place, 
but to be prepared to reword the instruction using “proportion” if “probability” was not 
understood.
There is a delicate balance to be struck in the design of this task between keeping the task 
open to stimulate ideas of both randomness and distribution, and stimulating the ideas of 
distribution so much that randomness is not considered. Early informal trials of the 
activity suggested that this balance was struck, in that responses included some indications 
of the ‘shifting perspectives’ that had been observed in previous tasks.
10.4 Presentation of the counters task
In presenting the task in an interview, I decided that this should be the first task, to ensure 
that all interviews in the second stage would address it fully. However, it appeared from 
the trials with Year 7 pupils that this task was more difficult than the dice activities had
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been, so it would be important to ensure that the initial interaction with the sampling bags 
was made accessible.
The task was presented in three parts.
In part 1 ,1 presented to the interviewee the sampling bags and a supply of extra counters, 
both black and white. I explained the initial purpose with words such as:
We have two sampling bags here, each containing 10 of these counters, some black and some white, 
but in different proportions. So there is a total of 10 counters in each bag at the moment. We shall 
sample one counter from one bag, have a look at it, record the colour and replace it. We then sample 
one counter from the other bag, look at it, record it, put it back. We shall repeat that a few times and 
then I shall invite you to talk to me about what we’ve seen. Later, I shall give you a task to do in 
response to this.
One sampling bag was held and managed by the interviewee, who drew the counters, 
recorded the outcomes and replaced the counters. The second bag was held, managed and 
recorded by the interviewer (that is, by me). After recording ten outcomes from each bag,
I invited the interviewee to consider the outcomes recorded from each bag and to comment 
on these.
Part 1 was relatively easy to understand. I expected that it would provide a gentle 
introductory activity for the interview. I hoped to begin discussion of the interviewee’s 
interpretation of randomness when they commented on the first ten outcomes observed 
from each bag.
In part 2 ,1 explained to the interviewee the task of matching the two bags using words 
something like:
Your task now is to change the probability of drawing a black counter from your bag by adding 
counters to your bag, until you think that the probability of drawing a black counter from your bag is 
the same as it is from my bag. You can only find out what is in each bag by sampling one counter at a
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time, record the colour and replacing it. You are allowed to add more counters to your bag if you 
wish, in order to change the probability of drawing a black counter until you think the probability is 
the same in your bag as in my bag.
I invited the interviewee to ask any questions and attempted to clear any confusion. Then I 
explained to the interviewee the choices for what to do next.
You might choose to collect more data, from one or both of the bags.
Or you might choose to add some counters to your bag to try to match more closely the probabilities 
of drawing a black.
If the interviewee chose to collect more data, I asked them which bags they wanted to 
sample from, and how many observations they wanted to record from each bag. If the 
interviewee chose to add some counters to their own bag, I asked them to tell me how 
many they wanted to add of each colour. In either case, I also asked them to explain how 
they had arrived at their decision.
This second part of the task was complex and the interviewee needed to get a clear idea of 
what was required of them. I expected that I would need to answer questions and clarify 
the explanation of this part. The process of achieving what the interviewee considered to 
be a good enough match between the probability of drawing a black counter from Bag A 
and that from Bag B, might require several iterations of sampling, adding counters, and 
sampling again.
In part 3, when the interviewee was satisfied that they had got the probabilities of drawing 
a black from each of the two bags as closely matched as they could, I invited them to 
inspect the contents of the two bags, to see how well they had done. In this part I expected 
the interviewee to count the numbers of black and white counters in each bag, and then 
possibly look back through their data and their decisions at each stage to see how well their 
inferences about the contents of each bag matched what was actually there.
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10.5 Summary
The new counters task was developed specifically to probe more deeply the relationship 
between the local perspective on randomness and the global frequentist view, without 
clouding the picture with prior beliefs. While it is not possible to remove prior beliefs 
completely from any activity that I might use in interviews to explore randomness, the 
counters tasks does not encourage the interviewee to focus awareness on any such prior 
beliefs.
The stage 2 interviews were planned to begin with the counters task and move on to some 
of the previous tasks afterwards. Chapter 11 sets out in more detail how the stage 2 
interviews were conducted.
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The process involved in the interviews in Stage 2 was broadly similar to the process in 
Stage 1, with the addition of the Counters Task at the start of the process. In this chapter, I 
describe the presentation of the Counters task alongside the other tasks. I describe the 
participants in stage 2 and how they came to be selected, and the processes involved in the 
transcription and analysis of each interview.
11.1 The Interviewees
There were nine interviews in stage 2. Table 11.1 lists the interviewees in the order in 
which they were interviewed and gives some information about each. A fuller description 
of each interviewee follows later in this chapter.
Name Gender Year Age Maths set
1 Linda F 11 16y lm Set 1
2 Bernice F 10 15y 0m set 3/6
3 Claire F 10 15y 0m Set 1/6
4 Hannah F 10 14y 8m Set 3/6
5 Rory M 9 14y 5m Set 4/7
6 Mosaab M 11 16y 11m Set 5/6
7 Andrew M 9 13y 11m Set 1
8 Guhan M 8 13y 3m Set 1/6
9 Assim M 12 17y 2m AS
Table 11.1: Interviewees in stage 2 interviews
11.2 The selection of participants
Interviewees were school pupils aged between 13 and 17, and they came from three 
sources. Some were children of neighbours or colleagues as in stage 1.
A second source was a group of 20 able pupils in Years 7, 8 and 9, from neighbouring 
schools, who attended a series of Saturday morning classes taught by me. I sent letters 
home to parents of all pupils and interviewed those pupils who replied. Interviews with 
these learners from these two groups took place out of school time: at weekends, during 
early evenings or during school holidays in my home.
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Others were pupils at a mixed 13-18 Upper School, with a comprehensive and ethnically 
diverse intake. I had approached the Head Teacher, who had agreed that pupils could be 
invited to participate, and a letter requesting parental consent was sent home to parents of 
pupils selected by the head of the mathematics department. I wanted to broaden my 
sample of learners, and so I asked the head of department to include some learners from 
ethnic minorities, and some pupils for whom mathematics was more challenging.
However, I requested that learners selected should be willing and able to express their 
ideas in discussion. I wanted to try to avoid selecting learners who were unwilling to 
speak in front of me and the microphone. The selected pupils were from various sets in 
Years 9, 10 and 11. These pupils were interviewed on school premises in a small office 
during their mathematics lesson.
11.3 The interviewees in detail
In this section I give a brief description of each interviewee in turn. Most of the 
interviewees were relatively able and successful pupils, as in stage 1. However, three of 
the interviewees in stage 2 were from middle or lower sets and experienced difficulties 
with some aspects of mathematics. The descriptions in this section are drawn from my 
interview notes made shortly after each interview, as I transcribed the audiotapes.
11.3.1 Linda
Linda, aged 16.1, was a highly able and articulate pupil in the top set of Year 11 at an 
independent selective girls’ school, and was studying GCSE Mathematics. She was the 
daughter of a family friend and was known to be an extremely conscientious and hard­
working student. She did not see herself as mathematically able and appeared to lack 
confidence in her mathematical ability.
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Linda’s interview was the first one that I did in Stage 2 and so was the first time that I had 
tried the counters task in an interview. The interview took place in my home during a 
weekend.
At the start I emphasised to Linda that I wanted her to think aloud about the tasks and to 
externalise what was going on in her mind. Initially, as I briefed her about the first task, 
she appeared to be quiet and reserved, giving monosyllabic responses, but as the interview 
developed she was able very effectively to ‘think aloud’, expressing both her uncertainties 
about how to interpret what she saw, and her developing ideas.
11.3.2 Bernice
Bernice is a Year 10 pupil, aged 15.0, of moderate attainment (set 3 out of 6) in a mixed 
comprehensive 13-18 school. The class teacher selected Bernice for this interview as a 
pupil who would be willing to talk about her thinking. The interview took place in school 
in the maths department office during as mathematics lesson.
I began by explaining that I would be giving her some tasks to do and that it was important 
that she should talk about her thinking as she was working on the tasks. I explained that I 
wanted her to try to think out loud. Bernice was quiet at the start of the interview, but she 
spoke more as she relaxed.
11.3.3 Claire
Claire was a highly able Year 10 pupil, aged 15.0, in the top set in a comprehensive upper 
school (13-18). She was rated by the Head of Department as a ‘star mathematician’, but 
she also excelled in other areas of the curriculum (literacy, languages and science). She 
was highly articulate and expressed her ideas clearly and effectively; she had also read 
widely. The interview took place in her school, in the maths department office, during a 
maths lesson.
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I discovered in the first few moments of the interview that Claire is the daughter of a 
family friend, whom I had seen very little in the past five years. She had recognised my 
name on the permission letter that she had been given to take home for her parents. In the 
interview, Claire was exceptionally coherent and articulate,
V
11.3.4 Hannah
Hannah, aged 14.8, was a highly articulate pupil in Year 10 at a comprehensive upper 
school, in set 3 out of 6 for mathematics. She was described by her maths teacher as being 
of moderate ability, but ‘quite talkative’. The interview took place in the school maths 
office during a morning mathematics lesson. At the start Hannah was somewhat 
apprehensive, and said little, but as she relaxed, she began to say more, and by the end she 
was explaining confidently her ideas and thinking about the tasks.
11.3.5 Rory
Rory, aged 14.5, was a boy in Year 9 at a comprehensive upper school. His teacher 
described him as a likeable lad but not particularly good at mathematics. He was in set 4 
out of 7. The interview took place in the school mathematics department office during a 
morning mathematics lesson. At the start of the interview, Rory appeared shy. He 
followed instructions carefully and was cautious about taking action until he was quite sure 
what I wanted him to do. As the interview progressed, he began to relax and was more 
forthcoming with ideas and comments.
11.3.6 Mosaab
Mosaab was a young East-African, who had only been in the UK for a few years. He was 
working in year 11 towards GCSE mathematics in a lower set. Aged 16.11, he was in fact 
a year older than others in Year 11. He was very polite and keen to please, but sometimes 
he did not appear to understand what to do. The interview took place in the school
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mathematics office during a mathematics lesson. In this interview, I had to pay particular 
attention to my language. Mosaab was working in his third language and he had a limited 
vocabulary. He also had a strong accent, which made transcription difficult in places.
11.3.7 Andrew
Andrew was an exceptionally able child in Year 9, aged 13.11, who had just started at a 
local selective independent school. He had particular strengths in mathematics, science 
and technology. The interview took place at Andrew’s home just after the end of term.
I had worked with Andrew about nine months earlier when he was a pupil on the series of 
Saturday morning classes that I taught. He was a very thoughtful child who tended to 
think deeply before expressing himself. I was a little concerned that he might be reluctant 
to express himself in the interview so, when I explained to Andrew that I would be talking 
to him about a variety of tasks, I emphasised that I wanted to hear how he was thinking 
about them. It was therefore important that he should try to think aloud.
11.3.8 Guhan
Guhan was a very able boy, aged 13.3, in the top set in Year 8 in a local Middle School. I 
had taught him nine months earlier when he was a pupil on the series of Saturday morning 
classes that I taught. He had impressed me as a highly intuitive thinker, who processed 
ideas very quickly. The interview took place in my home one afternoon after the end of 
term.
11.3.9 Assim
Assim was a Year 12 student, aged 17.2, studying for AS level mathematics at a 
comprehensive upper school. He was due to take a module in statistics, but he had not yet 
started it. I had an additional reason for interviewing him in that he was interested in the
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possibility of programming a simulation of the counters task in Flash. I took him through 
the counters task first so that he would understand what was involved in it, and interviewed 
him about. The remainder of this interview was concerned more with the practicalities of 
building a computer simulation. Therefore, this interview deals only with the counters task 
and the review task.
11.4 The conduct of the second stage interviews
The second stage interviews were conducted in a similar manner to stage 1 and usually 
needed to be completed within 50-60 minutes. However, the introduction of the counters 
task as the first activity changed the timing of the remainder of the interview, and in most 
cases one or more of the other tasks was omitted. The tasks used in the interviews in stage 
2 are summarised in Table 11.2. The interviews are listed in the order in which they were 
conducted.
Interviewee Counters
Task
Biased
Die
Spherical
Die
Cracked
Die
Coin
Generation
Coin
Tossing
Review
task
1 Linda 1 1 1 1
2 Bernice 1 . 1 1 1 1
3 Claire 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 Hannah 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 Rory 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 Mosaab 1 1 1 1 1
7 Andrew 1 1 1 1 1
8 Guhan 1 1 1 1 1
9 Assim 1 1
Table 11.2: Tasks used in Stage 2 Interviews
Where there was not time for all the tasks I omitted one or both of the coins activities, and 
occasionally also omitted one of the dice activities. In each interview I kept time for a 
discussion of the review task.
During the analysis of stage 1 interviews, I was concerned about some of the questions I 
had asked. In particular, I felt two questions were being overused.
Page 227
Chapter 11: Stage 2 Interviews
Firstly, I had often asked questions such as: “Do you think that was random?” or “Was that 
chance?” In planning my questions for the stage 2 interviews, I aimed to ask more open 
questions, such as: “What do you make of what you have seen so far?” or “What do you 
think of this die so far?”
Secondly, I was too often asking: “What might happen next?” This question had been 
introduced to elicit the interviewees’ beliefs about the random generator that they were 
working with. I planned this question less often in the stage 2 interviews.
11.5 The analysis
My approach to the analysis of the interviews was similar to that in stage 1. Once I had 
prepared a detailed commentary on each interview, I worked through each account, 
identifying the themes that had been found significant in the first stage interviews, and 
paying particular attention to the idea of shifting perspectives between the local and the 
global views of randomness. Occasionally, I found the need to identify a new theme which 
seemed to occur across several of the second stage interviews.
At the end of this process, I reviewed the list of themes again, checking the ways in which 
I had clustered related themes under a single heading, and reducing areas of overlap 
between themes as far as possible.
11.6 Summary
The format for the stage 2 interviews was essentially the same as was used in stage 1. The 
first task was the new counters task, and some of the original stage 1 tasks were cut as 
required by the constraints of the time available for the interview.
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The process of analysis was also similar to that applied to the stage 1 interviews. The 
intention was to build upon the themes and issues identified in stage 1, to refine and 
develop these ideas, and to add to them where appropriate.
In Chapter 12,1 set out a clearer sense of shifting perspectives that has arisen from analysis 
of stage 2 interviews, particularly in the counters task, in the light of the findings from 
stage 1.
Chapter 13 brings together the findings from stage 1 and stage 2, drawing on the material 
in Chapter 8 and 9 as well as data from stage 2.
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The counters task was developed for use in the second round of interviews and differed 
fundamentally from the dice rolling and the coin tossing tasks. Its main purpose was to 
look specifically at the relationship between local and global perspectives on randomness, 
which were identified in the first round of interviews. In contrast with the original tasks, 
the counters task required the interviewee explicitly to infer the nature of the underlying 
distribution from consideration of the local perspective.
In this chapter, I present examples of interviewees’ working on the counters task, and I 
focus particularly on some shifts of attention that I have seen. I describe some features of 
the circumstances of these shifts that may contribute to their occurrence. Shifts of 
attention were evident in all the tasks, but the counters task has highlighted some particular 
issues. For most interviewees, the task highlighted the question of how many counters 
would need to be sampled to produce a sufficiently reliable estimate on the probability of 
drawing a white counter from a bag. Some interviewees changed their view about this 
issue as the task progressed. An example was Linda, whose work is described in section 
12.1. Typically, the interviewee’s attention shifted between specific outcomes from the 
interviewee’s bag and the interviewer’s bag. This was evident in all the interviews and is 
exemplified in the work of Bernice in section 12.2. In some instances, this shift occurred 
almost item by item, at each draw. There was also a shift of attention from the sequence of 
outcomes, often focusing only upon either white or black but not both, to the unseen 
contents of the bag. Bernice’s work in 12.2 demonstrates this.
Finally, in section 12.3,1 describe a shift from looking for evidence of randomness or non­
randomness in the outcomes to looking within the generating process. I had not discerned 
this shift in previous interviews, but have found evidence of it in almost all interviews 
within the counters task. Section 12.3 examines extracts from five different interviews.
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12.1 Linda: sample size in the counters task
In this section, extracts from the interview with Linda (age 16.1) are used to illustrate the 
responses of interviewees to the counters task. As with the dice and coin activities in stage 
1, some subjects showed confidence in their judgements on the basis of very few 
outcomes. Linda did so from a very early stage in this task: for example, after only 3 
outcomes (B W B), Linda stated “there are probably more black ones” (line 26). As she 
continued to work on the task, she kept returning to this issue of sample size, encouraged 
by the structure of the task. How many outcomes needed to be observed from each bag 
before a judgement could be made?
After the sixth draw from each bag, Linda had observed 3W and 3B from Bag A and 2W 
and 4B from bag B, and suggested that Bag B was not likely to contain equal numbers of 
black and white counters. After the seventh draw from each bag, W from Bag A and B 
from Bag B, she restated her view with more confidence.
Linda: In your bag it looks like there are more black counters, I think, than white ones, because there have
only been 2 white ones pulled out in 6 turns, no... 1 turns. And in my one ... there could be equal 
numbers of each, I think. I’m not sure though.
(Lines 60-63)
Linda wanted to estimate the proportions in the bags on the basis of the first 10 outcomes. 
My intention that the counters task should cause the subject to begin with their attention 
rooted in the distributional perspective seemed to work in this case. However, it seemed 
that Linda was concerned to identify the exact numbers of black and white counters in each 
bag rather than to estimate the probabilities of drawing black and white. The difference 
here is subtle, as the probabilities should be dictated by the relative numbers of black and 
white in the bag. Linda’s intent, however, appears to be to infer from her sampling the 
precise numbers of black counters and white counters in the bag. The counters task, as it 
was set up in these interviews, did not enable me to explore the difference between seeking
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to identify the contents and seeking to estimate the probability, since I had fixed the total 
number of counters in the bag at the start (ten) and had told the interviewees what that was.
Linda: You need to have more trials where you pull them out before you get a good picture of what’s in
the bag. Because, now we’ve had 10 goes, you get a kind of clearer picture, whereas when we just 
had 3 goes... I couldn’t really tell... how many white ones or how many black ones there might 
be.
(L in e s  8 5 - 8 8 )
Linda’s awareness of the issue of sample size seemed to be evolving. She was already 
aware that, although ten outcomes gave a better picture of the contents of the bag than 
three outcomes had done, she really needed to see more before she could make her 
estimate of the contents.
I explained to Linda what she was required to achieve in the remainder of the task. I 
emphasised that each bag had begun with ten counters, that the number of black counters 
in each bag was different and that she was only allowed to add counters to her own bag.
So far, she had observed exactly five of each colour in the first ten outcomes from each 
bag, so she had no basis for adding any counters. However, Linda was uncertain how to 
respond to the situation. In the next extract, she reviewed the list of outcomes again and 
noted that the proportion of black counters observed after only four draws had been the 
same for each bag, and again after five draws. Her attempts to learn more from sub­
sequences of the set of outcomes observed showed that she was unsure what she should 
pay attention to in the list of outcomes. She then sought clarification about the rules of the 
task.
Linda: ... I don’t quite know. I mean, if I ... just look at the first 4. That indicates tha t... there’s the
same proportion in each bag. But if I look at the first 5, that indicates that the proportions are the 
same. And so... I’m not really sure what to do. But I guess I could take more out of... No.
(Laughs) ... Am I allowed to sample them from both bags, or just one, just mine?
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I: You can sample from both bags, one at a time.
(Lines 122-128)
In the end, she decided to collect more data from each bag, but she found it frustrating 
when, for each of the next three draws, the outcome from the second bag matched that 
from the first bag. After completing a second batch of ten outcomes from each bag, Linda 
chose to combine the first and second batches and to look at the numbers of black and 
white in the first twenty draws. She concluded that the observation of 10B:10W from her 
bag and 9B:11W from mine was clear evidence that there were more white counters in my 
bag than in hers. However, she had trouble deciding how many counters to add to her bag.
Linda: OK. So then that indicates that there are more white ones in your bag. So if I was to match that, I
would have to add... No... How many would I have to add to my bag? I would probably have to 
add one white... no, 2 white ones... no, that wouldn’t work... I don’t know!
(Lines 147-150)
Given that there was already so much uncertainty about the contents of each bag arising 
from the variability in the proportion of whites in a small sample, Linda seemed unduly 
concerned to be precise about how many white counters to add. She seemed to have 
mistaken the recorded numbers of black and white outcomes for the actual contents of each 
bag. When I reminded her that there were exactly ten counters in each bag, she appeared 
to be even more confused and uncertain, concluding that she did not know how many 
white counters to add. When I suggested that she might wish to collect more data, she 
decided she would do so. However, Linda had little idea of how much more data she 
might need, or even whether any further data could be relied on to help.
I: ... you might want to collect some more data?
Linda: ... I think so, but I don’t know if it would make any difference... Can we collect like 5, do 5 more
turns. And that might help.
(Lines 161-163)
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Her decision to collect only five more observations from each bag was surprising, as I had 
expected her to be more aware now that small samples were not reliable. Once again, the 
outcomes from the second bag matched exactly those from the first. This meant that there 
was still little difference between the outcomes observed from the two bags -  11B:14W 
from my bag and 12B: 13W from hers. In spite of the small difference between the two 
sets of data, Linda decided that this confirmed there were more whites in my bag. But she 
was still uncertain how many whites to add to her bag, and became anxious that she was 
“doing it wrong”. I reassured her that there was no right or wrong approach to this 
problem, and I emphasised again that I was interested in how she thought about it rather 
than whether her answer was ‘right’.
Linda: So... that definitely... that kind of confirms that there are more white ones in your bag. I’m just
not sure how many I would need to add... if I double the ratio 11 to 14, then you’d have 22 to 28. 
So what I could do is add... 12 black counters to mine and 18 white counters. But that would be a 
bit too many wouldn’t it? ... Or would it? I don’t know. Can I do that?
(Lines 172-177)
Linda had invented an algorithm to determine what to add, although she appeared to have 
taken the outcomes from her bag as 10B:10W instead of 12B:13W. She decided to 
proceed with adding counters, but carried out one last ‘check’ of her calculations.
Linda: I think I’ll do that then. I’ll just check the ratio once more though, to check I’m doing it right. So,
I’ve got 9 black ones, 10 11, yeah, 11 black ones. 11, 12, 13, 14, so yeah, it’s definitely 11 to 14. 
So 22 to 28 ... I don’t know if that would work. But... yeah... I’ll add 12.... no... yes... 12 black 
ones and 18 white ones.
(Lines 182-185)
Unfortunately, in her check, she only counted the results from my bag, but did not recheck 
the calculation from her own bag, so she did not spot her earlier error. Linda had 
established that her estimate of the ratio of black to white in her own bag was 22:28.
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Taking my bag as containing 10 Black and 10 White, she added 12 Black and 18 White to 
give 22B:28W.
However, Linda’s intention here was clearly to treat the aggregated observations from 
sampling the bags as an indication of the underlying distribution of black and white 
counters in each bag. In that sense, she was trying to work in the global perspective, 
treating the aggregated results as indicative of a long term pattern.
Having added 12 Black and 18 White counters to her bag, Linda chose to collect more data 
from each bag. She decided to collect the same number of outcomes as before, 25 from 
each bag, because “it might be easier to compare the results”.
Linda: I mean, you could do fewer trials, I guess, but it might be easier to compare the results if.. .you use
the same number.
(Lines 199-200,202)
The result of the next 25 outcomes showed 15 white and 10 black from my bag, and 14 
white and 11 black from Laura’s. The difference between the proportions of black 
counters drawn from each bag was small, but she was not sure how much difference would 
be expected if the probability of drawing black was the same for each bag. She was aware 
that some uncertainty should be present due to the ‘randomness’ of the situation, but was 
not sure how to relate this to her inference that the underlying probabilities were the same 
in each bag.
Linda: In mine I’ve got 14 white ones and 11 black ones. And in yours, {counts) 15 white ones and that
would be 10 black ones. So, the results are very similar because you’ve got 15, 15 times the white 
counter occurred and in mine it occurred 14 times. Yours, the black one occurred 10 times and in 
mine 11 times. So, well... that would kind of show me that... I don’t know... I don’t know if you 
need to have identical results in order that... in order to show you that the ratio is the same in each 
bag. Because the ratio could be the same in each bag... and... perhaps these results are just not 
what you would expect.
(Lines 212-219)
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Linda was aware of the possibility of variation in the sample proportion, but she did not 
have a sense of how much variation to expect.
Towards the end of the counters task, she tried to relate her reasoning about the proportion 
of blacks in each bag to the fact that she knew the total number of counters in each bag at 
the start had been 10. With bag A, whose contents had not changed, she could not convert 
the ratio 11:14 into a ratio n : (10- n). This difficulty with calculating the ratios appeared 
to cause her some anxiety and interfered with her discussion about ‘randomness’.
Linda: ... if the ratio was 11 to 14, then that’s a bit hard to... Oh I don’t know. ... 11 to 14. So there are
more whites... there would be more whites in your bag. So perhaps there would be 6 white 
counters and 4 black counters, because when you double that ratio you get 8 and 12... No... that’s 
not very much like 11 and 14. ... You would need to divide... No. Oh, I don’t know. .. .If you 
divided... No. {Laughs nervously). I don’t know. I think there would probably be 6... There 
would definitely be more white counters in the bag, so there would probably be either 6 white 
counters and 4 black counters or perhaps 7 white counters and 5... no that doesn’t work... 7 
white... 7 white counters and... no that’s not enough. OK. I think there would be 6 and 4 -6  
white and 4 black.
(L in e s  2 8 9 - 2 9 9 )
Linda was struggling to hold in her mind simultaneously the various constraints on the 
ratio calculations. However, her goal appears to have been to identify the contents of my 
bag. The ratio of 6W:4B seemed more acceptable to her than the incompletely articulated 
ratio of 7W:3B.
Again the discussion returned to the question of how much data Linda would need to see to 
be able to be confident that she had matched the ratios in the two bags. It was clear from 
what she said that she felt some frustration about her inability to explain the differences in 
the ratios that she had observed, and she went on to attempt to explain the differences by 
suggesting that she really needed to have collected more data.
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Linda: ... So that would suggest that we didn’t do enough trials, really. In fact, you need to do more trials
before you get a better idea o f ... how many counters there are...
(Lines 318-320)
It was interesting that she did not see the need, this time, to qualify her response by noting 
that, however much data she collated, there would always be some uncertainty. However, 
her ideas about how much data would be required clearly changed during her work on the 
counters task: early on she had generalised on the basis of only three outcomes from each 
bag, and later she had thought that about 20 outcomes would suffice, but now she was 
looking for many more!
I: So 25 isn’t enough. Do you have any sense of how many you might need to do?
Linda: Perhaps, a hundred? Or more? Perhaps 200? That might give you a better idea.
(Lines 321-323)
This last observation emphasises again the need for learners to have experience of 
interacting with live random processes. This student is highly able and articulate, and 
academically successful. Yet her experience of working with live random processes has 
been quite limited. She suggested there had been one or two maths lessons that had 
involved rolling dice, but no more. However, she appears to have learned quickly; her 
suggestion that “perhaps 200” observations might be required in order to estimate the 
probability of drawing a black counter is quite different from her apparent willingness to 
estimate on the basis of only 3 outcomes at the start.
The issue of variability in a sample statistics is present in both the local perspective of 
disorder in randomness, and in the global distributional perspective. Within the local 
perspective, variation is the essence of the disorder and the unpredictability of the 
successive outcomes, but it is not measured. In contrast, the global perspective brings 
awareness of a distribution and hence of a sense that there may be bounds on the variation, 
that the variation may be one parameter of the distribution and that it is related to the
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sample size. Linda appears to have some awareness of distribution, that there may be a 
bound on the variation, and that the variation is related to sample size, but she does not 
understand how much the variation is affected by the sample size.
12.2 Bernice: Local and global perspectives in the counters task
In the early stages of the interview with Bernice (age 15.0), she was reluctant to talk, but as 
she relaxed she became more articulate. As she worked on the counters task, her attention 
shifted rapidly between the outcomes from the two bags.
The first time that Bernice was invited to reflect on what she had seen was after we had 
drawn ten counters from each bag and I had told her about the task. She had observed 9W 
and IB from her own bag, and 4W and 6B from my bag. Bernice chose initially to add a 
black counter to her bag “because there’s more black ones in that bag” (line 50). In this 
justification her attention was focused on comparing the number of blacks in each bag, 
which she inferred by comparing the number of blacks drawn from each bag. It is possible 
that she was prompted to think in this way by my remark in the initial briefing in line 17:
“... we’ll just sort of compare as we go along”.
Given the large disparity between the observations from the two bags, Bernice’s strategy 
was not surprising, but I might have expected her to have chosen to add more than one 
black counter. In fact, she had misunderstood the brief and wanted to add some whites to 
my bag as well. When I explained again that she was only allowed to add counters to her 
own bag, she chose to add three further black counters to her bag, making four extra black 
counter in all. Having added the counters, she began to draw again. After four draws, she 
had drawn four black counters in succession from her own bag, to which she had added the 
black counter, and I had drawn WBBW from my bag. When I asked her to comment on
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these outcomes, she simply noted: “It’s obviously coming out more black” (line 75), again 
focusing her attention on comparing the number of blacks drawn from each bag.
When I asked if she thought she might have it right, she was more cautious.
I: So, do you think you’ve got it right?
Bernice: (Pause 7 seconds.) Yeah, kind of.
(Lines 76-77)
We continued drawing until we had each drawn ten counters. Bernice had drawn seven 
black counters in the sequence: BBBBWBBWWB. I had drawn WBBWBWWBBB, 
giving six black counters. Bernice was staring at the lists of outcomes, so I asked her what 
she was thinking. Her reply surprised me and showed a clear shift of attention.
Bernice: Umm. Some of them are right, but the ones I got out are a long way opposite of what you’ve got 
out. Does that make sense?
I: The ones that you’re pulling out are the opposite to mine?
Bernice: Yeah. Some of them.
(Lines 81-84)
She seemed to be looking for a one-to-one match of individual outcomes from each bag. 
When the sequences are paired, only three pairs match. As Bernice had said, “Some of 
them are right”.
I did not comment further on this at this time, but asked her if she wanted to add more 
counters to her bag, or to collect more data. She chose to add some white counters. Her 
explanation showed that she was looking at the outcomes from the first ten and the second 
ten and considering what she had added last time.
Bernice: Cos,... (Pause 4 seconds) just because to start with there was more white and I added black, but 
there was already black in the bag. And if I add more white then I’ll make it more even.
(Lines 90-92)
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This seems to indicate that her attention had reverted to comparing the number of a kind 
drawn from each bag, in this case the whites. She had seen nine whites in the first ten, 
added four blacks* and then seen three whites in the second ten. She felt that she had 
added too many blacks the first time and now needed to add some white to “make it more 
even” (line 92). She chose to add just two white counters and then started to collect a third 
set of ten outcomes from each bag.
After three draws each, we had both drawn WWB, an exact ‘match’. When I invited her to 
comment, Bernice was cautious, possibly because the sample was so small, but I inferred 
from her comment that her attention might have switched again to matching the individual 
outcomes.
I: What do you think so far?
Bernice: ... Equal. Quite.
(Lines 110-111)
The fourth draws did not match: Bernice drew white and I drew black. Bernice still 
considered this was OK, but when the same thing happened on the fifth draw, Bernice said, 
“Help!” (line 116). Her search for matching individual outcomes was not being successful.
At the end of the third set of ten draws, Bernice had drawn WWBWWBWWWW, and I 
had drawn WWBBBWBWBB. This gave her eight whites and me four whites. Bernice’s 
next comment seemed to be an attempt to reconcile the two different approaches that she 
had been trying with the outcomes that she had observed. She was very hesitant about this 
suggestion, but she wanted to attribute the difference in the number of whites drawn from 
each bag to the uncertainty about which particular counter was selected at each draw.
Bernice: I think this depends on... how... much you shake it about... and which ones you pick out... It’s 
about the same in each, but they’re just... it depends which ones you pick out.
(Lines 120-121,123,125)
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In making this suggestion, Bernice had moved her attention from looking only at the 
outcomes to a consideration of the generating process. Of course, her motivation for doing 
so was to account for the outcomes that she had observed, but this was nonetheless a new 
shift from looking at the randomness in the outcomes to looking at the process.
Previously, Bernice had attempted to make statements at a local level about the patterns, or 
lack of them, in short sequences of outcomes, but she had also shifted her focus to the 
global level when she attempted to make statements comparing the proportions of white 
counters in the two bags. Those were the shifts between local and global that I had noted 
previously in other interviews. This shift from looking only at outcomes to considering the 
process was different.
Following these remarks, Bernice’s attention appeared to shift again towards the ratios of 
black and white counters in her bag, possibly encouraged by my next question. However, 
she seemed to be looking only at the sample from her bag when she suggested that the 
probability of drawing a white from her bag was slightly higher than that of drawing a 
black. Whereas a few moments before she had been trying to compare the individual 
outcomes from each bag, now she was looking at the outcomes from only one bag and she 
was attempting to make a global statement about the probability of drawing a white 
counter. Her intention here seemed to be to compare the ratio of black and white in her 
bag to 50/50.
I: Do you think the probability of getting a white is about the same in each bag now?
Bernice: ... Yeah, I think so.
I: Roughly, or...
Bernice: Yeah. Actually, I think more...white.
I: So you think...?
Bernice: The probability of getting white is more high...
I: From... your bag?
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Bernice: Yeah.
(Lines 126-134)
When I asked her to consider my bag, her attention seemed to be the same as before: 
comparing the ratio in one bag to 50/50.
I: What about in this bag?
Bernice: ... I think getting a black in your bag is a bit higher.
I: Yeah? Why do you think that?
Bernice: Because there’s more Bs in there (indicating the record o f outcomes from I ’s bag).
(Lines 135-138)
I wondered if she had considered the evidence from the previous two samples, and I 
invited her to note that the number of black counters in each of the three samples seen so 
far was six, which had been very consistent. I asked her to consider the number of blacks
in each of her samples. She noted the number of whites in her first sample and then went
silent for a long time.
I: And in yours?
Bernice: I’ve got, in the white, nine. (Pause 27 seconds.) The, it’s... I think it just depends...
I: On?
Bernice: On... (Pause 5 seconds.) No. I’m not sure. I think if I didn’t add the two white ones to that, that it 
would have been lower...
(Lines 144-148)
The number of whites in each sample from Bernice’s bag had varied greatly: nine, three 
and eight. After the first sample she had added 4 black counters, and after the second 
sample, two white counters. She did note that the addition of the two whites after the 
second sample might have helped produce the increase from three in the second sample to 
eight in the third. However, the variations between the samples were larger than the
numbers of counters she had added, and so were larger than she had expected to see and
she did not know what to make of it. She suggested that “it just depends...” but could not
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suggest what the factors might be. I suggest that she was simply saying that she did not 
know what to make of the evidence.
Bernice did not have enough experience of variability to understand that the kind of 
variation that she was seeing between the three samples was not really very unusual. 
Because she did not understand that such variation was to be expected, she did not know 
how to interpret the results and was unable to comment. She also seemed at this stage to 
be unaware of the principle that a larger sample might be expected to show a smaller 
variation, as every time she sampled exactly ten outcomes from each bag, and she made no 
attempt to combine the samples from my bag for which the contents had remained constant 
throughout.
In order to try to make the probabilities equal for the two bags, she decided to “add some 
more black”, and added just one black counter this time. This time she drew 
BWWBBWBWBW, making five whites. My sample was WWBWBBWWWW, having 
seven whites. Initially, Bernice’s attention was on the balance on Black and White counters 
in her own bag. She noted the equality of the white and black counters in this sample with 
some relief.
Bernice: That might have evened out.
(Line 165)
When I invited her to look at both samples together she said she was “not sure”. Her 
attention seemed to shift again as she tried to explain the mismatch between the number of 
blacks in each sample this time by reference to the extra black counter that she added 
before taking this sample.
Bernice: ... I think because I added that extra black one, that’s evened out the numbers that are in there.
That makes it higher, the probability for... to get black or white...
I: A higher probability to get black...?
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Bernice: .. .Yeah. Cos there was more white in before.
(Lines 173-176)
Bernice suggested that the extra black counter that she had added had made the chances of 
getting black (or white) out of her bag “more even” because “there was more white in 
before”, and she indicated results from her second sample in saying this. She was making 
a global statement to account both for the counters that she had added to her bag and for 
the outcomes she had seen subsequently. It is important to note here that Bernice has not 
suggested here that the probability of getting a black was the same for each bag. Indeed 
when I asked her if that was what she had meant, she was able to make a clear global 
statement comparing the probabilities that she inferred for each bag. She stated clearly that 
she thought the probability of getting a black was lower for my bag.
Bernice: No. I think it’s lower in that bag (indicating I’s bag).
(Line 178)
She gave as a reason for this conjecture the number of whites (seven) in my most recent 
sample. However, she did not choose to take account of the outcomes from previous 
samples, in each of which there had been only four whites from my bag.
Bernice: Because you’ve got more whites in each one. I think. Or in the end one.
(Line 182)
When I drew her attention to the fact that the contents of my bag had not changed 
throughout the activity, and that the previous samples had also come from the same
contents, Bernice hesitated, and seemed not to know how to deal with this information.
Then she suggested that she thought my bag contained the same number of black counters 
as white counters.
Bernice: {Pause 5 seconds.) Then I’m not sure.
I: You’re not sure what?
Bernice: What I’m thinking about it.
I: What do you think is in this bag?
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Bernice: The same amount of... in that bag of black and white.
I: You think there’s the same of each? Yeah?
Bernice: Yeah.
I: So five of each?
Bernice: Yeah.
(Lines 185-193)
It is helpful here to look more closely at the outcomes that Bernice had seen. These are 
summarised in Table 12.1.
Sample
number
Bag A BagB Added 
to bag ABlack White Black White
1 1 9 6 4 4 Black
2 7 3 6 4 2 White
3 2 8 6 4 1 Black
4 5 5 3 7
Table 12.1: Bernice’s observed outcomes
I cannot tell what process Bernice went through to arrive at this estimate, but it seems 
possible that she may have taken the average number of white, or black, counters across 
the four samples, to arrive at five per sample. I do not think she was taking account of the 
previous samples until I suggested them to her. She was not able to explain her reasoning.
When I asked her to estimate the number of black counters in her own bag, Bernice 
hesitated before suggesting that there would be about eight of each colour in her bag. The 
processes that might have been involved in arriving at such an estimate are many, and 
Bernice gave little clue as to how she had got there. I tried reviewing with her the counters 
that she had added during the task, reminding her of the single black that she added before 
the final sample. This alone seemed to be enough to alert her to the fact that there should 
now be seventeen1 counters in her bag, and she immediately modified her estimate of the 
numbers of black and white to make this total.
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I: And what have you put in? You added one black there didn’t you?
Bernice: Oh. About nine... white and eight black.
(Lines 199-200)
I was still curious to know more about how she had arrived at this estimate. When I asked 
her, she reviewed the outcomes of the first and second samples, and her explanation 
indicated that she had reasoned informally.
Bernice: ... to start with ... I pulled out more white than I did black. And then when I added the four black, 
more blacks came out. And... then when I added the two whites, it come slightly evened out. But 
not much. There was more white there. Then it came out equal the last one.
(Lines 204-205, 207-208)
She had overcorrected the number of blacks after the first sample, and possibly 
overcorrected the number of whites after the second sample, and the numbers of black and 
white were probably now approximately even, as was suggested by the final sample.
Bernice was now satisfied that she had done enough to make the proportions in the two 
bags equal, and she wanted to see what was inside the bags. As it turned out, Bernice had 
estimated correctly the contents of each of the bags: her bag contained nine white and eight 
black and my bag contained five of each colour, as she had suggested.
When I asked her what would be the probability of drawing a black counter from her bag, 
her reply showed that she did not necessarily understand formally how to calculate a 
probability. However, she was able to use informal language of ‘odds’ to express her ideas 
approximately.
Bernice: Umm. About 40 60.
I: How did you work that out?
Bemice: No. I don’t know. Umm. {Starts to count the counters again.) It’s about 40 60 because there’s
one less black than there is white.
/
(Lines 231-234)
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I cannot tell from what she said whether she knew what calculation to do, or whether the 
difficulty for her lay in the particular values involved. However, her strategy of making 
adjustments from 50:50 is evident.
Looking at Bernice’s work on the counters task, there is an indication in her attempts to 
infer probabilities from frequencies that she has not developed an understanding of the law 
of large numbers. Her attempts to use the observed frequencies to make statements about 
the probability of drawing a white were all based upon single blocks of ten outcomes.
Thus her attempts to adopt a global perspective in this activity had limited success because 
she could neither account for nor deal with the variation that she saw from one sample to 
the next.
For both Linda and Bernice, their attention shifts rapidly as successive outcomes emerge 
from the sampling bags. The interviewee’s attention moves in different ways: sometimes 
from outcomes from one bag to outcomes from the other bag; sometimes from considering 
the sequence of outcomes to considering the contents of the bag; sometimes from 
comparing the outcome sequences from the two bags to comparing the contents of the 
bags. Once for Bernice, the attention shifts clearly from considering outcomes to looking 
at the generating process. For each of these interviewees the rapid shifting of attention 
indicates uncertainty. They don’t know what to focus on, so they follow their attention, 
sometimes influenced by the interview question and sometimes by an outcome.
At one point, Linda appeared to have confused in her mind the samples of outcomes from 
the bags for the actual contents of the bags. This might be seen as a moment when the 
shifting of perspective between in this case the observed outcomes and the content of the 
bag fails to occur completely. There is a ‘slip of attention’. The person’s attention shifts 
but her awareness of what she is attending to does not.
Page 247
Chapter 12: Shifting perspectives in Stage 2 Interviews 
Both Linda and Bernice had shown little understanding of the relation between sample size 
and variability of the sample mean. Each had seemed to develop awareness during the 
activity that, in order reliably to estimate the contents of a bag, they needed to work with 
larger samples than they had assumed initially.
12.3 Sampling the same counter again
On a number of different occasions an interviewee attempted to explain some perceived 
anomaly in the observed sequence of outcomes from drawing counters out of the bag by 
suggesting that the process of sampling without replacement was in some sense ‘unfair’ or 
otherwise unsatisfactory. Sometimes their explanation mentioned the ‘danger’ of 
‘sampling the same counter again’, and at other times it was more a concern that the 
counters had not been sufficiently mixed up at the start, or that the counters had not been 
shaken after each replacement. One example of this was Bernice, whose work was 
discussed in 12.2.1.
Each of these incidents can be interpreted as exemplifying a new shift of attention. The 
interviewees were usually looking at the tasks through the sequences of outcomes that 
were generated. In these incidents, where the interviewee noted the idea that the same 
counter could be sampled more than once, the interviewee’s attention has moved to 
looking at the task through the generating process. I suggest that this is a shift from 
looking for randomness in the outcomes from the process to looking for randomness within 
the process itself.
12.3.1 Andrew
Right at the start of the counters task, after only the first ten draws, Andrew’s first 
comment on considering the ten outcomes observed was that they might bear little 
relationship to the contents of the bag since he might “have picked the same one out
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multiple times” (line 36). His attention had moved quickly from the outcomes to the 
process.
Andrew: Well, although you’ve got ten there, it’s not necessarily all the ten that were in the bag, because you 
could have picked the same one out multiple times, or... You may have picked all ten out, b u t... 
there’s no way of telling because ... there could only have been one or two, because if there’s one 
of ten, then you’d know if you’d picked all ten out.
I: Right. OK ... Can you draw any conclusions at all from what we’ve seen so far?
Andrew: ... From this, you could draw the chance of picking something, b u t... that wouldn’t necessarily be 
correct for that bag. ... It could only be correct for those ones you’ve drawn.
(Line 35-36, 38-45,47)
Later, after he had added some counters to his own bag and completed sampling to his 
satisfaction, he went on to inspect the contents of the two bags. As he counted the contents 
of each bag he reconstructed an account of the decision he had made to add two black 
counters. This led him to express a similar idea about the need for the bag to be effectively 
shaken..
Andrew: Inside we had... seven whites and... 12 3 4 5... blacks (recording the totals as he speaks.)
{Andrew then counted the contents o f the second bag)
Andrew: Five and... five. So you had an equal probability because you had five of each.
And... this one... {indicates the first bag again) to begin with I had... three blacks and seven 
whites. ... So I added two to it, so now, in my bag, I’ve got the same amount of... blacks as you 
have. But I can never have the same amount of whites because I’m not allowed to remove them... 
or add them to you, so I can’t make it the...
I: You could have added more counters.
Andrew: Well, yeah. But... then you’d get to the point where... you’ve got so many counters, that increase 
the probability by so much. So although it may still be fifty-fifty, it depends... because you’ve got 
where your hand chooses to go... to pick up the counter which could be a concentration of black or 
white. So... with the low number then you’ve got... although it’s the same probability, it’s where 
your hand goes. So if you’ve got lots of counters, you could have a bit pocket of white up one side 
of the bag, because it hadn’t been shook properly, or a big concentration of black, whereas if
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you’ve got... a smaller number then it’s easier for them to move, so it’s more likely to be a fairer 
probability.
(Lines 186-188,192,194-196,198-202,204,206-211)
Andrew thought that the counters were more likely to be properly mixed if the total 
number of counters was smaller. Inspecting the contents of the bag and reconstructing 
what had happened during the experiment had drawn Andrew’s attention firmly to the 
process by which counters were selected from the bag.
Although he did not use the word random in this discussion, he expressed the goal that he 
had in mind as “a fairer probability”. He was trying to ensure that, at each draw, each 
counter was equally likely to be chosen from the bag. In trying to consider the randomness 
of this experiment, Andrew focused on the generating process.
12.3.2 Claire
When Claire worked on the counters task, she decided after seeing only ten outcomes from 
each bag, and as soon as the task was explained to her, that she would add two black 
counters to her own bag. She was sure that her bag currently contained more white 
counters than black, and that the reverse seemed to be true of my bag. By adding two 
black counters to her bag she hoped to ‘even it out a bit’.
Claire: ... I think there’s more whites than blacks in this bag... and... it seems the reverse is true, there’s
more blacks than whites in that bag. So I’m going to try and even it out a bit more.
(Lines 74, 76)
She was unsure how many to sample; after some thought she decided to draw five, but 
only from her own bag. On observing 4W and IB, she chose to add two more black 
counters to her bag, and drew a further five outcomes. This time she drew WBWBW and 
commented that the outcomes seemed to be ‘getting more even’.
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Claire: So it seems to be getting more even... However, I’ll add just one more black to this one, and then 
do five trials from each.
(line 98)
Claire added the extra black counter and began to sample. She appeared to have decided 
that she had added enough counters to her bag and she now wanted to get on with 
collecting more data from each bag. However, I was surprised by her willingness to work 
with such small samples.
Claire drew WWBBW and I drew BBWBB, still showing more white counters in her bag. 
This time Claire paused for a while, and seemed less sure of how to respond. The trend 
she had observed earlier - the proportion black counters increasing in her sample of five 
each time she added more blacks to the bag - was now halted. After some thought she 
concluded that the bag still seemed to contain a greater proportion of white counters than 
black, and she elected to add two further black counters, and to look at five more draws, 
but only from her own bag.
Claire drew WWWBW. This was an even more anomalous result than the previous one 
and she appeared to find it difficult to interpret. However, she did suggest that the sample 
she had seen was still small, and that a larger number of outcomes would give more 
reliable (accurate) results.
Claire: ... I can’t get very accurate results from these things, because I keep putting them back in.
(iSpeaking very slowly.) But the more I do there’s probably going to be more accurate results.
(Pause 8 seconds.) There seems to be about 7 or 8... out of ten blacks in bag B ... (Pause 6 
seconds) .. .and still less blacks than whites in bag A.
(Lines 133-136)
Claire seemed to be trying to rationalise to herself the apparent contradictions between the 
unreliability, disorder and unpredictability of the individual outcomes, and the underlying 
distribution that she was trying to infer. She attempted to do this by appealing to the fact
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that she was sampling with replacement, and could therefore choose the same counter more 
than once. The contradictions between the local and the global perspectives led her on this 
occasion to move her attention from the outcomes to the process.
After she had made four additions to the contents of her bag, Claire wanted to inspect the 
contents of the bags as she was satisfied that she had got the probabilities as close as she 
could. In the process of sampling she had seen some variability between the ratios 
observed from successive samples. Before she inspected the contents I asked her if she 
had been surprised by the variability between the ratios observed in successive blocks of 
five trials. In her answer she suggested that the method of sampling with replacement was 
a “not very accurate way of testing at all... because you keep putting it back in” (lines 193, 
195). Again her way of accounting for the unexpected variability in the outcomes was to 
suggest that the process was in some sense inadequate.
12.3.3 Guhan
Having seen the first ten outcomes from each bag, Guhan had added one black to his bag 
and drew a second sample of ten counters from each bag. The second samples each 
contained six black counters, but Guhan was not satisfied that the proportions were now 
equal as he knew that his bag now contained 11 counters, while my bag only contained 10 
counters. He therefore added a further 9 counters to his own bag, and drew 5 more 
outcomes from each bag to test this. Unfortunately, this time the proportions of black 
counters in the two samples were not alike: 4 blacks in 5 out of his bag, and 2 blacks in 5 
out of my bag. Guhan used the fact that he was sampling with replacement to account for 
this, and suggested it might be better to sample without replacement:
Guhan: .. .either I have too many blacks, or that was just because we put them back in. So, maybe if you
take them out and keep them out on the side...
(Lines 116-117)
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Guhan was faced with a set of outcomes that did not behave as he had expected, and his 
response was to move his attention to the process by which the outcomes were generated 
and to suggest that this process was not good enough.
12.3.4 Hannah
Hannah observed 7 whites in 10 draws from her own bag and commented that she thought 
her bag had more whites than blacks. She then noted that my bag also had shown 7 whites 
in 10 draws, and she commented: “That might have more whites... Because it would be a 
coincidence if you’d picked out the same ones” (lines 95, 97). She seemed to be stating 
the obvious that my bag is most likely to have more white than black counters. Her 
subsequent comment could be interpreted to mean that she had assumed that each counter 
in my bag had been sampled exactly once in the sample of ten observations, but that she 
recognised that the same counter could have been sampled more than once. Indeed, if the 
true ratio of white to black in my bag had not been 7:3 then some counter would have to 
have been sampled more than once. Thus for the true ratio in my bag to be other than 7:3 
would require a coincidence to have occurred, whereas if the true ratio were 7:3 there is no 
requirement that a coincidence has occurred. However, the remark shows a shift of 
attention from the outcomes to think about the generating process.
Hannah struggled to understand what she was required to for this task when I explained it 
to her at this point, as she did not understand the word ‘probability’. However, after a 
discussion, she decided to draw more counters since both bags had shown the same 
proportion of white in the first ten draws. After a further 6 outcomes from each bag, she 
noted that there were more whites coming out of my bag (4 out of 6) than she observed 
from hers (1 out of 6). She recognised that she might choose to put a white counter into 
her bag, but commented:
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Hannah: I could p u t... another white in. You can never tell though really. Cos... it’s just like a chance.
You could be picking out the same one over and over again. But if you weren’t, this says that 
you’ve got more whites than what I have.
(Lines 185-188)
Here Hannah seemed to be struggling to know what to pay attention to. She did not have a 
sense of which of the competing influences of which she is aware (variability of the 
samples, sample proportion represents the proportion inside the bag) was most important to 
attend to in the moment. Her attention shifted briefly to the process in her remark “You 
could be picking out the same one over and over again”, and then reverted to using the 
outcomes to infer a global statement “you’ve got more whites than what I have”.
12.3.5 Linda
Linda did not mention the idea that the same counter might be sampled again while she 
was working on the counters task. However, towards the end of the interview when she 
was reflecting on the nature of randomness and reviewing the activities that we had worked 
on in the interview, she referred back to the dice tasks as well as to the counters task.
During her work with the spherical die and the cracked die, Linda had experienced 
significant uncertainty about whether the outcomes she had observed could really be 
considered to have arisen from a fair die. For example, with the spherical die, she had 
experienced a lower proportion of fours than she had expected. After some vacillation she 
eventually decided that both dice could be considered fair, but that the unevenness of the 
observed frequencies was “probably due to the way I’m throwing it” (line 713), rather than 
to chance.
I was surprised to find such uncertainty in a pupil of Linda’s age and ability and I 
wondered if she had lacked experience of interacting with dice. She acknowledged that 
she did not often use dice, but again referred to her concern about how to roll the die. This
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appeared to be an aspect of the activity that she felt insecure about. She even speculated 
about ways of designing a dice rolling experiment which did not involve her, by using 
several people to roll the die, or even avoiding a human altogether by using a machine to 
be ‘sure that it’s random’.
Linda: ... I think that people normally shake it don’t they? Shake it and then throw it. And I’ve just been
kind of tipping {rolls the cracked die) it onto the table and letting roll and then stop. So I think 
that’s probably something to do with it. See. I just threw it then and I got a four. So I think, I 
don’t know, maybe... if you were going to do this more accurately, you might get several people to 
throw the dice because they’re going to throw it in different ways... Or you might get some kind 
of machine to roll it so that it stops and you’re sure that it’s random.
(Lines 716-722)
Linda’s concerns about how to account for the variability that she had observed in the 
frequencies of the six possible outcomes had led her to move her attention to the process of 
rolling the die. This is very similar to what was observed in other interviews.
The extract above was the first time that Linda had used the word ‘random’ in the 
interview. When I asked her to explain what the word meant to her, she found this very 
difficult and initially suggested the idea that something ‘random’ is “not influenced by 
anything”. This idea has appeared in other interviews. However, she also suggested a new 
idea that “it’s not... chosen; it’s just generated”. For Linda this was illustrated in a 
powerful way by the idea of the random number generator in a computer or a calculator.
Linda: Oh, ‘random’? ... I don’t know. ... {Laughs.) Well I kind of know what it means. It’s hard to
define isn’t it? It means that the outcome was not really influenced by anything. It’s a 
completely... I don’t know... Well, if you’ve got like a random button on the calculator that... 
that just brings up this random number that’s just been generated by a computer, and... It’s just 
been selected at random so that means that... you don’t choose it. You just... Oh I don’t know. 
It’s just a bit hard to explain. ... I would just say that it’s not influenced by any other outcome.
It’s not selected or chosen; it’s just generated.
(Lines 724-732)
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Linda’s view of randomness here appears to be based in the outcomes: “just been 
generated” and “not influenced by any other outcome”. However, she still held a process 
dimension to this, as was shown when I asked her she would describe the outcomes 
produced by the cracked die as ‘random’. Linda was clear that these outcomes were not 
random, because the frequencies were unbalanced, and again she ascribed this to the way 
she rolled it, and again drew the parallel with the outcomes from the spherical die. In a 
sense she seemed to be saying that the outcomes of the cracked die could not be ‘random’ 
because they appeared to be influenced by the way she rolled the die..
Linda: ... No. I don’t think so. Because... because more fours and threes and twos are coming up more
often, again I think that’s just down to probably the way that I’m throwing it. Either that or it is 
biased. ... I’m not sure. But because... it the fits the... pattern of the last dice - that suggests to 
me that it’s not biased, because... I think it would be hard to bias two die in the same way ...
(Lines 736-740)
When I asked the same question about the outcomes from the spherical die, Linda was 
even more explicit that the die did not produce random outcomes. She asserted, “You can 
never be sure that they’re random results” (line 745), and a “person can (not) create 
completely random results because you’ve got all these factors influencing it...” (lines 
751-753). She cited the counters not being adequately mixed in the bags experiment, and 
rolling the die in a manner that is systematically biased.
Linda: ... No, I don’t think so. I think that neither dice produced random results, because, you can never
be sure that they’re random results. Because... it’s like the counters in the bag: you put the 
counters in the bag and you’re not sure if you’re shuffling them, or, you know, you might shuffle 
them around different times. Or because you’ve taken one out, you put it in and it’s kind of on the 
top, so you might be more likely to pick it next time. Or, on the other hand, when you put one back 
in, it might get shuffled around to the bottom, so you’re less likely to pick it again. So ... I don’t 
think that a person can... create completely random results, because you’ve got all these... other 
factors influencing it, like... shuffling the counters or rolling the dice in a particular way... So...
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No. I don’t think the results can ever be completely “random”. I think the only way you can get
completely random results is to use a calculator or a computer or something.
(Lines 744-756)
Her idea, that “you can never be sure that they’re random results”, was one I had not heard 
elsewhere. Linda was strongly aware of the many other factors that were affecting or 
influencing the outcomes in our experiments. In the dice rolling tasks, this included the 
way in which she rolled the die, as illustrated in her earlier concern that she, in some way, 
was not rolling the die correctly because she did not shake it first, or blow on it. In the 
counters task, she was concerned that she had not been sufficiently rigorous in shaking and 
mixing the contents before each successive draw, and that she needed to place her hand 
into the bag in different ways each time. She seemed almost to be looking for ways in 
which to ‘out-fox ’ some deterministic gremlin that might be imagined to be trying to 
produce systematically biased outcomes. And yet, in the end, she seemed to suggest that, 
because the outcomes were influenced by so many different factors, they could never be 
completely ‘random’. This seems to express the idea that randomness is neither caused nor 
determined nor influenced.
So how did that relate to her initial idea that “you can never be sure that they’re random 
results”? I think that because she was so aware of the multiple factors that might influence 
the outcomes, and because she could never be sure that she had adequately controlled them 
(out-foxed the gremlin!) then she could never be sure that the outcomes were ‘completely 
random’. The phrase ‘completely random’ seems to be synonymous in her mind with 
unbiased or fair, and seems to carry with it the prior belief that, if the process were 
unbiased, then each of the possible outcomes would be equiprobable.
Linda’s final assertion about the only way to get random results was remarkable. She saw 
the computer generation of random outcomes as removing the ‘human influences’ on the
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outcomes. In this way, computer generated random outcomes may be seen as ‘more 
random’ because they are detached from reality and therefore not influenced by ‘reality’.
12.4 Conclusion
Two distinct kinds of shifting perspectives have been discussed in this chapter relating 
specifically to work on the counters task. The first relates to rapid shifts between the local 
and the global perspectives. The primary intention behind the development of the counters 
task had been to examine this shift from a different direction: starting from the perspective 
of the global frequency distribution. It is clear that the task prompted interviewees to work 
with their ideas of frequency distribution to a greater extent than the dice activities did, but 
that the counters task did not incorporate an opportunity to articulate a prior belief about 
the distribution of white and black counters in the bags before any data was collected. 
Therefore the shifts seen in the counters task were almost entirely between local and global 
frequentist, with little evidence of the global prior perspective that was seen in the dice 
activities.
However, a new kind of shift has been identified in seven of the stage two interviews: five 
of these were discussed in section 12.3, and a sixth, Bernice, was described in 12.2.1. A 
seventh example, Rory, is presented briefly in Chapter 13. This new shift is from looking 
for evidence of randomness (or non-randomness) in the outcomes, to looking instead inside 
the process itself. In each case, the motivation for the shift seems to have been a concern 
that the outcomes were not behaving as had been expected -  usually a concern that the 
outcomes showed more variability than expected. Looking inside the process might be 
seen as an attempt to identify a cause for the perceived anomaly in the outcomes. In that 
sense there might be a relationship between this shift of attention from outcomes to process 
and the vacillation that was observed in some interviews in stage one between whether a 
perceived bias in the outcomes from rolling a die had a cause or not.
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Several other themes were present in stage 2 interviews, but these are reviewed in Chapter 
13, alongside related themes from stage 1 to provide an overview of the ideas that have 
emerged across the two stages.
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Chapter 13: Themes across the interviews
In this chapter, I revisit the ideas presented in Chapter 8, but drawing this time on data 
from both rounds of interviews. This chapter is organised in four sections, each addressing 
a question relating to how learners perceive randomness.
• What do people think randomness is?
• How are ideas about randomness expressed?
• How do learners recognise randomness?
• Is “randomness” caused?
There is some correspondence between these questions and the three headings used to 
organise the themes in Chapter 8. The first two of the questions above correspond broadly 
to the idea of “Interpretations of randomness” that formed section 8.1. The other two 
headings in Chapter 8 -  “Strategies for recognising randomness” and “Shifting 
perspectives” -  are different aspects of the answer to the third question. The fourth 
question raises a theme that relates to one of the interpretations of randomness discussed in 
Chapter 8, namely the ideas of Agency, Luck and Lack of control that were discussed in 
section 8.1.2.
While the ideas discussed in this chapter echo those addressed in Chapter 8, my intention 
here is to show how these ideas have been developed and refined as a result of the second 
round of interviews.
13.1 What people think random is
As in the first stage interviews, when interviewees were trying to describe or talk about the 
phenomenon of randomness, or about a process which might be considered to be random, 
it was important for me to be cautious about how I introduced the word ‘random’. The
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word was sometimes not part of an interviewee’s vocabulary. In this section, I give some 
examples of interviewees’ attempts to speak of randomness in the second stage interviews. 
Although my focus here is upon the ways in which these interviewees chose to express 
themselves, I have also reflected upon the circumstances in which they were speaking.
13.1.1 Linda: random is chance
For some, randomness is ‘just chance’, as it was for Linda (age 16.1). She had already 
worked on the counters task and puzzled over the biased die before she discussed the 
cracked die. She threw the cracked die in blocks of six throws and she referred to one 
block of six outcomes as “a trial”. After each trial, she paused to discuss the outcomes. 
Linda was bothered by the fact that, in successive trials (blocks of six throws) of the 
cracked die, she had 3 successive twos and 3 successive sixes.
Linda: Six occurred three times out of six, which again is quite unusual. I would expect, umm, the
probability of it falling on say a four, or something, on any number, would be one in six. So it’s 
quite unusual that you’ve got three twos in the first trial, and then three sixes in the next one.
(Lines 494-498)
However, on reflection she concluded that the occurrence of these successions was “just 
chance”. She thought that a greater number of trials (than 12) would be needed to get a 
sense of whether this die was biased.
Linda: I think it was just chance that that happened. That there were 3 twos and then 3 sixes. I don’t think 
that’s realistic to what would normally happen when you throw this dice. I think you would need 
to do a... maybe a lot more trials, and then you would get a better idea of whether it’s ... umm. 
Yeah. You would get a better idea of the probability...
(Lines 500-504
This incident also illustrates the difficulty that people experience when they interact with 
events in a situation where there is some reason to question the assumption that the 
outcomes are equiprobable, even though the outcomes might still be fair. The crack in this
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die was enough to sow the seed of doubt, so that when Linda saw an unusual sequence of 
outcomes, she needed to reflect upon whether these outcomes could be evidence that the 
die was not fair. Linda showed some insight in recognising that runs of three identical 
outcomes might occur “by chance”.
13.1.2 Bernice: random is unpredictable
In contrast, some interviewees did choose to use the word ‘random’. For example, Bernice 
(age 15.0) used the word late on in her interview when discussing the behaviour of the 
spherical die. She had observed a sequence of eight outcomes (3, 2, 6, 1, 5, 6, 3, 2) and 
had been using a pattern seeking strategy to think about what might happen next. When 
this strategy failed, she suddenly announced that she thought that this die was ‘random’, 
which surprised me.
Bernice: I reckon it’s random.
I: That’s an interesting word.
Bernice: (Rolls.) It could be anything.
(Lines 398-400)
Bernice’s description of the die as “it could be anything” could suggest that she was 
thinking of the word ‘random’ as meaning ‘unpredictable’. She went on to roll two sixes 
in succession and a two. When I asked again about what might occur next, she simply 
replied “Anything.”
I: Tell me what might happen next.
Bernice: Anything.
I: Anything. Because...?
Bernice: It’s a random dice. (Rolls.)
(Lines 405-408)
Here again she was connecting the word ‘random’ with the idea of unpredictable 
outcomes.
Page 262
Chapter 13: Themes across the interviews 
When she later went on to consider the cracked die, Bernice rolled it six times, getting 4, 3, 
1, 3, 2, and 1. She initially used the word ‘random’ as before to describe the behaviour as 
unpredictable. Soon afterwards, however, after throwing the die a few more times, Bernice 
became aware that she had not observed any sixes from the cracked die, and she 
questioned whether the die had been drilled.
Bernice: Has it been drilled, so it can’t land on a number six?
(Line 442)
I assured her that it had not, to my knowledge, and I asked why she thought it might have 
been. She answered that she suspected that it might never produce a six. Thus, for her, the 
idea of ‘random’, when applied to a die, held within it the sense that every outcome should 
be represented.
After fourteen outcomes Bernice had still not observed a six. Even when, on the fifteenth 
throw, she observed a six, Bernice did not return to the idea that the die was ‘random’. 
Instead she expressed surprise and then tried to find alternative explanations for the lack of 
sixes in the first fourteen throws, attributing it to “how you throw it” (line 466).
Rather than to accept that it is not uncommon to observe a run of fourteen throws in which 
only five of the six possible outcomes occurred, Bernice’s instinct was to look for an 
explanation for what she perceived to be non-random behaviour of the die. However, after 
a few more outcomes, she observed more sixes, and concluded that the die could “go on 
anything” (line 476). This was similar to her earlier statement that the die was ‘random’ 
because it was unpredictable and each possible outcome was represented (lines 398-400).
When I went on to ask Bemice if she thought that the counters task could be described as 
‘random’, she hesitated before agreeing. Although the word ‘random’ could be transferred 
to this different context, she seemed to feel that the transfer was not easy.
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Bemice: No... Because, if it was to... No! Yeah, I think it is, kind of... randomly... choosing a counter.
They could be out of the two... randomly choosing out of two. See what happens.
(Lines 496-497,499)
So, for Bemice, the counters task involved ‘randomly choosing’ one out the two possible 
outcomes. She noted that, if the bag had contained only white counters, then the outcome 
would be determined, and she suggested that the outcome would not then be random. Her 
idea of ‘random’ here seems to require that the outcome is indeterminate.
Bemice: Well, if the whole bag was white, then... you wouldn’t be able to get black.
I: Right. So, it would depend on what was in the bag.
Bemice: Yeah.
(Lines 503-505)
Although she had used the phrase “randomly choosing”, Bemice found this very difficult 
to explain, and after several hesitations she gave up.
I: OK. What does “randomly choosing” mean?
Bemice: (Pause 10 seconds.) .. .Choosing out of something that could be anything... (Pause 4 seconds.) I 
think... (Pause 8 seconds.) Choosing... (Pause 4 seconds.) No, I’m not sure.
(Lines 508-511)
The main view articulated by Bemice in these extracts was that random outcomes are 
unpredictable, but she also expected them to be representative of the possible outcomes. 
These ideas she expressed quite easily with reference to the dice activities. She also saw 
the counters task as producing random outcomes, but she found it much more difficult to 
explain what this meant beyond the idea that outcomes were randomly chosen.
13.1.3 Rory: random is luck
Rory (age 14.5) did not use the word ‘random’ at all, and yet he wanted to express such an 
idea quite early in the interview. He had begun the counters task by drawing a sample of 
10 counters with replacement from each bag. When he was told his aim for the remainder
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of the task, his immediate response was to discount the kind of evidence he would have to 
work from as ‘just luck’.
Rory: I know, but... But that’s just going to be luck isn’t it.
(Line 50)
I was surprised and I asked him to tell me more about this. He indicated that he was 
worried about the process of sampling individual counters with replacement.
Rory: Because, like... well you could be just lucky that you just keep picking out the same white one. Or
the same black one.
(Lines 54-55)
Rory’s use of the word ‘luck’ and ‘lucky’ here is slightly different from the way it has been 
used by some other interviewees. Very often ‘luck’ is used to refer to a situation where the 
outcome is good, as in winning a prize on the lottery, or bad, as in bad luck. In this 
example, Rory appears to be value neutral in his use of the words.
Rory did not appear to have a word for the concept of ‘randomness’. He seems to have 
attributed ‘random’ and unpredictable outcomes to ‘luck’. Indeed, his use of the word luck 
is in some cases a replacement for the missing word ‘random’ that he does not have. In 
this sense, his reference to the idea that you could “just keep picking out the same white” 
counter could be seen as Rory’s natural sense that the randomness of the sampling activity 
lay in the process itself, and not simply in the outcomes. Rory used the word ‘luck’ and its 
derivatives many more times than any other interviewee. Other interviewees sometimes 
used the word ‘chance’ to express ideas related to randomness, but Rory used the word 
‘chance’ only twice. Some interviewees used words probable, probably and probability to 
express uncertainty, but Rory did not use these words at all.
In spite of his lack of vocabulary to discuss the ideas contained in the tasks in this 
interview, I was impressed with Rory’s expression of his thinking. He seemed to have an
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understanding of the concept of randomness that encompassed process with outcomes, and 
he did not seem to have the same difficulty that others had in integrating the local and the 
global views of randomness.
Rory went on to use the word Tuck’ again about the counters task to describe the idea that 
he did not expect a sample from the bag necessarily to match the contents of the bag.
I: Would you expect it to be equal, if the probabilities were the same?
Rory: Mmm, no, not really cos... I mean it’s just luck init?
(Lines 139-141)
In these early uses of the word, Rory seemed to be using word “luck” as a synonym for
“random”. Later however, he spoke more about luck in the usual sense, and of people
j
“being lucky”. I shall return to a discussion of Rory’s ideas about luck in section 13.4.
13.1.4 Mosaab: random is not expected
Another interviewee who had no knowledge of the word ‘random’ was Mosaab (age 
16.11), who was a year older than other students in his year group. He had only been in 
the UK for a few years and he spoke English with a strong African accent. Towards the 
end of my interview with Mosaab, I asked him if he was able to think of any words that 
described the ideas that we had been talking about in the counters task and the dice tasks. 
He suggested “probability” and “chance”, but when I asked him if he had ever heard the 
word ‘random’, he said he had not. However, when I asked him if he could think of 
situations where he might think of things happening by chance, he was able to suggest a 
situation from everyday life very quickly.
I: What other kinds of... situations do you think things happen by chance?
Mosaab: It’s like when you think of something... I don’t know... it’s not expected to happen.
I: OK. Like what? Can you think of something?
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Mosaab: ... like you drive with the car and the stoplights stop you,.. .to get in tim e,.. .or it’s getting busy in 
the road so .. .you’re not expecting to get there.
(Lines 561-564, 566, 568, 570)
In spite of his difficulty in finding a word for the idea of randomness, I suggest that his 
suggestions above indicate that Mosaab had a concept of randomness, in that he had the 
idea that some events occurred unexpectedly. However, possibly because of his 
difficulties with the language, he had experienced serious difficulties in working on the 
interview tasks and explaining his ideas.
13.2 How randomness is expressed
Some interviewees showed clear evidence that their understanding of the word ‘random’ 
was constructed informally from social settings. That is, they had built their understanding 
of the word from interactions with other people, not necessarily in a classroom context. 
Some examples were the restricted uses of the word ‘random’ in stage 1 interviews, 
described in Chapter 8, section 8.2.
In this section I describe Claire’s use of the word “random”, which drew upon colloquial 
usage that has become current among teenagers, as was discussed in the incident of the 
‘random stapler’ in Chapter 6.
13.2.1 Claire: colloquial use of ‘random’
Claire (age 15.0) had discussed the dice activities fluently and confidently. In order to find 
out if she saw any relationship between these tasks and the wider topic of randomness, I 
told Claire that I was particularly interested how people think about randomness, and I 
asked her if she saw a connection between the tasks she had been doing -  drawing counters 
from a bag and rolling dice -  and randomness. She replied that she saw these tasks as 
related to probability, but when I prompted her further about the connection between
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probability and randomness she showed that she was unsure of the meaning of 
randomness.
Claire: Look. What do you mean by randomness? Or ... is that what you want me to tell you? I don’t
really know. ... (Pause 5 seconds.) I think random is quite a strange word. And you can use it for 
lots of different things. I’m not sure what the true meaning would be.
(Lines 334-337)
When I asked her how she would use the word ‘random’, she noted that the word has 
become commonly used in teenage conversation. She suggested that this modem 
colloquial use might be obscuring the true meaning and had little to do with probability.
She tried to describe how the word is used by using the word ‘random’ to describe itself.
Claire: .. .It’s just used for anything. Just randomly become a random word. (Laughs) It’s become used
quite regularly, so I think that kind of obscures its actual meaning. .. .1 probably wouldn’t use it , 
that much in anything to do with probability... Although I suppose they do go together, I wouldn’t 
think of it like that.
(Lines 341-345)
When I asked Claire now to try to describe what she thought the true meaning of the word 
might be, she found this very difficult. She suggested that the word ‘random’ had 
something to do with “a strange event... that hasn’t really got a meaning” or “an event that 
you wouldn’t expect” (lines 352-353).
In view of the difficulty she was experiencing in describing the meaning of the word, I 
suggested that we should avoid it for now. I asked Claire to think again about the process 
of drawing counters out of the bag and to consider what was happening to her thinking. 
However, when she tried to do this, she quickly returned to linking her ideas about the 
counters task to the idea of ‘randomness’. It seemed that she was fascinated by the word 
and wanted to explore it. She spoke of the process of sampling counters from the bag as “a 
random way of testing” (line 374) and, after a short pause, gave an example of what she 
meant by a “strange event”.
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Claire: A lot of people talk about... you’ve heard about ‘random acts of kindness’. And that means, I 
think, that’s using it to mean unconnected to anything... Without really a meaning, just for the 
sake of it.
I: So, for you a random act of kindness might be somebody acting kindly towards somebody else
without any reason for it...
Claire: Yeah. I think, I think they use it to mean... to strangers mostly. Like someone goes into a coffee
shop and pays for the next 20 coffees that any one goes in... that anyone buys. They don’t know 
the people... they’re not really doing it for anything, just to be kind. And I think that’s... that is 
quite random because... it’s not connected to anything. They haven’t got a reason to do it.
(Lines 375-384)
In Claire’s example, the person committing the random acts of kindness needed to be a 
stranger. This seemed to emphasise the lack of rational explanation, the lack of meaning, 
for the person’s actions, as well as the idea that these ‘random’ actions are “not connected 
to anything”, and particularly not connected to the person judging the act as ‘random’.
For Claire the task of drawing counters out the bags may have showed some of the aspects 
of ‘unconnectedness’ lack of meaning or reason, that she described in her example. 
However, she did not explain how she saw her example of randomness in “random acts of 
kindness” as being related to the counters.
Claire’s use of the word “random” in these extracts was unlike anything seen in the stage 1 
interviews, but was clearly based in the colloquial usage common amongst her peers. It 
involved an event “unconnected to anything” and “without meaning” and without reason: it 
carried the contradiction of the rational human being apparently acting irrationally, without 
reason or without meaning, and it clearly matched her earlier idea of a random event as 
“strange”. This was very similar to the modem colloquial usage that I discussed in section 
6.4, where I reported an undergraduate student who had used the word “randoms” to mean 
“random people”, “people that you don't know, that infringe on your day in some way”.
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In the light of Claire’s illustration of her interpretation of the word ‘random’, it is now 
worth returning to reconsider her earlier statement that the process of sampling counters 
with replacement was “a random way of testing”. The following extract sets this in 
context.
I: As you were doing it... what were you thinking about what you saw... some outcomes come up...
and you started to make a list?
Claire: It was affecting... my idea of how many counters were in the bag and proportion of black to
white... But I knew that... that it wasn’t very accurate, because of the way... because only picking 
one out at a time, I could be picking out 2 counters... there could be just 2 counters that I was 
picking out each time... Do you want me to link it to randomness?
I: If you can, yes.
Claire: (Pause 6 seconds.) I don’t know whether I can. (Pause 4 seconds.) I suppose... it’s a ... (pause 4
seconds) random way of testing.
(Lines 362,364, 366-374)
A teacher listening to this exchange, without the benefit of the illustration that followed it, 
might assume that Claire was using the word ‘random’ in a standard sense, to describe the 
sampling as random. However, Claire’s illustration o f ‘random acts of kindness’ suggests 
that what she really meant here was that it was a strange way of testing that had no 
meaning and appeared to be irrational. This mismatch between the way that Claire 
understands the word ‘random’ and the meaning a teacher would intend in classroom 
activities might cause some confusion.
Claire quickly began to take on the mathematical use of the term ‘random’ in a way that 
was new for her. Towards the end of the interview, in her discussion of the relationship 
between luck and randomness in the context of tossing a coin, she said, “It’s just random 
whether it’s Heads or Tails” (line 480). I suggested that she was now using the word 
‘random’ more often and I asked whether she was using it in the sense that she had done 
earlier or in a different sense. Her reply was clear.
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C: I think I’m trying to use it in what its true meaning probably is, rather than the everyday usage.
(Lines 498-499)
Claire’s emphasis on colloquial use the word random was unusual, but it was remarkable 
how rapidly she appeared to take on and seek to use the mathematical sense of the word 
within the 40 minutes of the interview.
13.2.2 Degrees of randomness
The expression of degrees of randomness involves an understanding beyond seeing 
randomness as only equivalent to fairness. It also seems to require a facility with 
language relating to probability and randomness. In the stage one interviews, the two 
interviewees who expressed this idea most clearly were Ben (age 15.7) and David (age 
14.1) (see 8.2 2), both of whom also showed that they were able to think of randomness as 
a model for incomplete knowledge in various real world contexts (see 8.1.3).
In the stage two interviews, Claire expressed a sense of degrees of randomness when she 
tried to explain the relationship between randomness and probability. In view of the fact 
that she had previously used the word ‘random’ only in a colloquial sense, this was a 
difficult task for her. She was able explain probability as “the likeliness of an event” (line 
389) and she recognised that, given a bag containing 7 black counters and 3 white ones, 
she was most likely to draw a black.
Claire: ... You could get either, quite easily. But there’s more chance of getting a black, because there’s
more counters.
(Lines 398-399)
When I then asked her if the word random had connection with the idea of probability her 
reply contained the unusual phrase “almost random chance”.
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Claire: It’s almost random chance whether you’ll get a black or a white... because... it could, it could be
either... so the fact that you’ve got a black is random, or... (Pause 5 seconds.) And the same for 
the dice, it could be any number, so it’s just... getting a six is random.
(Lines 404-407)
This has echoes of the idea o f ‘degrees of randomness’ where the situation is ‘more 
random’ when the chances are more equal. The situation I had described for her had 30% 
white and 70% black and so she described the chance as ‘almost random’. Here she seems 
to be using the word ‘random’ to mean that the chances of all the possible outcomes are 
equal, and again a little later when she commented on the chance of getting a six from 
rolling a fair die. But her usage of the word shifted when she described the fact of getting 
a black on the first outcome as ‘random’. When applied to the observed outcome she 
seems to intend ‘random’ to suggest that the outcome was ‘unconnected to anything else’, 
or in simpler and more direct terms than those used by Claire, it was unpredictable. 
Although Claire did not ever use the word ‘unpredictable’ as a synonym for ‘random’, her 
use of the word ‘random’ here seems to suggest that she may have been thinking in those 
terms.
In the stage 1 interviews, Abby came to the interesting conclusion that “randomness is 
personal”! She had been discussing the idea that the outcome of rolling a die was 
unpredictable, but that if she knew enough about the way it was rolled, how much it 
weighed, and enough about the physics, then it could become predictable. She went on to 
consider whether this would still be random.
Abby: (It) depends on what randomness means. Because if it does mean something that is unpredictable,
then... that depends what you mean by unpredictable, because I can’t predict the weather, but the 
Met office can, to a point. ... So that all depends on what is predictable and what is random. I see 
random as something that’s unpredictable, b u t... I’ve all of a sudden got a bit stumped as to what 
predictable and unpredictable mean.
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Abby: Perhaps random is a personal thing.
(Lines 307-309, 311-314)
She seemed to be creating for herself a new way of understanding ‘randomness’ as she 
spoke. The degree of randomness was related to the knowledge of the person making the 
judgement. She returned to this idea again later in the interview and gave further 
examples. It seems to me that this was an example of how the idea of degrees of 
randomness could be extended to form the more complex idea that randomness can be a 
model that depends on the knowledge of the individual.
13.3 How randomness is recognised
In this section I consider two different aspects of recognising randomness. The first is 
more obvious and straightforward and examines the strategies that interviewees used to 
decide whether the generators they worked with were behaving randomly, in a manner 
expected. The second aspect of the recognition of randomness considers the different and 
shifting perspectives adopted by interviewees to consider what they observed, and the 
ways in which attention appeared to shift, sometimes rapidly and frequently, between these 
alternative perspectives.
The strategies for recognising randomness, which are discussed below in 13.3.1, were 
usually exercised within the local perspective and tended to focus on the outcomes rather 
than the process. However, there is a sense in which the strategy of seeking 
representativeness in a sample of outcomes, which was discussed in Chapter 8, may 
provide a bridge between the local and global perspectives through awareness of the 
importance of sample size. I discuss this idea below in 13.3.1.2.
In circumstances where sequences of outcomes were clearly not representative of the 
underlying process expected by the interviewee, as when working with the biased die, the 
interviewee’s attention often switched to consider the symmetry of the generating process.
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Thus, the outcome of the search for representativeness sometimes led to a switch from 
attending to outcomes to the generating process. Some examples are considered in 13.3.2.
13.3.1 Strategies to recognise randomness
A wide variety of strategies has been observed during the interviews in this study. In 
Chapter 8 ,1 described pattern seeking and pattern breaking as a particularly significant set 
of strategies and I consider that again here. I also considered two other strategies in 
Chapter 8: representativeness and physical characteristics. I suggest that 
representativeness can be seen as related to pattern seeking. While the search for pattern in 
a sequence of outcomes from a random process is bound to fail in the long run, and the 
strategy of pattern seeking is overtaken by the expectation of pattern breaking, the search 
for representativeness is a strategy that is open to modification to make it more successful. 
While a short sequence of outcomes might not be representative of the underlying features 
of the random process that generated the outcomes, the degree of representativeness 
increases as the sequence of outcomes considered becomes longer. It is this feature of 
representativeness that has led me to consider sample size as the second significant 
strategy in this chapter. Awareness of the sample size required to make appropriate 
inferences about probabilities is difficult to acquire. Part of the reason behind the tendency 
observed in Chapter 8 for interviewees to expect representativeness even in short 
sequences was a lack of awareness of the importance of sample size.
13.3.1.1 Pattern seeking, Pattern spotting
When interviewees were working on the dice activities and the coin generation and tossing 
activities, they tended to focus on looking for non-randomness in the outcomes. In these 
circumstances one of the most widespread strategies was that of pattern seeking. Rather 
than focussing on finding evidence for randomness, the search for pattern is focused on 
instances of possibly non-random behaviour. When a pattern is spotted, if it does not
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break quickly, then it is deemed to be evidence that the outcomes are predictable. An 
example from the first stage interviews was presented in Chapter 8, section 8.3.2.
In the counters task, this strategy was rarely seen. However, it may have been behind 
Bernice’s attempt to reinterpret the task as matching the successive outcomes from Bags 1 
and 2, discussed in section 12.2. Focussing on the successive outcomes from each bag, she 
spotted a sequence of three outcomes in which the outcome from Bag A matched exactly 
the outcome from Bag B, and she began to look for this pattern to continue.
The strategy of pattern seeking was much more commonly observed in the dice and coin 
tasks, being encouraged by the nature of these tasks: interviewees were encouraged to 
speculate about the future outcomes.
Related to the pattern-seeking strategy was the strategy of monitoring the lengths of runs of 
the same outcome. In the dice activities, this was seen mainly when people were working 
with the biased die, as it was mainly here that they observed runs on longer than three 
outcomes. Indeed, spotting such runs was one of the features that seemed to alert some 
interviewees to the possibility that there might be something wrong with the die. Guhan 
(age 13.3) observed a run of four successive ones when he was rolling the cracked die: he 
laughed nervously as he rolled the third, and held his breath as he rolled the die for a 
possible fifth successive one.
However, run length seemed to be a much more significant feature when interviewees 
worked on the coin activities. For example, when Hannah (age 14.8) was working on the 
coin tossing activity, she observed THHHHTTTTH in the first ten outcomes and noticed 
the runs of four heads and four tails. She commented that this was quite different from 
what she had generated earlier from the imaginary coin.
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Hannah: Yeah. There seems to be more Heads and Tails clumped together than like spread out. Cos on 
mine I put Tails Heads Tails Tails Heads.
(Lines 824, 826)
She went on to suggest that such runs were another example of the ‘unpredictability’ of 
outcomes from a random process, saying, “You just can’t tell”. When I asked her if she 
had been surprised by the occurrence of four heads in succession, Hannah acknowledged 
that she had been and said that she had been avoiding such runs when performing the coin 
generation task.
Hannah: ... I didn’t think you’d get them all together like that.
(Lines 834-835)
A long run of the same outcome is a particularly simple pattern to spot. In an activity like 
the coin tossing activity, in which a person needs to observe the successive outcomes 
closely, a run of consecutive Heads or Tails might challenge the individual’s expectation 
that a run of more than three is unlikely to occur in twenty throws of a fair coin.
I was surprised to find that run length did not emerge as a concern of interviewees during 
the counters task, as this was also a situation in which there were only two possible 
outcomes and I had expected the interviewees to try modelling these outcomes as equally 
likely at some points during the activity. However, the nature of the task focused 
interviewees’ attention on the task of estimating the proportions of white and black 
counters in the bag, and they very rarely paid any attention to the sequence of outcomes 
that they observed. I found no comments in any interview on any run of black or white 
outcomes in the counters task.
13.3.1.2 Sample size
Many interviewees showed a tendency to draw conclusions or make generalisations on the 
basis of very few observations. Inevitably such generalisations were very unstable as
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successive observations would often suggest something different. The work of Linda, 
which was described in section 12.1, was a good example of this. Another example was 
Andrew, also working on the counters task.
When I outlined the counters task to Andrew, he quickly understood the problem, and 
decided that he wanted to collect more data before he decided what counters to add to his 
bag. In the first ten draws he had seen 3 black counters from my bag and 4 black counters 
from his own. I was surprised when he asked to sample only five more outcomes and only 
from my bag. He explained that he was not yet sure which bag contained the greater 
proportion of Black counters since the number of blacks observed from each bag differed 
only by one.
The number of further outcomes that he proposed to examine was really too small to be 
sure of providing much more clarity. Also, I could not understand at this point why 
Andrew chose only to look at outcomes from the one bag. In the event, Andrew observed 
a succession of 4 black counters followed by only a single white. After a pause he decided 
that he therefore needed to collect a further 5 outcomes from his own bag. Andrew drew 
WBBWW and recognised that, for each bag, he could combine the results from the second 
five with first sample of ten.
Andrew: But then I can add these to my previous results, and find out how many whites I’ve got from both. 
(Lines 98-99)
He found nine whites and six blacks from his bag, and eight whites and seven blacks from 
mine. Thus the difference of only one that he had observed in the first sample of 10 was 
now reversed to a difference of one in the other direction. Andrew was therefore still 
uncertain how to respond and spent some time considering what to do next. The small 
samples had produced unstable estimates of the proportion of black counters in each bag;
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this combined with Andrew’s concern that he should ‘get it right’ to produce his 
indecision.
After clarifying the rules he decided to collect more data, but again he elected to take only 
5 outcomes, although this time he sampled from both bags at the same time. He observed 
BWBWW from my bag and BBWBB from his own and he combined the new data with 
what he had already to give a total of ten black observed from his bag and only nine black 
from mine. Yet again the difference in the number of blacks observed from each bag had 
reversed.
After a pause, Andrew decided to add some counters although he now had little more 
evidence than he had had to start with. His decision to add two black counters to his own 
bag, which had produced more black observations, appeared irrational. I do not know why , 
he decided to do this. When asked what he was going to do next, he first explained his 
goal in his own words to check that he had understood correctly.
Andrew: ... I’ve got to make it so that they’re both an equal chance of getting a black?
I: As equal as you can get it. Yes.
Andrew: OK.
(Lines 153-156)
Satisfied that he had understood correctly, Andrew elected to draw a further block of 5 
outcomes from each bag. This time, he observed two black and three white counters from 
his bag and the same from mine. He commented that, while the observed proportions were 
equal now, he would need to repeat the experiment to be sure.
Andrew: That’s the final one and I got 2 blacks and 3 whites, and you got 3 whites and 2 blacks. So I’ll do 
that... I’ll repeat that again, because they’re equal now, but I need to repeat it to make sure.
(Lines 163-165)
In spite of his reliance on very small samples for evidence, Andrew was aware that he 
really needed to see more evidence to judge that the probabilities of drawing black were
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approximately equal in each bag. However, again he chose to draw only five more 
outcomes from each bag. This time he observed 2 white and 3 black from each bag.
Again the numbers were equal from each block, although not the same result as previously. 
Andrew seemed to be satisfied that these results indicated that he had made the proportion 
of black counters the same in each bag.
Andrew: ... They’re closer than they were before now, because out of the two results we’ve got... an equal 
chance from both bags of getting black and an equal chance from both bags of getting white... and 
that’s because, from the two, after adding... two, we’ve got 5 blacks from each bag, and... five 
whites... from each bag, so it’s fifty-fifty from this set of results.
(Lines 172-174, 176-178)
There is a suggestion in his use of the phrase “from this set of results” that Andrew has 
recognised that the results observed from samples such as these are inherently variable. 
However, he did not appear to be aware that this high variability in the proportion of black 
counters observed in samples of only five or ten outcomes could mean that his observation 
of equal proportions from each bag was unreliable. It is possible that the fact that his latest 
samples, when taken together, also indicated that the proportion of black counters was 
equal to the proportion of white counters in each bag, was a further encouragement to 
Andrew to rely on the results he had seen.
Andrew’s reliance on small samples was typical of many interviewees. However, he also 
recognised that, when the contents of the bag remained unchanged, he could combine the 
results of successive samples to give larger samples. He seemed to recognise that larger 
samples were more reliable, but he did not have a sense of how much the reliability would 
increase with a given increase in sample size.
Few interviewees were able to suggest sample sizes that would give reliable conclusions in 
the tasks. However, there were some exceptions. In the second stage, Linda showed 
evidence of having learned from the experience of drawing counters and trying to make
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estimates. She stated at the end of her work on the counters task that she wanted to look at 
a sample of “perhaps two hundred” in order to make a good estimate of the probability of 
drawing a white. I did not see such a change in any other interviews. In stage one, Joe 
(age 13.5), one of the youngest interviewees, showed greater awareness of the relationship 
between variability and sample size than most interviewees had done. The extract 
discussed here was also discussed at the end of Chapter 8, section 8.4.3, as an example of 
working in the global perspective. Towards the end of his work on the cracked die, Joe 
had become convinced that the die might be biased by the crack, but he was aware that, 
although he had not seen any occurrence of a 1 or a 6, the evidence he had collected from 
about fifteen rolls was not conclusive.
Joe: ... the crack seemed to affect it in a way. .. .We haven’t actually got a single one or six. And that
might be because of the cracks, or it might not...
(Line 115-117)
When I asked him how one would be able to tell if the outcomes from rolling this die were 
affected by the crack he confidently suggested that you would need to roll the die many 
times and record the outcomes.
Joe: Well you could roll it a number of times and record your results and see... whether it seemed to
favour one side... But then that could be just luck or chance. So there’s no definite way of 
finding out, really. But you could, if you rolled it a number of times... say a hundred times, and 
you didn’t get a single six or a single one, then... it would probably be in your mind that six and 
one were... less, they had less chance of being rolled.
(Lines 119-120, 122-126)
The level of caution expressed in Joe’s conclusion was unusual: after observing no ones or 
sixes in one hundred rolls of the die, you still could not be certain that the die was biased, 
although you might have in mind that one and six “had less chance of being rolled”. A 
sample of one hundred rolls of a die was larger than had been suggested in other
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interviews. Joe was aware that sample size was important, but he could not judge the 
reliability of his conclusions.
Another interviewee who showed awareness of the value of basing conclusions on larger 
samples was Abby, whose work on the dice activities was discussed in Chapter 9. Abby 
had commented that one way of determining whether the cracked die was biased would be 
to roll it “hundreds and millions of times” (line 126).
It is interesting that these few examples of people who recognised the need for larger 
samples are also people who adopted a global frequentist perspective on randomness, 
looking for evidence from a frequency distribution. I suggest that this connection between 
awareness of sample size and the ability to work comfortably within the global perspective 
on randomness indicates that experiments to explore the variability of estimates based on 
different samples size may play an important role in the development of a secure 
integration of the local and the global perspectives.
13.3.2 Shifting perspectives
My thinking about the different perspectives that I saw interviewees adopting and shifting 
between during these interviews has evolved significantly during the analysis of stage 2. 
When I first became aware of interviewees’ changes of attention, during my analysis of 
stage 1,1 noticed movement between what I then saw as local and global perspectives. 
However, I was strongly aware in most interviews that the global perspective took two 
distinct forms. In Chapter 9 ,1 have described what I saw as two forms of the global 
distributional perspective: the prior and the frequentist.
In this sub-section, I describe how my thinking about these three perspectives has evolved. 
I also discuss briefly a second kind of shift -  between outcomes and process -  which I 
introduced in Chapter 12. Alongside these discussions, I present data indicating how often
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these different perspectives and shifts were identified in each interview and within each 
task.
13.3.2.1 Local, Global (prior and frequentist)
A person is working within their prior perspective when their attention is on what they 
believed about the distribution of outcomes before they saw any outcomes. When 
interviewees were first give a die in a dice activity, most believed initially that the die 
would be fair. However, in the case of the biased die, the observed outcomes challenged 
this prior belief. Some interviewees continued to hold onto their prior belief until they had 
seen and recorded a significant number of outcomes. An example was David, described in 
section 9.2. These interviewees became aware of the emerging long-run distribution of 
observed outcomes alongside their prior belief. In these few cases, the interviewee was 
clearly working with two distinctly different global perspectives -  their prior belief, and 
the emerging frequency distribution. Each of these perspectives -  the prior and the 
frequentist - was clearly global, in that they each carried meanings about the long run 
behaviour of the process. In particular, in the language of the first of the global meanings 
of randomness identified by Pratt, the proportion of outcomes for each possibility in the 
long run is to some extent predictable (Pratt, 1998, pl42). Thus a mismatch between the 
proportions seen in these two global perspectives created a conflict within the individual 
that needed to be resolved.
The distinction between global prior and global frequentist perspectives is not always 
either necessary or helpful. For many interviewees working with the spherical die, their 
prior belief was that this would be a fair die, and they observed an emerging frequency 
distribution that supported them in this belief. The only means by which I could infer what 
perspective the interviewee had adopted to think about the situation at any particular 
moment was to listen closely to what they said and to watch their behaviour. Because
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there was no clear difference between what the interviewee perceived from their prior 
belief and from the frequency distribution, it was sometimes impossible to discern from the 
data which global perspective the interviewee was working in at any moment. In such 
cases the distinction was unnecessary.
The counters task in stage 2 did not require the interviewee to articulate any prior belief 
about the probability distribution of black and white counters before sampling any 
counters. Thus the prior variant of the global perspective was never expressed, and it was 
as though it did not exist for the interviewee working on this task. However, each 
interviewee needed to work within a global frequentist perspective in order to make 
inferences about the proportions of black counters in each bag and so decide how to adjust 
the contents of their own bag. This task encouraged the interviewee to express their beliefs 
about when a global frequentist perspective would become available to them; this was why 
the discussions about sample size that were reviewed in 13.3.1.2 came to the fore.
13.3.2.2 Outcomes and Process
In all the tasks, interviewees’ attention was usually on the outcomes generated. However, I 
described in Chapter 12, several interviewees who became concerned while working on the 
counters task that the procedure of sampling with replacement was in some way unfair, or 
uninformative. I interpreted the shift of attention from the observed outcomes to the 
manner in which counters were selected as a shift from outcomes to process. A similar 
shift of attention can be seen in the dice activities when a person attempts to account for 
the observed outcomes in terms of the physical features of the die. This is very clear in 
work with the biased die, where the conclusion that the die has a weight in one face 
provides a clear account for the process that generated the observed outcomes. However, it 
can also be seen in the work with the spherical die, where the presence of the tiny moving
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bead inside the sphere provided for some interviewees a reason to consider the generating 
process to be fair, while for others it was a reason why the process might be biased.
For example, Hannah (age 14.8) experienced a long period of uncertainty before
concluding that the biased die was really biased. When she worked with the spherical die,
she quickly suggested that it seemed “OK”, contrasting the way in which the biased die
(the square one) had not rolled with the way this one did.
«
Hannah: I think with this one you’ve got a... a pretty good chance, because with the square you couldn’t
exactly roll it because it was square, but this one it can just keep rolling. Or it... could keep rolling 
if it hadn’t got weight in it, but... Idunno. I think... I like this dice.
(Lines 571-574)
While it is likely that her judgement had been influenced by the outcomes that she had 
observed, which were much more variable than those from the biased die, she did not refer 
to these observations in her explanation. Rather she constructed an explanation in terms of 
the physical rolling of the die. She seems to have been reassured by the fact that this die 
would not stop easily at any particular outcome, unlike the biased die, which bounced and 
stopped quite quickly on each throw. For Hannah, the roundness of the spherical die 
suggested that it was fair, as she confirmed a little later.
Hannah: ... I think this one is chance, actually.
(Line 581)
Similarly, a shift of attention from outcomes to process can be discerned in some work 
with the cracked die, where the asymmetry of the crack is sometimes used to account for a 
perceived asymmetry in the emerging frequency distribution. In this case, there seems to 
be a suggestion that the shift of attention from outcomes to process can be triggered by a 
perceived mismatch between the two global perspectives: prior and frequentist.
When he was working on the cracked die, Mosaab (age 16.11) rolled the die seven times 
quickly, without comment, getting 6, 6, 4, 6, 3, 4 and 6. Then he sighed deeply and
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commented, “I would say that it’s not fair.” He justified this remark, not by reference to 
the outcomes he had just obtained, but talking about the physical attributes of the die.
Mosaab: Because here is quite wider, and makes the bottom heavier. Like... want to break and it will stick 
(rolls) there. Like you see, here.
(Lines 527,529)
Mosaab appears to have thought the seven observed outcomes were unrepresentative of a 
fair die, and he has treated them as indicative of a frequency distribution biased in favour 
of sixes. He has sought to justify the observed outcomes in terms of the asymmetry of the 
crack -  an asymmetry of the generating process.
In many cases the shift from outcomes to process is associated with a desire to account for 
the outcomes. This is closely related to the question addressed in section 13.4: “Is 
randomness caused?” An interviewee who is able to account for the observed outcomes in 
terms of luck as an external force or agency might be unlikely to examine closely the 
generating process to account for asymmetries in the observed frequencies.
13.3.2.3 Occurrences of shifting perspectives
In this sub-section I summarise the occurrences of the two kinds of shifting perspectives 
described above. It is difficult to count the number of instances of a shift shown by an 
interviewee within an activity, since the beginning and end of any particular shift are not 
clearly defined. However, it is possible to examine each task separately, and consider 
whether an interviewee demonstrated a particular shift of perspective at some time while 
working on that task.
In Table 13.1,1 have indicated the tasks during which each interviewee showed evidence 
of a particular shift. A shaded cell indicates that an interviewee did not undertake a task. 
Evidence of the process/outcome shift is indicated by a “P”, and the local/global shift by 
“G”. A blank cell indicates that no shift was demonstrated.
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The table gives an indication of the prevalence of the two shifts identified in this study. 
While the process/outcome shift has been observed slightly more frequently than the 
global/local shift, the difference is not great. It is remarkable how often the two shifts were 
both seen in the same task-interview combination.
Instances of shifting from a focus on outcomes to a consideration of the process were 
sometimes brief, and shown only in a passing remark, such as “Perhaps it was just the way 
I rolled it” (Linda, line 380). Typically, an occurrence of the process/outcome shift in a 
task produced fewer remarks than a local/global shift did.
A few interviewees showed some shifts during their discussion in the review task, but 
these were unusual.
Name Stage Counters
task
Biased
die
Spherical
die
Cracked
die
Coin
generation
Coin
tossing
Review
Lara 1 G
David 1 GP GP G GP
Alex 1 P GP P P
Ben 1 P GP GP GP
Dom 1 GP P P
Nick 1 G GP P
Joe 1 P P GP P GP
Abby 1 GP GP GP GP GP GP
Belle 1 P P GP G G P
Linda 2 GP GP GP GP P
Bernice 2 GP P GP P
Claire 2 GP P GP GP
Hannah 2 GP GP GP P P
Rory 2 GP P GP P P
Mosaab 2 G G P P
Andrew 2 GP P GP G
Guhan 2 GP P G
Assim 2 GP
Table 13.1: Shifting perspectives, by task and by interviewee
Every interviewee except Lara showed some evidence of each shift. However, Lara’s 
interview was the first one, and the tasks were still being refined. Lara did not really relax 
during her interview, and I was aware that my conversation with Lara had not worked as 
well as later interviews.
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There were some interviewees who demonstrated the local/global shift only once. Alex 
was reluctant to consider a frequency distribution, as noted in Chapter 9, and her only 
reference to a global distribution was brief and based on a very small sample. Similarly, 
Dom showed only a fleeting reference to the global perspective when he was discussing 
the results from the biased die.
13.4 Randomness and causal factors
A few interviewees demonstrated a belief in luck as an agency influencing the outcomes 
from an otherwise random process. Others showed a rather different view of causes lying 
behind the supposedly random outcomes, and viewed a random process as one which could 
be thought of as very complicated, with many factors affecting the outcomes. In this 
section, I describe some evidence about causality from the stage 2 interviews. The ideas 
relating to ‘luck’ are discussed in 13.4.1, and the contrasting views relating to many factors 
are considered in 13.4.2.
13.4.1 Luck and randomness
There were more incidences of the use of the word “luck” in the stage 2 interviews than 
there had been in stage 1. The only interviewee in stage 1 to discuss at length her ideas 
about luck was Alex, whose ideas were reported in Chapter 8, section 8.1.2. In the stage 2 
interviews, four interviewees discussed luck: Hannah, Rory, Claire and Andrew. While the 
first two were believers in luck, the second two took essentially rational positions, either 
that while some people perceive themselves to be lucky or are perceived to be so by others, 
they are no different from everybody else, or that luck does not exist in any objective 
sense.
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13.4.1.1 Hannah
When Hannah (age 14.8) was working with the biased die, she continued to believe that 
the die was a fair die for a long time. She struggled to account for the long run of sixes 
that she observed and expressed confusion and frustration. After sixteen outcomes she had 
seen ten sixes, four fives and two ones. As she struggled to find some explanation, she 
drew an interesting parallel with the counters task, suggesting that she considered that both 
the counters task and rolling the die should produce unpredictable outcomes.
Hannah: You can’t te ll... It’s like... with the bag and the... white and black things, you know, you
couldn’t tell which you were going to get. ... it’s like you’re just taking a chance really isn’t it? 
(Lines 389-391, 393)
Hannah went on to restate that this die was not behaving in the way that she would expect 
a die to behave, and she said that she could not understand why “there’s so many different 
numbers on there and all I’m getting is a five and a six” (lines 396-397). This showed a 
shift of perspective between her prior belief that the die should have six equally likely 
outcomes, and the contrary empirical idea suggested by the unfolding frequency table in 
which nearly every outcome is either a five or a six.
She struggled to account for what she saw, and eventually suggested that she was just 
“being lucky”.
Hannah: ... I’m being lucky.
I: You’re being lucky?
Hannah: Yeah. {Laughs.) I don’t know. It’s weird.
I: Have you ever been lucky before?
Hannah: No, actually. When I want to get a six, I don’t get sixes, and now I’m getting sixes all the time. I 
think it’s this dice. I think I should take this dice home with me.
(Lines 435-441)
Page 288
Chapter 13: Themes across the interviews 
There is a suggestion in her remark, “I should take this dice home”, that she had begun to 
suspect that the die was to blame, but she tried to explain it to herself as a lucky die. She 
rolled a few more times, observing 6 6 6 6 2 6, and then cried out in anguish!
Hannah: I give up! I’m not going to get another number. I’m not though. It’s just going to keep coming up 
sixes. So, I’m not going to get another number.
(Lines 455,457-458)
I was not sure whether this remark indicated that she thought the die was biased so I asked 
her again if she thought she was lucky. She reiterated that she must be lucky, and restated 
an earlier argument that the outcome of rolling the die was “just chance”.
Hannah: Yeah, I must be lucky. It’s just a chance isn’t it? You don’t know when you roll a dice which 
number is going to come up. There’s just a big chance I’m going to keep getting sixes.
(Lines 462-464)
However, there was an ambiguity here: her statement “there’s just a big chance I’m going 
to keep getting sixes” sounded remarkably like the idea that the die was biased. To explore 
this distinction further, I asked her if she thought this kind of thing might happen if she 
were using this die at home or with her friends to play a board game.
Hannah: I don’t know. You can’t tell can you? It probably wouldn’t, knowing my luck. But... {laughs).
No. You can’t tell really, cos, you know... it’s just a dice. It’s like... six other... like sides on 
there. So, I don’t know. I don’t think so though. I don’t think it could happen.
(Lines 467-470)
Her answer made the kind of distinction that I had hoped for. If she had believed that this 
die was biased, she would have had no problem in thinking that these outcomes would be 
replicated in a different setting. Hannah did not consider this possibility, but used again 
her argument about the chances of the sides, implying again that the six had “a big 
chance”. I interpreted her conclusion, that she did not think these outcomes would be 
replicated in her home setting, to imply that she still considered that the outcomes were just 
a consequence of her being ‘lucky’.
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Hannah continued trying to hold on to the idea that the die was not biased, that it was as it 
appeared, a fair cubical die. In trying to reconcile this view with the data that she had 
collected from rolling the die, she appeared to use two approaches. The first was to 
consider that she was being lucky: a luck that might run out at some time. The second was 
to consider that the die was just showing a chance run of sixes that would stop at some 
time. These two views were not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, it seemed to 
me that the “I’m just lucky” viewpoint was stronger for her, together with the sense that 
the ‘luck’ would eventually ‘run out’.
Hannah continued in this vein until she had seen 36 outcomes, at which point she finally 
began to suspect that the die might be weighted, and eventually asked me outright if it was. 
After admitting that the die was weighted, I talked to Hannah about the experience that she 
had just had. She said she had suspected earlier that the die might be weighted, but she had 
strongly wanted it to be lucky.
During the review task, Hannah had shown signs of switching between using the words 
“chance” and “luck”, so I wanted to explore whether Hannah saw a distinction between 
these two ideas. When she told me that she was accident-prone, and was always hurting 
herself, I asked if she ever thought of such accidents as luck or chance. She was reluctant 
to call it “luck” since she saw luck as involving good fortune -  “it’s not very lucky when 
you hurt yourself’. However, she was comfortable with using the term “bad luck” to 
describe her sporting accidents. When I asked if she thought that these sporting accidents 
could be described as ‘chance’, she spoke of them in a different way, focusing on the 
chance outcome of a tackle, and considering which player would come off worst and 
potentially be hurt.
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I: So is it chance?
Hannah: Well. It’s because I play a lot of football. And it’s like a chance I could go in for a bad tackle and 
hurt myself. You can never know. It’s a fifty-fifty... who’s going to come out worst.
(Lines 885-887, 889)
It seems clear from Hannah’s replies that she saw luck as having a positive outcome, and 
that the ‘lucky die’ that kept producing sixes was the epitome of this. She interpreted the 
word “chance” as more like a probability or one of a set of possibilities.
13.4.1.2 Rory
In the review task Rory (age 14.5) was keen to emphasise that all the tasks involved ‘luck’, 
so I asked what he meant by luck. His reply suggested a perception that outcomes which 
occurred in his favour would be called luck
Rory: Just, when... you’re not actually thinking about it, you’re just having a guess, and then... it just
seems to happen to go your way.
(Lines 579-579)
Earlier in the interview, Rory’s use of the word ‘luck’ had appeared to be value-neutral. 
Here he was thinking of luck as when things “happen to go your way”, a much more 
clearly positive view of ‘good luck’. Rory stated clearly that he believed some people are 
lucky, so I asked how he would recognise someone who was lucky. His reply suggested 
that a lucky person can only be recognised by the fact that something good has happened to 
them, such as they have “won the lottery”. Rory was unwilling to describe the person as 
lucky before the good fortune has occurred to them. As he said: “You wouldn’t know” 
(line 593).
I asked Rory to identify what determines whether or not a person is going to be lucky. He 
found this difficult and his answer was not coherent. Luck could be “the same as the dice”, 
which I took to mean ‘unpredictable’. He had trouble identifying games that involved 
luck, stating that there was “no game that’s just luck”, but after some hesitation he
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mentioned Monopoly, which he thought was “a bit luck... you have the dice that’s lucky 
but nothing else. You have to just... think” (lines 615, 617-618). He was able to identify 
that the luck came into Monopoly through the dice, but noted that the game also depended 
on thought.
When I asked Rory to think of other things that involved luck, he constructed two intricate 
scenarios. The first was about a fight in which there was “a lucky escape”, and the second 
about a building disaster from which there was “a lucky escape”. These seemed to draw 
inspiration from electronic games of some kind.
I: ... does luck only relate to things that involve dice and tossing coins and pulling things out of bags?
Are there any other things that are lucky?
Rory: Yeah. Like ... something was going to happen like people were having a fight, and... there was
just this little gap and they said you would have to stay in the middle. Just this tiny little gap. And 
that’s luck that you got through without damage cos that little gap there. Or a building was going 
to... something was going to happen to a building. And... there was just a little hole for you to get 
through, and that’s lucky.
(Lines 619-625)
These scenarios seemed quite different from dice or coins, but I wanted to be sure that 
Rory did not imagine some connection. I asked him if the lucky escape felt a bit like 
rolling a die: roll a die and get a six, and you have a lucky escape. Rory was sure this was 
quite different because these scenarios involved being scared.
Rory: No, because... you’re so scared you’re just trying to look for anything. .. .It’s just luck that you
actually saw the hole. .. .But it won’t happen in different things. Like... when you’re scared, it’s 
like... it won’t happen. If you’re scared... when you’re just trying to look for somewhere... some 
way out. And a different scared is like when you’re just... hoping that they go away, and if they 
just fell over then that’s luck, and if you run away then that’s luck as well. If you got away that 
counts.
(Lines 634, 636, 638-642)
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These two scenarios, and the idea of being scared, seemed to refer to events that were 
perceived as just beyond his control; when the outcome went his way, then that was luck.
In this sense, the idea of luck that Rory was using was a little like the local meaning of 
randomness identified as “unsteerability” by Pratt (1998).
I asked Rory if he would consider himself unlucky if he had an accident. His answer did 
not engage in a discussion of whether the event of the car crash itself would be considered 
lucky or not. Rather he was concerned with the outcome of the accident for a particular 
individual: escaping the worst effects, or suffering serious injury.
I: Are you unlucky if you have an accident?
Rory: {Pause 5 seconds.) Luck. Cos luck is hard to get, so unlucky must just be normal then. If you hurt
yourself... if you... if you’re in a crash, in a car crash, and everyone else went through the 
windscreen and you were still sitting there, then that’s lucky. .. .But if you were the person who 
went through the windscreen and they were still sitting there, then you would say you were 
unlucky... like the person in hospital is unlucky...
(Lines 645-648, 650-651)
For Rory, being lucky in a car crash was to benefit from a good fortune that goes beyond 
the normal, to escape from something bad. Then to be unlucky was to be the opposite, in 
the sense of being left behind with the bad consequences. The person who goes through 
the windscreen is unlucky, and the person in hospital is unlucky. In this sense, to be 
unlucky is the norm: if you are in an accident, then the norm is to be injured. Rory’s 
statement that “luck is hard to get” was striking, with its image of fighting against the odds 
to benefit from a bit of good fortune.
As he talked about this, Rory suddenly switched to thinking about football. He considered 
the football manager who says, “We were unlucky not to score”.
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Roiy: ... I don’t see why ... football managers say you’re unlucky. If they did score, they wouldn’t say
“you’re lucky”, they’d say “that’s good”, and it is.
(Lines 652-654)
Because Rory was trying to see unlucky as the opposite of lucky, he suggested that to fail 
to score would only be lucky if to score would be considered lucky. When I asked Rory if 
he thought that there was luck in football, I expected him to say that there was. I was 
surprised when he said that it wasn’t luck, but just a “lot of hard work” (line 658). When I 
pressed him further on this, he admitted that here might be luck, in that luck can occur 
* anywhere. However, the qualifications that he put in to what he said strongly emphasised 
the idea that luck is unpredictable and “it sometimes never happens” (line 661).
As we ended the interview, Rory said several times, “it’s strange,” and then commented.
He was still considering what was lucky and what was unlucky. Indeed, the way he 
expressed himself suggested to me that, during the interview, he felt that he had come to a 
different and more critical understanding of Tuck’ and what might be meant by saying 
someone or something is ‘lucky’ or ‘unlucky’.
Rory: I was just thinking about luck. And if my friend says, “oh you’re lucky”, I would think it was just
normal that I’d actually experienced different things about luck, so... If someone says, “you’re 
lucky” now I would just think, “why am I lucky?” Why is that “unlucky”?
(Lines 672-675)
During the interview, our discussion had moved from an awareness of randomness in the 
activities, without using the words ‘random’ or ‘chance’, towards a discussion of the idea 
of luck. In some ways Rory used ‘luck’ as a way of speaking about ‘randomness’, but 
there were some differences arising from the way in which the word ‘luck’ is used 
colloquially because the word is overlaid with ideas of good or bad, beneficial or not.
Only occasionally did his use of the word “luck” convey a sense of an outside agency 
controlling the outcomes.
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13.4.1.3 Claire
During the review task, Claire (age 15.0) suggested that the outcome of rolling a fair die 
was “complete luck”. When I invited her to reflect further on this idea, she seemed to use 
“luck” in place of “random”, and suggested an idea similar to degrees of randomness, 
contrasting rolling a weighted die (less luck) with rolling a fair die (more luck). She 
suggested that the outcome of the weighted die involved less luck, but that when the 
outcomes were equally likely (it’s “a fair test”) they were not affected by anything else and 
the outcome would be “just luck”. She went on to suggest that luck might be related to 
randomness.
Claire: ... Luck. What a difficult word... Luck’s random... Oh yeah. That’s what I should be saying.
It’s just random whether it’s Heads or Tails... Luck... Yeah. I think it probably is quite... very 
closely linked to randomness.
(Lines 479-482)
As she thought further about the differences between luck and randomness, Claire 
recognised that in some circumstances there were differences. She noted that “being 
lucky” had connotations of having good things happen but seemed to consider that this 
might be a colloquial distortion of the “true meaning”. She considered that the “true 
meanings” of luck and randomness were “probably very similar”.
Claire: Luck can also be like... to do with getting good things... That probably... because luck gets used 
quite often.. .that probably obscured its meaning a bit as well. ... But I think, luck and randomness, 
their true meanings probably are very similar, because it’s just unconnected with anything else. 
(Lines 484-488)
Claire had suggested that some people were considered to be “lucky” so I asked her 
whether she considered that people were lucky. I was interested to discover that she 
thought not. She suggested that some factors might contribute to making someone appear 
to be lucky, but she did not elaborate on what these might be. On the other hand she 
considered that whether or not something good happened to a person (that is, they
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appeared to be lucky), as opposed to something bad happening (which would be unlucky) 
could be seen as “just random”.
I: You say, “if you’re a lucky person”. Are some people lucky?
Claire: No, I don’t think they are ... I think factors can contribute to make someone seem lucky. ... I
think that, yeah, it’s just random whether they... something good might happen to them, rather than 
something bad.
(Lines 489-493)
Claire seemed to have used luck as a synonym for random, but had then recognised that the 
word “luck” carries a value judgement that the outcome is good. However, she was sure 
that people only appeared to be lucky when good things happened to them. Appearing to 
be lucky did not make them different from everybody else, and in that sense she did not 
consider that they were ‘lucky’ in an objective sense.
13.4.1.4 Andrew
In contrast to the previous examples, Andrew (age 13.11) did not believe in luck!
Andrew: ... luck is just something that people associate with... if someone were to appear lucky by like 
winning a game three times in a row, it might not mean that they’re any good at it, it might just 
mean that for some reason they did win. So I don’t believe that there’s such a thing as luck.
(Lines 543-546)
He accepted that one might refer to someone as being lucky -  for example if they had won 
the lottery -  but he was in no doubt that their win was due to chance, not luck!
Andrew: ... you could call someone lucky for some reason, like they’ve won the lottery, which is like a one 
in whatever million chance... But it’s... nothing that they’ve done, like they’ve decided “I’m so 
lucky, I’m going to go out and play the lottery because I’m going to win”. It’s more, they’ve 
played it and they’ve just happened to win because of chance.
(Lines 552-553, 555-557)
Andrew was also able to explain how people tend to rationalise to themselves after the 
event that they were lucky.
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Andrew: I mean they could have like drawn conclusions from, like ... “I almost got run over by a lorry but I 
decided to step back at the last moment, so I’m lucky.” .. .But that’s ... just something that 
happened, not necessarily that they’re bom lucky or that they’re luckier than everyone else.
(Lines 559-560, 562-563)
Andrew’s attitude was strikingly in contrast to that of other interviewees who had 
discussed luck, in that he was so clear in rejecting the idea of luck.
13.4.2 Many factors
The question of whether a process affected by causal factors could be considered to be 
random was one which produced a variety of responses from interviewees. As mentioned 
in the discussion of shifting perspectives in 13.3.2, there was indication that some 
interviewees were able to hold more than one view about this, and were able to move from 
one view to another during the interview. In the following extracts I present three different 
ways of thinking about the relationship between random outcomes and causality. In the 
first, Hannah spoke of the die in animist terms, and found it difficult to see chance as a 
model for real world experiences, preferring to look for causal explanations. In the second, 
both Linda and Abby suggested that situations that were influenced by many factors could 
not be considered to be random. Finally, Ben and Andrew started from positions similar to 
those of Linda and Abby, but went on to express a sense that, where the process is complex 
and unpredictable, involving many factors, it can be still considered to be random.
13.4.2.1 Animism and causal explanations
When Hannah (age 14.8) was working with the biased die, she had observed three fives 
and seven sixes. Commenting on this, she seemed to attribute an independent will to the 
die: “this dice obviously don’t want to give me a one two or a three” (line 359). She could 
not understand what was going on, but she knew that it was not as she expected it to be.
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Later, in the Review Task, because Hannah seemed to play a lot of football, I asked if she 
considered that the result of a football match could be thought of as ‘chance’. She agreed 
that it could be, but her consideration of a football game seemed to have two distinct 
elements. First, she referred to not knowing which would be the better side “until you start 
playing”.
Hannah: Yeah... you don’t know who’s the better side until you start playing. You don’t know whether you 
can score or not. It all depends really.
(Lines 893-894)
In saying this, Hannah seemed to be suggesting that the result could be considered random 
if she did not know which was the better side, and implied that one side being better than 
the other would be a factor determining the result. The second element emerged when I 
asked her if the better side would always win. She agreed that this was not always the case 
since the better side (her own in her account!) might drastically under-perform against a 
poor team, and so lose. However, in her eyes, this was not ‘chance’, but “just stupidity” 
(line 900)! Thus, she seemed to have identified two factors determining the result of a 
match: which was the better side, and whether the better side played as well as they could. 
She had agreed that the result could be considered to be chance, but she had continued to 
have causal factors in mind at the same time.
13.4.2.2 Many factors mean not random
In an extract discussed in 12.3.5, Linda (age 16.1) discussed the counters task and asserted 
that no person could generate truly random outcomes by sampling counters with 
replacement because factors such as mixing the counters or rolling the die in a standardised 
random manner could never be fully controlled. She went even further and stated that “the 
only way you can get completely random results is to use a calculator or a computer or 
something” (line 755-756). This final assertion was remarkable in that it seemed to 
suggest that randomness required a degree of purity removed from human influence.
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Abby (age 17.7) had seemed to argue in a similar way in the stage 1 interviews. During 
the Review task, she discussed the idea that whether or not her plants would flower could 
be considered to be a random event, but this was less random because there were 
identifiable factors affecting the outcome.
Abby: Most things are affected by other things. Like whether my plants are going to flower or not is
affected by whether I water them...
I: So, does that make it not random?
Abby: Not quite so random. And I mean it’s affected by the quality of the soil... and {laughs) whether it’s
got tomato spot disease.
(Lines 557-560, 562)
Later she considered the idea of programming a machine to water her plants automatically 
to avoid the possibility of her forgetting to do it for herself.
Abby: ... you can get a machine to do it, and programme it in to water the plant, but what if the machine
breaks?
(Lines 581-582)
I had expected that Abby would see a breakdown of the machine as ‘unpredictable’ and 
therefore as ‘random’. However, she suggested that this could not be considered to be 
random.
Abby: It would be due to something being wrong with the machine... .Machines are generally not very
random. ... Machines, you can make them do random things because they don’t have other 
influences. The less... something is influenced by other things, I believe, makes it more random. 
(Lines 585, 587, 590-592)
Abby seemed to be saying that the less the outcome is influenced by other things, the more 
random it is, which is similar to the idea suggested by Linda. Later in the interview, Abby 
made a similar claim relating to accidents, noting that when the factors causing the 
accident are predictable, the accident itself is more predictable -  that is, it is less random.
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She listed various factors that might contribute to causing a road accident, before finally 
summarising her claim.
Abby: You know, it’s all the factors that influence it. And things being influenced by a factor that is
predictable makes it more predictable, obviously. Like a hole in the road is a factor that means that 
you can predict that it’s more likely that an accident will happen there. Or a more busy road is a 
factor that makes it more likely that a car is going to crash, because, you know, if there’s more cars, 
then one’s likely to crash.
(Lines 640-644)
The final factor listed by Abby, that an accident is more likely on a busy road, is slightly 
different in that it is related to the idea a particular outcome is more likely to be observed 
when a larger sample of cases is inspected. It is interesting that, in spite of Abby’s claim 
that the accident with many factors causing it is ‘less random’, she was still using a 
probabilistic term - “more likely” - to express her argument.
13.4.2.3 Many factors mean random
During the Review Task, Ben (age 15.7) began by expressing himself in a similar way to 
Linda and Abby. He was trying to think of examples of random phenomena, but was 
finding this difficult because other factors were involved.
Ben: It’s quite a hard thing to think of something that’s just completely random though. There’s always
factors involved in i t ...
(Lines 510-511)
Later however, Ben expressed the idea that a situation could be considered to be random if 
there were “millions of factors” so that the outcome could not be predicted. I have 
discussed this extract from Ben’s interview in Chapter 8 (8.1.3). Ben’s view of 
randomness seemed to change from a sense that he could not consider a situation to be 
random if there were causal factors involved to a more sophisticated view that randomness
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could be used to model a situation in which there were many uncontrollable factors 
working together in a complex and unpredictable system.
In the second stage interviews, Andrew (age 13.11) showed a similar shift in his view of 
the role of influencing factors during his interview. During his work with the spherical die, 
he was concerned by the absence of fives and sixes from the sequence of the first twelve 
outcomes. However, he said that he could not be sure that this was sufficient evidence to 
be concerned about the fairness of the die because “there are too many variables for it to 
just be that one thing” (line 337). When I asked him to explain this remark, he mentioned 
many other factors that were not controlled in this experiment.
Andrew: Well, there could be differences in the surface, or something, which could cause it to slow down 
earlier or later. .. .If you were to have a completely perfect surface, so there couldn’t be as many 
variables, then you might get the same result all the time, because... there would be less things to 
interfere with the dice, so it could just be left down to the person throwing it, and the speed they 
throw it with. ... And the way it’s made, you can’t be sure that... it will always be perfectly fair... 
because of the process its made in. There could be like defects between dice to dice.
(Lines 342-348)
Andrew was suggesting that many factors might have contributed to the absence of 5 and 
6, besides the behaviour of the die itself or how hard it was rolled. In particular, he 
considered the features of the surface he rolled onto. Andrew’s remark about the die that 
“you can’t be sure that... it will always be perfectly fair” seems to suggest that at this 
moment he saw ‘fairness’ as a perfect ideal that cannot in reality be attained. This seems 
to me to be a sophisticated idea akin to seeing randomness as an idealised model for some 
situations.
Later, when he was working with the cracked die, Andrew had been concerned about the 
fact that he had not seen any sixes in the first twelve outcomes. When he saw a six on the 
thirteenth throw, and another on the fifteenth, I had expected that he would have been
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reassured and would have stopped the experiment. However, he continued throwing with 
great interest a further nine times. When I asked him why he had done so, he explained 
that he had wanted to see if he would get any more sixes. He suggested that he was 
concerned that the occurrence of sixes might have been dependent on the way in which he 
threw the die. In the event, he had not seen any further sixes in the extra nine throws, so I 
wondered whether he was still bothered about this. He stated clearly that he was not and 
explained why.
Andrew: Because... you could go for... an entire game or something not getting a six, and then get a load... 
from straightforward throws. It’s just... there’s so many things that could affect it... it doesn’t 
really make a difference.
(Lines 489-490,492,494)
On this occasion, Andrew was reassured about the fairness of the die by the fact that there 
were so many factors that could affect the outcome.
Both Ben and Andrew had shown signs that, while they were aware that factors 
influencing the outcomes in a process might be used to provide a causal non-random 
explanation for the outcomes, they could see randomness as a useful model in the presence 
of complex systems of uncontrollable or unpredictable factors. This awareness seems to 
encompass the idea that randomness can be a model for complex deterministic systems, in 
which the details of the interactions between the factors affecting the outcomes are too 
complex for the judge to know or to want to know. It was interesting that, unlike many 
other interviewees, both Andrew and Ben were able to think easily of examples of 
situations in everyday life that might be modelled using randomness and the associated 
ideas of probability. They also did not show any sign of thinking in terms of luck; indeed 
Andrew had explicitly denied the existence of luck (see 13.4.1.4).
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13.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have reviewed several different themes across the two stages. It now 
seems possible to speculate about ways in which some themes may be related to one 
another.
People often hold contradictory ‘beliefs’, and ‘claimed beliefs’ are not always compatible 
with observed behaviour. For example, pattern-seeking behaviour often seemed to coexist 
with a clear belief that the outcomes were unpredictable. Such behaviour might be 
particularly found where learners are struggling with ideas which demand that their 
attention be focused in one place yet they naturally find their attention attracted elsewhere. 
Thus people’s sense of randomness is confusingly reflected in the apparently ‘random’ 
way in which their attention seems to shift, especially where they seem to lack vocabulary 
for what they want to express, or are not sure what it is they want to (or the interviewer 
wants them to) express.
The words used by interviewees to speak of randomness, and the sometimes surprising 
ways in which the word ‘random’ has been understood by interviewees, seem to relate in 
subtle ways to the ideas that interviewees express. For example, Rory’s use of ‘luck’ as a 
synonym for ‘random’ may have encouraged him to slip from expressing apparently 
rational views about randomness to a more superstitious expression. The words used, and 
the networks of meaning that they express for the speaker and listener, can enable clear 
expression of ideas, and yet at the same time they seem to constrain and limit expression 
and understanding. Claire’s initial preoccupation with a colloquial sense of ‘random’ 
influenced her expression, and probably her thinking, throughout her interview. Abby’s 
realisation that she could think of the judgement of randomness as a ‘personal judgement’ 
was a revelation for her, and it seemed to move her thinking forward.
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The strategies used by interviewees to discern randomness may be related to the 
developing awareness of aspects of randomness. Pattern seeking may develop into 
representativeness and lead to recognition of the importance of the sample size. These 
strategies in turn appear to be related to the growing awareness of the global perspectives, 
particularly the empirical perspective.
Expressions of superstitious belief sometimes seem to act as a bar to people questioning 
when they perceive departures from disorder and chaos that they might expect to see in the 
local perspective on randomness. Ideas such as animism (the die has a will of its own) and 
luck (this die is lucky) provide accounts for outcomes from the biased die, and these 
seemed to remove any need for interviewees to look away from the outcomes to inspect the 
generating process.
When interviewees were able to think of randomness as a model for situations in which 
outcomes were ‘caused’ by many factors in a complex system, they showed subtle and 
delicate shifts between speaking of the outcomes as random and determined.
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Chapter 14: Conclusions and Implications
In this final chapter, I summarise the results of this study of learners’ perceptions of 
randomness, referring back to the aims set out in Chapter 4. I discuss the limitations of the 
study and the implications of the findings for pupils’ learning.
In sections 14.1 and 14.2,1 summarise the findings and relate these to the aims and to key 
references that were discussed in the review of literature in Chapters 2 and 3. Section 14.1 
deals with findings relating to the understanding of randomness, while 14.2 is about 
shifting perspectives between different ways of looking at or seeing randomness. Section
14.3 contains a discussion of the limitations of the study and considers the aspects of the 
study that constrain my ability to elaborate on the aims. Implications of the study for 
future research are presented in 14.4. Finally, in section 14.5,1 discuss some implications 
of the findings for teaching and learning statistics and probability.
14.1 A summary of the findings
In the aims, I proposed two sets of questions that needed to be studied. Firstly, what 
learners believe about randomness:
• What do learners believe randomness to be?
• What do learners expect from a random generator?
• How do learners recognise what they believe to be random and discern the random
from what they consider to be non-random?
The second set of questions relates to the idea that randomness is an important model to be 
applied to describe a process.
• To what situations and circumstances do learners consider randomness to be an 
appropriate model?
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• What is the range and variety of situations and circumstances for which learners 
consider that randomness is an appropriate model?
• How are learners’ responses to this second set of questions related to their responses to 
the first set?
The bulk of the results of my study relate clearly to the first set of questions, but analysis 
of learners’ beliefs about randomness also reveals some insights about the ways in which 
learners consider that randomness can be applied.
Learners’ beliefs about randomness need to be considered at two different levels: 
understanding of the word, and understanding of the concept.
14.1.1 Understanding of the word ‘random’
Some learners have a knowledge of the word ‘random’, but it is clear that learners’ usage 
of the word ‘random’ may not always match the meaning given to the word in mathematics 
lessons. Not all learners are comfortable with the word.
• In stage 2 interviews, five out of nine interviewees did not use the word at all.
• One interviewee, David in stage 1, used the word ‘random’ in a restricted sense.
• There is some evidence, from the interview with Claire and from the preliminary study, 
that the modem colloquial use amongst young people of the word random, and its 
derivatives, has spread and could lead to some misunderstanding between teachers and 
learners in classrooms.
• In several interviews, the word chance was used as a synonym for randomness, and 
occasionally the word ‘luck’ was used.
There is indication in the evidence referred to above that many interviewees are not 
confident in their use of the word ‘random’.
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14.1.2 Understanding of the concept of randomness
Understanding of the concept seemed to fall into various categories. In this section I 
summarise the evidence under five headings:
• Agency: situations are governed by an outside agency or by luck.
• Randomness is unpredictable
• Restricted randomness: random outcomes must be fair
• Degrees of randomness
• Randomness as a model for incomplete knowledge
In the following sub-sections I consider each of these headings in turn.
14.1.2.1 Superstition
A few interviewees spoke of the outcomes in the interview tasks as being caused by some 
agency or by luck. I see this as possibly being different from the use of the word ‘luck’ as 
a synonym for ‘random’, such as Rory’s described in 13.1.3. The difference emerged in 
the way that an interviewee spoke of some people as being lucky, or implied that their 
behaviour might be affected by their view of being lucky or unlucky. Alex (age 15.3, set 
2/6) displayed this understanding in stage 1 as described in section 8.1.2, as did Hannah 
(age 14.8, set 3/6) in stage 2 (section 13.4.1.1), and Rory (age 14.5, set 4/7) in later 
passages of his interview (section 13.4.1.2). A related view was the animist view shown 
by Hannah (section 13.4.2.1), in which she ascribed to the biased die a will of its own. In 
essence this category of understanding is characterised by an element of superstition.
These views are similar to those reported by Kath Truran (1998), and Amir and Williams 
(1999). In this study, evidence of superstition was not found amongst the most able pupils. 
However, out of the eight interviewees in this study who were not in top sets or in A level
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classes, three have demonstrated some evidence of superstition. Such beliefs may indeed 
be widespread amongst secondary pupils, as was suggested by Amir and Williams (1999).
14.1.2.2 Randomness is unpredictable
Evidence has been presented of learners interpreting randomness in terms of what it is not. 
By far the most common in the interviews in this study was the idea that randomness is 
characterised by unpredictability. Many interviewees spoke of outcomes as unpredictable, 
particularly in the dice activities. It seems likely that these tasks lead the interviewees to 
express themselves in this way, as they consider the outcomes seen so far and think about 
what might happen next. One interviewee, Mosaab in stage 2, spoke of outcomes as not 
expected. This was a similar idea to unpredictable.
Related to randomness being unpredictable was the idea of pattern-breaking. Patterns that 
were seen to emerge in the sequence of observed outcomes were expected to break and not 
to persist. I return to this idea in the discussion of strategies in 14.1.3, since it formed the 
basis of a significant strategy for recognising randomness.
The idea that unpredictability is interpreted as randomness was present in the first of the 
local meanings of randomness identified by Pratt (1998).
14.1.2.3 Restricted interpretations of randomness
A few interviewees (for example, Alex in section 8.1.1.1) spoke of the idea of randomness 
as being equivalent to fairness, or as requiring that the outcomes should be equally likely. 
This is a restricted view of randomness and it might be expected to limit the individual’s 
ability to take on the more flexible idea of degrees of randomness.
Pratt (1998) identified fairness as the fourth of his local meanings of randomness, 
suggesting that where the outcomes occurred with approximately symmetrical frequencies, 
pupils interpreted this as evidence of randomness. However, there is evidence in this study
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that some people take this further and believe that if the outcomes are not equally likely 
then the process is not random. It is not surprising to find this belief being expressed since 
it was identified in Chapter 2 as one of the meanings of the word ‘random’ listed in two 
commonly used dictionaries, and this sense of the word is also sometimes used by 
statisticians when speaking of a ‘random sample’.
I consider that the significance of this view of randomness for learners lies in its 
antithetical relationship to the idea of ‘degrees of randomness’, which I see as an important 
idea for developing an appreciation for the power of randomness as a model for everyday 
situations.
14.1.2.4 Degrees of randomness
Interviewees in stage 1 who spoke in terms of randomness being a matter of degree, and 
who were able to think of some things as being more random than others, included David 
(age 14.1) and Ben (age 15.7) in Chapter 8, and Abby (age 17.7) in Chapter 9. In stage 2, 
this idea was expressed by Claire (age 15.0). I see this idea as critical in the development 
of an understanding of the applicability of randomness as a model for a variety of 
situations in the real world.
I also see the idea of degrees of randomness as part of the solution to the paradox of seeing 
randomness as equivalent to fairness. Once randomness is seen as unpredictability and a 
probability distribution as a measure of the degree of predictability, then the learner can be 
seen to possess the resources to construct a global perspective on randomness -  that is to 
construct the idea of a probability distribution.
Interviewees who expressed the idea of degrees of randomness were also able to see a 
variety of applications of randomness to the weather, to sport and to chance events in 
everyday life. Interviewees who appeared to see randomness as an absolute concept,
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without a clear expression of degrees of randomness, such as Hannah or Alex, did not 
appear to perceive this variety of applications.
14.1.2.5 Randomness as a model for incomplete knowledge
A more powerful view of randomness, discussed in Chapter 2, arises from the definition of 
randomness proposed by Kyburg (1974): randomness can provide a model for a situation 
in which the judge has incomplete knowledge, even though the situation might be strictly 
deterministic. Such a view of randomness was clearly expressed in stage 1 by David and 
Ben, in 8.1.3, and by Abby when she spoke of randomness as ‘personal’ in 13.2.2. In stage 
2, Claire also seemed to express this idea, but much less clearly. It is interesting to note 
that these individuals are precisely those who also expressed the idea of ‘degrees of 
randomness’, and that, with the exception of Claire, the extracts showing this idea of 
randomness as a model for incomplete knowledge are from different parts of the interviews 
from the places where they expressed ‘degrees of randomness’. This suggests to me that 
these two ideas might be linked.
Ben and Andrew also expressed the idea of randomness as a model for incomplete 
knowledge in their suggestions that randomness might be a model for situations were 
affected by many factors (13.4.2).
The example of Abby is particularly interesting as her idea that randomness was a personal 
judgement appeared to have developed within the interview.
14.1.3 Strategies for recognising randomness
Three significant strategies are described here, drawing upon the discussion in Chapter 13.
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14.1.3.1 Pattern Seeking
The primitive strategy of pattern seeking was described in Chapter 3 as a fundamental 
human activity (in section 3.9). Most interviewees showed some evidence of pattern 
seeking in their attempts to interpret the behaviour of the random generators presented in 
the interview tasks. This strategy is clearly most fundamental in making the judgement as 
to whether or not the outcomes generated are predictable. However, many interviewees 
were able to take this further, and expected to see some patterns emerging in the sequence 
of observed outcomes, but also expected these patterns to be short-lived. A difficulty was 
to decide how long a pattern might be expected to continue before it became too long and 
constituted evidence that the sequence was not random.
14.1.3.2 Representativeness
I suggested in Chapter 13 that use of representativeness as a strategy for recognising 
randomness might be seen as a special case of pattern seeking. Instead of looking for 
patterns in the ordered sequence of observed outcomes, as in the pattern seeking strategy, a 
person using representativeness is looking at an aggregation of the observed outcomes, and 
in this sense the use of representativeness can be seen to mark a step towards recognising a 
frequency distribution. Thus, when rolling a die that is believed to be fair, the person is 
expecting each outcome to occur roughly the same number of times. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 13, many interviewees experienced significant difficulty in knowing 
how many outcomes were needed before the aggregation could be regarded as 
representative. Nearly all interviewees tended to make their judgement on the basis of 
sequences of outcomes that were too short to provide reliable evidence. Thus, the 
judgements that they made were frequently changed, which seemed to increase the 
uncertainty expressed by the interviewee.
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14.1.3.3 Sample size
A few interviewees recognised that, to improve the reliability of the judgements they 
made, they needed to increase the size of the sample they considered. I have tentatively 
suggested that the development of an awareness of importance of sample size may be 
related to the development of a global frequentist perspective.
14.2 Shifting perspectives
In the course of transcribing and analysing these interviews, I have become increasingly 
aware that the interviewee’s attention appeared to shift between different aspects of the 
task, or different ways of looking at the task. Often, the focus of the interviewee’s 
attention would be apparent from what they said and from the way in which they 
responded to outcomes they were considering. In Chapter 9 ,1 gave examples from the first 
round of interviews relating particularly to the two ideas of local disorder and distribution. 
The counters task was designed to explore this issue further. However, during the analysis 
of the second stage interviews, I have seen a more complex picture emerging in which 
issues other than the local and global perspectives appeared to play a part.
Writers such as Gattegno (1987) and Marton and Booth (1997) have suggested that 
learning is strongly directed by the learner’s awareness of features of the phenomenon that 
is being considered. However, awareness does not tell the whole story; at any instant a 
learner may hold one or more features of the situation in their attention and reflect on 
them. The shifting of attention between different, and sometimes apparently conflicting, 
perspectives on a problem may be a precursor to the learner bringing each of the 
perspectives into awareness simultaneously.
Within these interviews, the apparently different viewpoints that learners adopted, and 
between which they were seen to shift their attention, could often be classified as local or
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global. A similar dichotomy, albeit a little different, which was discussed in the literature 
review, is that between seeing randomness as either the underlying process or the sequence 
of outcomes generated. I have observed a third, and rather different shift between seeing 
the ‘random’ outcomes as having been ‘caused’ by some agency or as having no cause.
For some interviewees, the shift between not caused and caused was similar to a more 
fundamental shift between seeing the outcomes as random or not. Random outcomes were 
sometimes seen as having no cause, whereas outcomes that were caused by some agency 
could not be considered as being random.
14.2.1 Local and global
At the local level of what will happen next there is unpredictability. In the short run, 
sequences of outcomes typically lack sustained order and pattern. Although on many 
occasions some pattern may appear by chance, such patterns are typically not sustained 
when the process is allowed to continue further. However, these illusory patterns can be a 
significant distraction for a person interacting with the outcomes, especially if they are 
trying to make some judgement either of what outcome might occur next, or more 
generally about whether the process may be thought of as random.
In the dice activities and the coins tasks used in this study, typically the interviewee’s 
attention was initially focused at the local level and in the short run. Subjects looked for 
patterns in the sequence of outcomes, as they tried to predict what might happen next. 
When they observed patterns emerging in the sequence of outcomes, they looked to see 
those extended and tried to use them to make predictions. When they considered that 
outcomes were unpredictable, they accepted that the process was ‘chance’ or ‘random’ (or 
sometimes ‘luck’).
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At the global level, in the longer run, there emerges an order and pattern in the distribution 
of the observed outcomes across the space of possible outcomes. This is the emergence of 
distribution.
Sometimes the interviewees consciously tried to ‘control’ the process to produce an 
outcome that had not been seen in a sequence of outcomes. If the process is allowed to 
proceed, then the outcomes are experienced as uncontrollable.
The shift of attention is between, on the one hand, the unpredictability of the next outcome 
(what will happen next) and the lack of order and pattern in the short run (in a short 
sequence of outcomes), and on the other hand, the order and pattern of an empirical 
probability distribution. In my interviews, the interviewee’s attention was often 
particularly unstable when the samples, from which they were trying to infer the 
distribution, were too small, and produced apparently conflicting information. This can be 
seen, for example, in the accounts of Linda in 12.1 and Andrew in 13.3.
Within the counters task, when interviewees saw the distribution as being controlled by the 
adjustments that they made to the contents of the bag, this awareness was often 
accompanied by beginning to adopt a global perspective on the randomness of the 
outcomes. The nature of the counters tasks encouraged interviewees to express awareness 
of the distributional aspect of randomness.
14.2.2 Two variants of global: prior and empirical
When a person interacts with an apparently familiar random process, such as rolling a die, 
tossing a coin, or drawing counters from a bag, they bring to that interaction their prior 
beliefs about how the process will behave, derived in part from past experiences. Such 
prior beliefs are often naturally expressed in terms of the distribution of outcomes that is 
expected to be observed. For example, when rolling a cubical die, most people would tend
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to expect the six different outcomes to be equiprobable, and they might therefore expect 
that, in a number of trials, the relative frequencies of the six outcomes would be 
approximately equal. However, many people have little understanding of how much the 
variation of the observed relative frequencies from the expected relative frequencies of 
each outcome will depend upon the total number of trials.
The fact that such prior beliefs exist means that sometimes the person’s attention will be on 
their prior belief, and at other times they will be attending to the emerging empirical 
distribution, as they look for a match between the two. This shift of attention between 
prior beliefs and emerging distribution was not seen in the counters task as the task did not 
highlight for the interviewee a prior belief about the probabilities of drawing a black 
counter or a white counter from each bag; rather the task focused the interviewee’s 
attention on inferring probabilities from outcomes. This shift was much more commonly 
observed in the dice rolling and the coin tossing tasks, where there were clearly identifiable 
prior beliefs, based on equiprobability, that were highlighted in the tasks.
I suggested in Chapter 13 that both the prior and the empirical perspectives can be seen to 
be variants of the global perspective, since each represents a deterministic meaning of the 
long-run behaviour of randomness. Therefore, movement between attending to the prior 
and the empirical might be more profitably seen as part of the local-global dimension, in 
which there are really three different perspectives: local, prior and empirical. Then the 
empirical can be identified with the global frequentist idea of distribution. As the total 
number of outcomes considered becomes larger, so the empirical distribution becomes 
much more clearly visible in the aggregated data. It can be considered by the learner as a 
phenomenon subject to external factors, and can be ‘controlled’ by changing those factors 
in a controlled manner.
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The maimer in which learners appear to switch their attention rapidly between different 
aspects of and perspectives on randomness, may indicate something of the uncertainty and 
anxiety that learners experience about how to interpret random phenomena, especially in 
the context of mathematics lessons. Such uncertainty about what to attend to may shed 
some light on the failure identified by Metz (1999) to integrate understanding of the 
uncertainty of individual outcomes and small samples with the long run pattern and 
determinism of distribution. Metz described two failures amongst learners. The first was a 
tendency to over-state the deterministic aspects of a distribution, and the second, a reverse 
tendency to under-rate the information given by a distribution. I now see each of these 
failures as arising in part from a shifting of perspectives. Resting in the global perspective 
might lead to overstating deterministic aspects of distribution, while reasoning from the 
local perspective might produce the inability to recognise uncertainty separately from 
distribution. Behind each of these lies a failure to understand the nature of variability and 
its relationship with sample size. The learners’ failure to understand may be prolonged by 
their inability to focus productively on either the global or the local perspective. For 
example, David, Beulah and Hannah each experienced prolonged periods of uncertainty 
when working with the biased die, during which they tried to account for the extreme 
imbalance in the outcomes in terms of luck or chance, before finally recognising that the 
die was biased.
14.2.3 Process or outcomes
The shift of attention between process and outcomes refers to two contrasting ways of 
seeing randomness, either in the sequence of outcomes observed, or focussing on the 
dynamic process that generated the outcomes. In some interviews, the interviewee’s 
attention shifted from seeing individual outcomes to commenting on the process by which 
outcomes were generated.
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For example, in the counters task, several interviewees suggested that replacing the 
sampled counter after each draw was not satisfactory because the same counter might be 
sampled in each successive draw. Sometimes, this suggestion was used to account for a set 
of outcomes that had not come out in the way the interviewee had expected. Hannah (in 
section 12.3.4) used such an argument to suggest the possibility that the observed relative 
frequency of black counters might not represent the proportion of black counters in the 
bag. For Rory (in section 13.1.3), concern about possibly sampling the same counter again 
and again led him to suggest that the counters task was not really possible, dismissing it as 
“just luck”.
Some interviewees tried, post hoc, to account for a relative surplus or deficiency of a 
particular subset of possible outcomes through the way in which the die was rolled, or the 
asymmetry of the crack in the cracked die, as described in 13.3.2.
It may be seen from the examples above that the shift between process and outcomes 
seemed to be sometimes due to concern about “causation”: that is, to account for how a 
particular subset of outcomes were ‘caused’ to appear.
There is a possible association between the shift between local and global perspectives and 
the shift between seeing randomness in outcomes or in process. In the local perspective, 
attention is naturally upon the disorder of individual outcomes. A person working in the 
local perspective may view individual outcomes closely and be concerned either to 
describe or to account for the randomness of the unfolding sequence of outcomes. On the 
other hand, in the global perspective, the individual discerns a long-run distribution of 
outcomes, which may be controlled by manipulating the Underlying process. This 
awareness may bring the user into a stronger awareness of the generating process.
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14.3 Limitations of this study
The intention of this study was to provide detailed case studies based upon evidence from 
18 interviews with learners of various ages from 13 to 17 years. Therefore the sample of 
learners was not controlled for age, ability, gender or cultural background, although each 
of these variables might affect an individual’s ideas about randomness and how these are 
expressed. Age and gender have been recorded for each interviewee, and a broad 
indication of ability is given by the nature of the school if selective, or by which set the 
learner is in for maths. The sample as a whole contains a disproportionate number of more 
successful learners. This is largely a consequence of the fact that I set out to interview 
pupils who would be able to express their ideas in interview. It is likely that there are 
further differences to be observed in how learners perceive randomness, chance and luck, 
particularly amongst pupils who are less successful in school.
While the sample of interviewees is small, each interview consisted of several tasks and 
lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. The data in the interview transcripts is rich and varied. 
However, the interviewees’ responses to the tasks are likely to be sensitive to the 
interventions from the interviewer. Indeed, there are strong indications in the interviews 
that this is the case, particularly in the differences between the interview transcripts from 
stages 1 and 2. This not surprising; indeed flexibility was built into the methodology for 
the interviewer to interact with interviewees as they worked on the tasks. It was this 
flexible response to the dynamic nature of the tasks that enabled me to follow 
interviewee’s attention as it shifted between different ways of looking at and seeing 
randomness. However, it would be valuable to develop further tasks founded upon a 
dynamic view of randomness, and focused on particular features of learners’ perceptions, 
that could be used in further interviews.
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Time has been an important constraint in this study. The time required to transcribe and 
analyse these interviews is considerable. This has limited the number of interviewees that 
I could manage at each stage, and the number of tasks that could be developed and used in 
the interviews.
My concern with validity in this study has focused on ensuring trustworthiness and 
credibility. By providing a detailed account of my interviews and of the interventions that 
I made, I have aimed to ensure that my account is trustworthy and hence that my 
interpretations are credible with respect to the interviewees in my study.
14.4 Issues for future research
I see two important issues for further research arising out of this study. One relates to the 
controlled exploration of the perceptions of randomness highlighted here, to see the extent 
to which these vary with age, ability, gender and social and ethnic background. The 
second is to explore further the transition from local to global perspectives, particularly the 
development of the empirical distributional perspective. I discuss each of these in the 
following sections.
14.4.1 Controlling for learner variables
The sample in this study has shed light on the variety of perceptions of randomness that 
learners bring to their studies. However, there is much still to be learned about how these 
perceptions develop within the individual as their understanding develops in other areas. 
Many of the perceptions shown by an individual may be related to the learner’s previous 
experiences of randomness. It would be helpful to learn more about how perceptions 
develop within an individual and about how the variety of perceptions is related to age, 
gender and abilities, and to social and ethnic backgrounds.
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A study of how perceptions vary with age and abilities might lead to greater understanding 
of the development of perceptions of randomness within individuals. However, I am 
particularly interested to learn more about how prevalent are the ideas that I have termed 
‘pre-random’, such animism and luck. I should like to understand how such ideas are 
formed or acquired, and how they interact with the ongoing development of mathematical 
ideas about randomness and probability. I strongly suspect that these ideas may be related 
to family circumstances in which gambling plays a part; for example, where discussion of 
and participation in activities such as the National Lottery is usual. Researchers such as 
Wagenaar (1988) have long taken an interest in gambling behaviours, but I am not aware 
of any study which attempted to research the impact of gambling by older family members 
on children’s perceptions of randomness.
14.4.2 Transition from local to global
<-
I see one of the most significant issues to have emerged from this study as being the 
shifting of attention in the mind of the learner between the local and the global 
perspectives. The emphasis that I have placed within this study upon randomness as a 
dynamic concept has been an important element in enabling me to see the way people’s 
attention has moved in the interview tasks. However, my emphasis upon tasks that do not 
use computer simulation has restricted my work in this study to comparatively small 
numbers of trials. Interviewees have not generated more than about 40 outcomes in any 
task, and their ability to aggregate the data has been mostly restricted to simple frequency 
tables. In experiments with only two possible outcomes, the frequency distribution is just 
beginning to settle down after 40 trials. For example, in the counters task, where bag A 
began with 7 black and 3 white counters, and bag B had 5 black and 5 white, the observed 
frequencies of black and white from each bag might be expected to show some difference 
after 40 trials. However, to acquire more certainty requires more outcomes. In an 
experiment with a slightly biased die, inequalities in the frequencies might require many
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more than 40 outcomes. It has been clear in this study that learners have little sense of 
how many outcomes they need to observe in order to make reliable judgments about 
probabilities.
Computer simulation can enable learners to run an experiment many times and view 
aggregated data from large samples very quickly. Learners can then change factors within 
the experiment and explore the effect upon the aggregated data. There is a need to 
discover more about how learners’ interact with such software, and how their interactions 
affect the development of their perceptions of randomness. However, there is still a need 
to address the concerns about pseudo-random generators discussed in Chapter 3, and to 
discover whether learners’ understanding of pseudo-randomness is different from their 
understanding of other random generators. Pratt’s (1998) study looked at some aspects of 
these issues, but did not look closely at the shifts of attention between global and local or 
between outcomes and process.
It is important now to explore how learners can develop awareness and understanding of 
the relationship between sample size and variability. I am sure that computer simulation 
will play an important role in the necessary research into the development of 
understanding, and in providing learning environments. However, the rapidly shifting 
perspectives displayed by learners suggest to me that there is deep uncertainty about where 
to place attention, what to attend to and how to attend. There is a need to develop clearer 
understanding of how to structure a learner’s attention productively to develop awareness 
of variation and how it is affected by the degrees of randomness as well as sample size.
14.5 Teaching and learning
The findings of this study suggest very strongly that learners do not have sufficient 
experience of interacting with random outcomes and of building towards the concept of
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distribution. Throughout all my interviews, I had the clear impression that the 
interviewees had not previously spent time in the ‘no-man’ s-land’ between the local 
perspective of observing a few (perhaps five or six) individual outcomes and the global 
perspective of viewing and interpreting a long-run frequency distribution. The notion of 
probability expressed by interviewees was usually based on an a priori interpretation of 
probability, but occasionally moved to a frequentist approach. However, when a 
frequentist idea of probability was expressed, there was rarely an understanding that the 
underlying probability might take many hundreds or thousands of outcomes to emerge with 
the required degree of precision.
The emphasis in the Cockcroft Report (DES, 1982) upon practical work in mathematics, 
and more recently in the National Curriculum for Mathematics (DfEE, 1999) upon 
experimental work in statistics and probability, may be appropriate but alone it is seriously 
insufficient. I suggest that such practical experimentation needs to be accompanied by 
structured questioning from the teacher, and focused discussion between learners.
Learners need guidance to help them to focus their attention productively upon aspects of 
randomness, but they also need guided discussion to help them develop both the language 
and the underlying concepts with which to think productively about randomness. Here I 
am drawn back to my discussion in Chapter 3 of learning from constructivist and 
Vygostkian perspectives. In my study, some interviewees did not appear to have discussed 
experiments with random generators with their peers. Their understanding of the language 
of uncertainty, and particularly their use of words like random, fair, chance, luck, seemed 
unfamiliar and rather vague. Concepts such as variation and distribution were only rarely 
mentioned. Learners need time to experience the uncertainty that arises when they need to 
make judgements about random processes based upon small samples, and they need to be 
encouraged to discuss their experiences with the teacher, and later with one another, using 
mathematical and statistical words to describe the underlying concepts.
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Finally, I suggest that the findings of this study have implications for classroom activities 
with random generators. It is dangerous to make assumptions about how much pupils 
understand about randomness, probability, and about random generators. Several 
interviewees in this study showed surprising lapses of understanding: for example, Lara, 
who was studying statistics at AS level, lacked confidence in using the language of 
uncertainty, and Claire did not know the mathematical meaning of ‘random’. There is a 
natural assumption that a physical random generator will be symmetrical, but, where the 
process was asymmetrical, interviewees often did not know how to take account of this.
For many interviewees, there was an important period of interaction between collection of 
data about outcomes and inspecting the physical generating process, during which they 
speculated about the effect of the physical characteristics of the process upon the observed 
outcomes.
I suggest that, in pupils’ early experiences of experimenting with random processes, it is 
important that learners are allowed and encouraged to inspect the generating process, to 
consider whether a model of randomness is appropriate, and to discuss their view with 
peers. It is also important that pupils are introduced, at an appropriate time, to some 
generating processes that cannot be easily modelled by a probability model based upon a 
set of equally likely outcomes. It is through consideration of such ‘unfair’ generators that 
learners can begin to develop an awareness of degrees of randomness, and to speak about 
this. From an appreciation of degrees of randomness, pupils can begin to consider ways of 
applying their mental model of randomness to a wider variety of contexts, and to consider 
more carefully the relationship between deterministic contexts and randomness.
Classroom discussion about whether and under what circumstances the event of scoring a 
winning goal in the final minute of a critical football match could be modelled using 
randomness could allow learners to consider the role of causal factors in the predictability 
or unpredictability of such an event. Then perhaps an appropriately designed computer
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modelling tool might be introduced to enable learners to build a representation of their 
random model for this event. Of course, even in a computer simulation, the random 
generator should be open to inspection, discussion and amendment by the learner.
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